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NTSB Safety Study - Glass Cockpit Avionics in Light Aircraft (SS1001)
Reproduced for study. Always verify against the official GACAR at gaca.gov.sa.
Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics
into Light Aircraft
Safety Study
NTSB/S S-01/10
PB20 10-917001
National
Transportation
Safety Board
NTSB /SS-10/ 01
PB2010-917001
Notation 795 4A
Adopted March 9, 2010
Safety Study
Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light Aircraft
National
Transportation
Safety Board
490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2010. Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics into Light
Aircraft . Safety Study NTSB/SS -10/01. Washington, DC.
Abstract: This study used manufacturer records, aircraft investigation information, and a tailored subset
of general aviation activity survey data to assess how the transition to electronic primary flight display
(PFD) avionics has affected the safety of light aircraft. The study also evaluated the resources and
requirements supporting the transition to this new technology. The results of this study suggest that, for
the aircraft and time period studied, the introductio n of glass cockpit PFDs has not yet resulted in the
anticipated improvement in safety when compared to similar aircraft with conventional instruments.
Advanced avionics and electronic displays can increase the safety potential of general aviation aircraft
operations by providing pilots with more operational and safety -related information and functionality, but
more effort is needed to ensure that pilots are prepared to realize that potential. The Federal Aviation
Administration ( FAA) , manufacturers, aviatio n industry groups, and academia have an established history
of collaboration through the FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS ) program initiative for supporting
aircraft model -specific and scenario -based training techniques that would teach pilots “higher -order
thinking skills.” However, the FAA has changed the focus of the FITS initiative and has to date relied on manufacturers and commercial vendors to deliver the equipment -specific training originally envisioned
for FITS. Adoption of uniform equipment -specific training elements by the FAA to ensure pilots have
adequate knowledge of aircraft equipment operation and malfunctions, as well as improved reporting of
equipment malfunctions and service difficulties, is likely to improve the safety of general aviation
operations beyond those involving aircraft with glass cockpit displays. However, such actions are
particularly important in order to achieve the potential safety benefits associated with advanced cockpit
technologies in light aircraft.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent f ederal agency dedicated to promoting
aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is
mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents,
determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recomm endations, study transportation safety issues, and
evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The NTSB makes public its
actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations,
and statistical reviews.
Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Internet at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about
available publications also may be obtained from the website or by contacting:
National Transportation Safety Board
Records Management Division, CIO -40
490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594
(800) 877- 6799 or (202) 314- 6551
NTSB publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical
Informat ion Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB2010 -917001 from:
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, Virginia 22161
(800) 553- 6847 or (703) 605- 6000
The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 4 9 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence
or use of NTSB reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter
mentioned in the report.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
i Contents
Figures ........................................................................................................................................... iii
Abbreviated Terms ........................................................................................................................v
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Background .................................................................................................................1
Introduction of Glass Cockpit Displays into Light Aircraft ............................................................1
History of Advanced Cockpit Avionics ...........................................................................................4
Advanced Avionics in General Aviation ...................................................................................4
Previous Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................5
General Aviation Research to Date ..................................................................................................7
General Aviation Safety Record ......................................................................................................8
Chapter 2: Study Design and Methodology ...............................................................................11
Study Design Issues .......................................................................................................................11
Methodology ..................................................................................................................................12
Study Aircraft Fleet .................................................................................................................13
Activity Survey .......................................................................................................................14
Accident Data .........................................................................................................................15
Analyses .........................................................................................................................................15
Statistical Comparisons ..........................................................................................................16
Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis Results ..................................................................................18
Description of Study Fleet .............................................................................................................18
Description of Study Accidents .....................................................................................................19
Accident Information .....................................................................................................................19
Accident Involvement .............................................................................................................20
Accident Severity ....................................................................................................................21
Activity, Exposure Data, and Accident Rates ................................................................................22
Flight Conditions ...........................................................................................................................25
Time of Day ............................................................................................................................25
Weather Conditions .................................................................................................................27
Flight Plan Filed .....................................................................................................................28
Purpose of Flight ............................................................................................................................29
Planned Length of Flight ........................................................................................................31
Phase of Flight ........................................................................................................................32
Accident Event Type ...............................................................................................................33
Accident Pilot Information ............................................................................................................34
Number of Pilots .....................................................................................................................34
Pilot Age .................................................................................................................................34
Pilot Certificate Level .............................................................................................................35
Pilot Instrument Rating ...........................................................................................................35
Pilot Flight Hours ...................................................................................................................36
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
ii Summary of Quantitative Analysis Results ...................................................................................37
Chapter 4: Qualitative Assessment ............................................................................................40
FAA Requirements and Guidance Materials .................................................................................40
Equipment -Specific Training .........................................................................................................41
Manufacturer Training Programs and Materials ............................................................................43
Aircraft Manufacturers ...........................................................................................................43
Avionics Manufacturers ..........................................................................................................44
Insurance Requirements .................................................................................................................44
Chapter 5: Case Study Review ...................................................................................................46
Pilot Expectations Regarding Glass Cockpit Displays ..................................................................46
Equipment Design and Reliability .................................................................................................48
Standardization of Instrument Design and Operation ....................................................................51
Interpretation of Equipment Malfunctions .....................................................................................54
Equipment -Specific Training .........................................................................................................56
Tracking E quipment Function and Reliability ...............................................................................58
Chapter 6: Data Recording in Glass Cockpit Avionics ............................................................61
Chapter 7: Discussion ..................................................................................................................64
Accident I nvolvement and Accident Rates ....................................................................................64
Safety Issues ...................................................................................................................................65
Training Resources and Requirements ...................................................................................65
Providing Pilots with Information about Display Operation and Limitations ........................66
Equipment -Specific Training Requirements ...........................................................................67
Equipment Malfunction Training ...........................................................................................68
Tracking Service Difficulties and Equipment Malfunctions ..................................................69
Summary .......................................................................................................................................70
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................71
Findings ..........................................................................................................................................71
Recommendations ........................................................................................................................72
Appendix: Study Accidents .........................................................................................................74
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iii Figures
Figure 1. Example of a light aircraft conventional cockpit. ........................................................... 3
Figure 2. Example of a light aircraft glass cockpit. ....................................................................... 3
Figure 3. Annual general aviation accident and fatal accident totals, 1999 –2008. ........................ 9
Figure 4. Annual general aviation accident and fatal accident rates, 1999 –2008. ....................... 10
Figure 5. General aviation and on- demand Part 135 average annual flight hours by age of
aircraft, 2006. ................................................................................................................................ 12
Figure 6. New registrations of aircraft study fleet by cockpit display configuration and year. ... 18
Figu re 7. Accumulated study aircraft fleet size by cockpit configuration and year. .................... 19
Figure 8. Distribution of glass cockpit cohort aircraft and accidents per year. ............................ 21
Figure 9. Comparison of study accidents by severity of outcome. .............................................. 22
Figure 10. Compa rison of study accidents by time of day. .......................................................... 26
Figure 11. Combined 2006 and 2007 flight hour distribution by time of day and cockpit
configuration. ................................................................................................................................ 26
Figure 12. Comparison of study accidents by weather. ............................................................... 27
Figure 13. Combined 2006 and 2007 flight hour distribution by weather and cockpit
configuration. ................................................................................................................................ 28
Figure 14. Comparison of study accidents by flight plan filed. ................................................... 29
Figure 15. Comparison of study accidents by purpose of flight. ................................................. 30
Figure 16. Combined 2006 and 2007 flight hour distribution by purpose of flight and cockpit
configuration. ................................................................................................................................ 31
Figure 17. Comparison of study accidents by phase of flight. ..................................................... 32
Figure 18. Comparison of study accidents by event type and aircraft configuration. ................. 33
Figure 19. Comparison of number of pilots aboard study accident aircraft. ................................ 34
Figure 20. Comparison of study accident pilots by certificate le vel. ........................................... 35
Figure 21. Comparison of study accident pilots by instrument rating. ........................................ 36
Figure 22. Illustration of a conventional airspeed indicator mechanism, copied from the FAA
Instrument Flying Handbook . ....................................................................................................... 52
Figure 23. Illustrations of the internal mechanisms that drive analog attitude and heading
indicator instruments, copied from the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge . ...... 53
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
iv Figure 24. Illustration of an AHRS, copied from the FAA Pilot’ s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge..................................................................................................................................... 54
Figure 25. FAA instrument rating knowledge test sample: instrument malfunction interpretation
(pitot tube intake and drain blockage). ......................................................................................... 55
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v Abbreviated Terms
AC advisory circular
ADAHRS Air Data Attitude Heading Reference System
AERI Airmanship Education Research Initiative
AFM aircraft flight manual
AGATE Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments
AHRS attitude and heading reference system
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ATP airline transport pilot
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
CB circuit breaker
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPS certification process study
CRT cathode ray tube
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FITS FAA Industry Training Standards
GA general aviation
GAATAA General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity and Avionics Survey
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association
GIFD Garmin Integrated Flight Display
G-LOC G-induced loss of consciousness
GPS global positioning system
IFR instrument flight rules
IMC instrument meteorological conditions
MFD multifunction flight display
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nm nautical miles
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
vi PFD primary flight display
PTS Practical Test Standards
SDR service difficulty report
SFAR special federal aviation regulation
TAA technically (also, technologically) advanced aircraft
TSO technical standard order
TSRV Transport Systems Research Vehicle
VFR visual flight rules
VMC visual meteorological conditions
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
vii Executive Summary
In a span of only a few years, the cockpits of new light aircraft have undergone a
transition from conventional analog flight instruments to digital -based electronic displays
commonly referred to as “glass cockpits.” These new displays integrate aircraft control,
autopilot, communication, navigation, and aircraft system monitoring functions, applying technology previously available only in transport -category aircraft. The enhanced function and
information capabilities of glass cockpits rep resent a significant change and potential
improvement in the way general aviation pilots monitor information needed to control their aircraft. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) initiated this study to determine if the transition to glass cock pits in light aircraft has improved the safety record of those aircraft.
Three different approaches were used in this study. First, a retrospective statistical
analysis of manufacturer records, aircraft investigation information, and activity survey data w as
conducted to compare the accident experience of recently manufactured light single- engine
airplanes equipped and not equipped with glass cockpit displays. Second, an evaluation of glass
cockpit training requirements and resources was conducted to charac terize the training and to
identify areas for potential safety improvement. Finally, accident cases were reviewed to identify
emerging safety issues associated with the introduction of glass cockpit displays into this class of
aircraft.
The statistical an alysis found that for 2002–2008, light single -engine aircraft equipped
with glass cockpit displays experienced lower total accident rates —but higher fatal accident
rates —than the same type of aircraft equipped with conventional analog instrumentation.
Acci dents involving glass cockpit aircraft were more likely to be associated with
personal/business flights, longer flights, instrument flight plans, and single -pilot operations,
while accidents involving conventional analog cockpit aircraft were more likely t o be associated
with instructional flights, shorter flights, and two -pilot operations. Accident pilots flying glass
cockpit equipped aircraft were found to have higher levels of pilot certification and more total
flight experience than those flying convent ional aircraft.
The evaluation of light aircraft glass cockpit training requirements found that the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) has been updating training handbooks and test standards to
incorporate generic information about electronic flight ins trument displays. However, current
airman knowledge written tests (such as private pilot, instrument rating, commercial pilot, and
flight instructor certificates) do not assess pilots’ knowledge of the functionality of glass cockpit
displays. In addition, the FAA has no specific training requirements for pilots operating glass
cockpit -equipped light aircraft. The lack of equipment -specific training requirements from the
FAA results in a wide range of initial and recurrent training experiences among pilots o f glass
cockpit aircraft. With the exception of training provided by airframe manufacturers with the purchase of a new aircraft, pilots must currently seek out and obtain equipment -specific glass
cockpit training on their own.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
viii The review of accidents invo lving light aircraft equipped with glass cockpits found that
pilots’ experiences and training in conventional cockpits do not prepare them to safely operate
the complex and varied glass cockpit systems being installed in light aircraft today. Further, the lack of information provided to pilots about glass cockpit systems may lead them to misunderstand or misinterpret system failures. As a result, there is a need for new training
procedures and tools to ensure that pilots are adequately prepared to safely operate aircraft equipped with glass cockpit avionics.
The results of this study suggest that the introduction of glass cockpits has not resulted in
a measurable improvement in safety when compared to similar aircraft with conventional instruments. The analy ses conducted during the study identified safety issues in two areas:
• The need for pilots to have sufficient equipment -specific knowledge and
proficiency to safely operate aircraft equipped with glass cockpit avionics .
• The need to capture maintenance and operational information in order to assess
the reliability of glass cockpit avionics in light aircraft.
As a result of this safety study, the NTSB made six recommendations to the FAA: five
address training requirements and one address es reporting requireme nts.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
1 Chapter 1: Background
Introduction of Glass Cockpit Displays into Light Aircraft
In a span of only a few years, the cockpits of light aircraft1 have undergone a transition
from conventional flight instruments to integrated, computerized di splays commonly referred to
as glass cockpits.2 This change has occurred rapidly . Glass cockpit avionics first started to appear
in light aircraft as noncertified systems installed in experimental and amateur -built aircraft.
Cirrus Design Corporation began the transition to glass cockpits in Federal Aviation
Administration ( FAA )-certified light aircraft in 2003 when it started delivering single -engine
piston airplanes with electronic primary flight displays (PFD). The new disp lays quickly became
standard equipment in the company’s SR20 and SR22 models. Cessna Aircraft Company, Piper Aircraft Incorporated, Mooney, and Hawker Beechcraft soon followed, and data from the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) indicate th at by 2006, more than 90
percent of new piston- powered, light airplanes were equipped with full glass cockpit displays.
In addition to flight instruments, the previously separate components for autopilot, communication, navigation, and aircraft systems ha ve been integrated into glass cockpit displays
to provide flight management, terrain and traffic avoidance, enhanced/synthetic vision displays, and upset recovery functions. Autopilots and global positioning systems (GPS) in particular have become standard components in the avionics systems of light aircraft. Several manufacturers of
glass cockpit displays now produce displays with supplemental type certification for retrofit
installation in existing aircraft, suggesting that the number of aircraft equipped with full glass
cockpits will continue to grow .
This study was designed to test the hypothesis that the transition to glass cockpit avionics
in light aircraft will improve the safety of their operation. The study also sought to evaluate the
resources and requirements supporting the transition to this new technology. To accomplish these goals, this study included three separate analys es, as described in this study report: The introduction of this advanced technology into light aircraft
has brought with it a new set of potential safety concerns to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), such as equipment design and operation; pilot performance and training ; and new
accident investigation techniques.
1 The term “light aircraft” is used throughout this report in reference to aircraft with a maximum gross weight
less than 12,500 pounds and certified under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23. The statistical comparisons
included in this study were limite d to a specific group of light aircraft: the single -engine piston aircraft typically
used in general aviation operations.
2 The term “glass cockpit” refers to the use of computer screens rather than analog gauges.
3 General Aviation Airplane Shipment Repor t, End -of-Year 2006 (Washington, DC: General Aviation
Manufacturers Association, 2007) indicates that 92 percent of the 2,540 piston airplanes delivered during 2006 were
equipped with glass cockpit electronic flight displays.
4 This study was limited to fa ctory -installed cockpit displays and did not include any analyses of retrofit
installations of glass cockpit equipment.
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2 • A retrospective statistical analysis of accidents and activity data from two cohorts5
• A qualit ative review of FAA and industry training resources and requirements related to
glass cockpit displays conducted to characterize the training and identify areas for
potential safety improvement. of
recently manufactured airplanes produced with and without electronic PFDs, conducted to identify any differences in activity, accident rates, or accident circumstances associated with glass cockpit displays.
• A review of accident case studies conducted to identify emerg ing safety issues associated
with the introduction of glass cockpit displays into this class of aircraft.
Changing from conventional instruments to glass cockpit displays has created new
challenges for interface and display design with implications for th e way pilots monitor
information in the cockpit. However, the differences between conventional and glass cockpit displays extend beyond appearance (figures 1 and 2) . Each of the conventional round- dial
instruments relies on electromechanical, pneumatic, or pressure -sensitive components to
generate and display specific aircraft performance and control parameters, such as airspeed, altitude, heading, pitch and bank attitude, rate of climb, and rate of turn. In contrast, glass cockpit displays rely on computer ized systems that integrate multiple data inputs and controls. Glass
cockpit displays can present more information in the space required for conventional instrument panels, but the increase in information places greater demands on pilot attention and creat es a
risk of overloading pilots with more information than they can effectively monitor and process. The complexity of the integrated computerized systems that drive glass cockpit displays may also limit pilots’ understanding of the functionality of the underlying systems.
The typical light aircraft glass cockpit consists of at least two displays: a primary flight
display, or PFD, and a multifunction flight display (MFD). A PFD replaces individual flight instruments to display the airspeed, altitude, attitu de, and rate information that pilots use for
aircraft control.
6 As the name “multifunction” suggests, a wide range of supplementary and
status information can be selected for display on an MFD. Typical MFDs supplement or replace discrete navigation, communication, weather displays, and system status information , such as
engine and fuel gauges. They can also display navigational charts, airport diagrams, and electronic checklists. For this study, a glass cockpit aircraft is defined as having at least a PFD .
5 The term “cohort ” is used in statistics to refer to a group of subjects, in this case aircraft, that share similar
characteristics. T he aircraft cohorts in this study were all single -engine, piston- powered airplanes manufactured during
the same 5 -year period, with either glass or conventional cockpit instruments.
6 Electronic PFDs replace pressure- sensitive mechanical instruments with a n air data computer to process static
and dynamic pressure values for airspeed, altitude, and associated rate information. Computerized PFDs also replace
conventional mechanical gyroscopic flight instruments with an attitude and heading reference system (A HRS) that uses
sensors in three axes to calculate heading, attitude, and yaw information. Integrated PFD processing subsystems are
usually further integrated with aircraft autopilot and navigation systems.
7 Some light aircraft with conventional flight ins truments have been manufactured or retrofitted with MFDs and/or
GPS equipment with moving map displays. In this study, the classification of a glass cockpit is based on the primary
flight instrument display, consistent with the industry consensus definition of an integrated cockpit/flightdeck provided
in GAMA Publication 12 - Recommended Practices and Guidelines for an Integrated Cockpit/Flightdeck in a 14 CFR
Part 23 Airplane: “…at a minimum, an integrated cockpit/flightdeck must include electronic display and control of all
primary airplane airspeed, altitude and attitude instruments, and all essential navigation and communication functions.” See <
http://www.gama.aero/files/gama_publication_12_p23cockpit_april_2005_pdf_498cadb978.pdf >.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
Figure 1. Example of a light aircraft conventional cockpit.
Figure 2. Example of a light aircraft glass cockpit.
NTSB accident investigators now encounter glass cockpit -equipped aircraft more
frequently than in the past, and the onboard data recording capabilities in many of these displays
have enabled investigators to obtain detailed recordings that document specific actions, events,
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
4 or equipment operations that would not be available with conventional instruments. However,
not all manufacturers include recording capabilities in their equipment, so these records are not
always available. Further, conventional analog instruments can be physically examined8 for
indications of preaccident operation, but the software -based systems that drive electronic
displays leave no evidence to indicate how they were functioning before or during an accident unless data are intentionally recorded.
History of Advanced Cockpit Avionics
Electronic flight displays were first developed for military applications in the 1960s, and
by the 1970s, computer -driven cathode ray tube (CRT) displays began replacing
electromechanical instruments in commercial transport- category airplanes. The use of CRTs led
to the moniker “gla ss cockpit,” which is still commonly applied to aircraft that incorporate
digital flight displays, even though lighter weight , liquid -crystal -display or light- emitting diode
technologies have replaced CRTs.
In 1974, the National Aeronautics and Space Admi nistration (NASA) started testing a full
glass cockpit in a specially equipped Boeing 737 as part of the Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) project. The typical transport -category airplane cockpit at that time was crowded
with more than 100 instrume nts and gauges. Integrated displays were developed in conjunction
with increased automation as a means of reducing some crew tasks and combining aircraft control, position, and status information into a few space -saving displays.
Although the airframe and engine systems in light aircraft are not nearly as complex, the
glass cockpit displays now being used i n these aircraft share similarities with their transport -
category predecessors, such as integrated flight management and autopilot functions, communications, and detailed navigation displays. The range of features offered in the cockpit displays that are n ow being introduced into light aircraft has moved ahead of many of their
transport -category counterparts to include infrared imaging systems, synthetic vision, highway -
in-the-sky navigation, and upset recovery capabilities. Much of NASA’s
TSRV work made its way into the design of cockpits of civilian transport -category aircraft with
the introduction of the Boeing 757/767.
Advanced Avionics in General Av iation
Much of the research leading to the recent introduction of glass cockpit displays into light
aircraft developed from the NASA -sponsored Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments
(AGATE) consortium. In response to decreasing general aviation ac tivity and aircraft sales
during the 1980s and 1990s, NASA, the FAA, the general aviation industry, and academia joined
8 Such evidence includes rotational scoring on gyros or witness marks from needles hitting the face of instrument
displays during impact.
9 Chapter 6 of this report contains more discussion of data recording functions in electronic flight displays.
10 L. E. Wallace, Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley Boeing 737 Flying Laboratory , NASA
SP-4216 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautic s and Space Administration, 1994).
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
5 to form AGATE as the first step in pursuit of a new transportation system based on light aircraft.
The goal of AGATE was to develop new and affordable airframe and avionics technology, certification methods, and flight training systems for the next generation of light aircraft used in general aviation by adapting technology previously available only in transport -category aircraft
operated by commercial airlines.
11 At the core of the initiative was the vision of replacing short -
haul, intercity air carrier flights with personal flights in small aircraft that would be so easy to fly that almost anyone “could get in, select a destination, and go” with minimal training and expense.
12 AGATE -sponsored research resulted in new certification and design guidelines for
affordable composite materials, cockpit displays, and avionics that are now used in such airplanes as the Cirrus Design Corporation SR20/ 22 series, the Diamond Aircraft DA40 series,
and new models of very light jets.
With the introduction of this new technology, the FAA and aircraft ma nufacturers
anticipated a need to provide specific training for general aviation pilots transitioning from
conventionally equipped aircraft to those with digital flight displays. To that end, the FAA
worked with academic and industry partners like the Embr y-Riddle Aeronautical University, the
University of North Dakota, and participating manufacturers to develop the FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS) program . The original FITS program plan advocated aircraft type -
specific training and the use of scenari o-based techniques to teach pilots the “higher -order
thinking skills” required to safely operate high performance aircraft with advanced automation capabilities. To date, several manufacturers and national training providers have developed FITS -
accepted tr aining courses. In addition, the FAA is incorporating FITS principles, such as
scenario -based training, decision -making techniques, and learner -centered grading, into its
training materials. Using a similar collaborative approach, the FAA has also worked closely with
manufacturers and industry groups to produce new and/or updated manuals that discuss electronic flight displays. Such manuals include the Advanced Avionics Handbook , The AGATE program ended in 2001 before the real -world
effects of many of these changes could be assessed.
14 Instrument
Flying Handbook,15 and Pilot’ s Handbook of Aer onautical Knowledge .16
Previous Lessons Learned
The applicability of air carrier experience may be limited due to the diversity in general
aviation equipment, operations, and pilot population. Nevertheless, the large body of research
into human- machine inte raction and aircraft control issues stemming from the increase in flight
11 E. M. Bolen, p resident of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, statement before the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, U.S. Senate Commerce Committee (April 24, 2001).
12 “Affordable Alternative T ransportation: AGATE – Revitalizing General Aviation,” NASA Facts , July 2,
1996, FS-1996- 07-02-LaRC (Hampton, Virginia: National Aeronautics and Space Administration , 1996), available
at <http://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/factsheets/AGATE.html > (accessed September 1, 2009).
13 K. Gale, The Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments (AGATE) Alliance, AGATE Alliance
Commercialization Impact Report, 1995- 2000 , NASA AGATE -WP 12.0- 120011- 114 (San Francisco, California:
STARnet, 2002).
14 Advanced Avionics Handbook , FAA -H-8083- 6 (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, 2009).
15 Instrument Flying Handbook , FAA -H-8083- 15A (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Federal Aviation
Administration, AFS -600: 2008).
16 Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge , FAA -H-8083- 25A (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Federal
Aviation Administration, AFS -600: 2008).
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
6 deck automation in transport -category aircraft during the 1980s and 1990s holds lessons for what
can be expected in light aircraft. In general, advances in automated control systems h ave led to
substantial improvements in equipment reliability and have increased the precision of complex
aircraft control functions. Airlines quickly realized that glass cockpit avionics , and the automated
control and flight management functions that accom panied them, would increase efficiency and
decrease operating costs. New displays also provided crews with far more status and planning information. Further, glass cockpit displays are generally lighter and cheaper to maintain than the multiple systems the y replaced, and the integration of automation with aircraft systems allowed
aircraft to be certified for operation with a two -person crew.
Flight crew response to the new technology was also for the most part positive. However,
the overall effect of incr eased automation and system integration was to shift workload from task
performance to the higher level cognitive tasks of planning and systems monitoring. The new
technology generally reduced workload demands on the crew, but in some cases, the greatest reductions occurred during times when workload was already low. In addition, crews began
reporting that glass cockpit equipment could actually increase workload during emergencies and times of high demand because they were often forced to reconfigure the na vigation and flight
management systems in flight to modify routing or approach information.
18 Pilot reports and
observational research also identified crew difficulties when transitioning to glass cockpit aircraft
19 and occasional confusion with the operation of integrated systems, even among pilots
who reported feeling as though they understood their systems well.20
Even before electronic displays became common, anecdotal reports from flight crews, as
well as findings from accidents and research, revealed po tential problems if pilots relied too
heavily on automated systems or if they misunderstood automated system behavior.
21 In its
findings of probable cause on the 1984 Scandinavian Airlines accident at John F. Kennedy Airport,
Apply the findings of behavioral research programs and accident/incident investigations
regarding degradation of pilot performance as a result of autom ation to modify pilot the NTSB identified the crew’s over-reliance on the aircraft auto throttle system and
issued the following recommendation to the FAA:
17 A presidential task force d etermined in 1981 that transport -category aircraft such as the MD80 and Boeing
757/767 could be safely flown with only a two -person crew because automation could be used to replace flight
engineer duties. See J. L. McLucas, F. J. Drinkwater, and H. W. Leaf , Report of the President ’s Task Force on
Aircraft Crew Complement (Washington, DC: 1981).
18 E. L. Wiener, Human Factors and Advanced Technology (Glass Cockpit) Transport Aircraft , NASA -TR
177528 (NASA Ames Research Center: National Aeronautics and Space A dministration, 1989).
19 N. B. Sarter, D. D. Woods, and C. E. Billings, “Automation Surprises,” G. Salvendy, ed., Handbook of
Human Factors and Ergonomics , 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1997).
20 N. B. Sarter and D. D. Woods, “How in the World Did We Get Into Th at Mode? Mode Error and Awareness
in Supervisory Control,” Human Factors, vol. 37 (1995), pp. 5- 19.
21 For example, see E. L. Wiener and R. E. Curry, Flight- Deck Automation Promises and Problems ,
NASA- TM-81206 (NASA Ames Research Center: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1980).
22 Scandinavian Airlines System, Flight 90, McDonnell Douglas DC -10-30, John F. Kennedy International
Airport, Jamaica, New York, February 28, 1984, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR -84/15 (Washington, DC:
Nation al Transportation Safety Board, 1984).
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
7 training programs and flight procedures so as to take full advantage of the safety benefits
of automation technology. (A -84-123)23
Subsequent fatal air carrier accidents, like the April 26, 1994, crash of a China Airlines
Airbus 300- 600 in Nagoya, Japan, and the December 20, 1995, American Airlines Boeing 757
crash near Cali, Colombia, drew further attention to the issues of human interaction with
computerized aircraft systems, cockpit displays, and associated data input and communicati on
functions. In response to these issues, the FAA commissioned a comprehensive review of crew
interfaces with advanced flight deck systems. Among the findings were such vulnerabilities as the flight crews’ inadequate understanding of complex flight deck s ystems and their occasionally
inappropriate decisions about how and when to use automation.
A 2001 study conducted by the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory
25 examined
how the Army’s move to glass cockpits had affected safety in real -world flight operations. The
study analyzed accident rates of four models of helicopters with conventional and glass cockpit
configurations. Study results indicated a significantly higher accident rate for the glass cockpit
configuration group than for the conventional cockpit group. The authors suggested that the findings provided reason for concern and discussed several possible reasons for the difference,
including the possibilit y that concurrent mission and equipment changes rather than cockpit design
alone contributed to higher accident rates. Subsequent survey research suggested that even though
pilots preferred the glass cockpit design and believed it improved safety, they fou nd learning to use
the displays and maintain ing their proficiency to be more difficult and reported issues of higher
cognitive workload in glass cockpit aircraft than in those with a conventional design.
General Aviation Research to Date
Less research is available specific to the safety consequences of glass cockpit avionics in
light aircraft, mostly due to their recent introduction and a general lack of available data. In
2003, a joint FAA and industry group published a study of technically advanced aircr aft (TAA)
issues27
23 Closed in 1991, “Acceptable Alternate Action,” based on several actions by the FAA that included
(1) collaborating with NASA and aviation industry representatives in the development of a comprehensive National Plan
for Aviation Human Factors ; (2) issuing Advisory Circular (AC) 120 -35B, Line Operational Simulations: Line -Oriented
Flight Training, Special Purpose Operational Training, Line Operational Evaluation ; and (3) issuing an advanced
qualification program specia l federal aviation regulation (SFAR) establishing alternative methods of complying with
training requirements of 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 to incorporate advanced training methods and techniques. based on subject matter expert evaluations and reviews of case studies using the Human
24 K. Abbott and others, The Interface Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems, Federal Aviation
Administration Human Factors Team Report (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, 1996).
25 C. Rash and others, Accident Rates in Glass Cockpit Model U.S. Army Rotary -Wing Aircraft, Army
Aeromedical Res earch Lab oratory Final Report (Fort Rucker, Alabama: U.S. Army Aeromedical Research
Laboratory , 2001).
26 C. Rash and others, A Comparison of AH -64 Pilot Attitudes Toward Traditional and Glass Cockpit
Crewstation Designs, Army Aeromedical Research Lab orator y Final Report (Fort Rucker, Alabama: U.S. Army
Aeromedical Research Lab oratory , 2002).
27 General Aviation Technically Advanced Aircraft, FAA -Industry Safety Study: Final Report of TAA Safety Study Team,
<http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/research/media/TAA Final Report.pdf > (Washington, DC: Federal
Aviation Administration, 2003 ). This report defines a TAA as follows: “A General Aviation aircraft that contains the
following design features: Advanced automated cockpit such as MFD or PFD or other variations of a Glass Cockpit, or a
traditional cockpit with GPS navigation capability, moving map display and autopilot.”
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8 Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) .28
A 2005 analysis by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety
Foundation The study was prompted by an industry
observation that accident numbers for TAAs were no better than for conventionally equipped
aircraft —contrary to expectation. Most safety problems identified in the study were attributed to
pilot judgment errors rather than issues associated with pilot -equipment interaction.
Unfortunately, findings from the study ar e of limited applicability to the current generation of
aircraft because none of the accident aircraft included in the study was equipped with a PFD.
29 came to conclu sions similar to those in the 2003 FAA report and concluded that the
TAA accident record at the time was generally similar to that of legacy aircraft. Like the FAA’s TAA study, the report attributed most accidents to faulty pilot judgment rather than probl ems
with the avionics or the pilot -aircraft interface. In a 2007 followup study,
30 the AOPA Air Safety
Foundation compared accidents involving TAAs to general aviation accidents from 2003 through 2006. This study suggested that the number of TAAs involved i n accidents was smaller than
would be expected , given the percentage of these aircraft in the overall population: while TAAs
made up 2.8 percent of the aircraft fleet, they were involved in 1.5 percent of total accidents and 2.4 percent of fatal accidents. Additional results suggested that differences in aircraft usage might
have contributed to the distribution of accidents. For example, the percentage of accidents involving weather was higher for TAAs, and the percentage of accidents during takeoff and climb was lower.
General Aviation Safety Record These findings would be expected if the TAAs were used for long distance,
point -to-point flying rather than primary flight training. The AOPA studies were limited because
comparisons were made to the diverse group of aircraft used in general aviation operations, and
the flight- hour or usage data needed to determine differences in exposure or to verify the
resulting conclusions were not available.
The annual number of general aviation accidents, fatal accidents, and fatalities occurring
in the United States has been decreasing for many years. In 2008, U.S. general aviation
experienced the lowest number of fatal accidents and its second -lowest number of total accidents
since 1944.32
28 For an explanation of the HF ACS classification, see S. A. Shappell and D. A. Wiegmann, The Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System —HFACS, DOT/FAA/AM -00/7 (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation
Administration, 2000). As shown in figure 3, annual gene ral aviation accident and fatal accident totals
29 Technically Advanced Aircraft: Safety and Training (Fred erick, Maryland: Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, Air Safety Foundation, 2005).
30 Technically Advanced Aircraft: Safety and Training (Frederick, Maryland: Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, Air Safety Foundation, 2007).
31 The AOPA Air Safety Fo undation report was based on data extracted from the NTSB’s aviation accident
database; however, the reported accident categories are assigned by Air Safety Foundation analysts and may differ
from the NTSB findings of probable cause.
32 Based on data compil ed from Annual Review of U.S. General Aviation Accidents Occurring in Calendar Year
1968 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1969); Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data, U.S.
General Aviation Accidents Calendar Year 1979, NTSB/ARG- 81-1 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety
Board, 1981); Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data, U.S. General Aviation Accidents Calendar Year 1989, NTSB/ARG -93/01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1993); and National Transport ation Safety
Board, Aviation Accident Statistics: Accidents, Fatalities, and Rates, 1989– 2008, U.S. General Aviation (available at
<
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table10.htm >).
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9 declined from 1999 through 2008. Without any additional information, such as activity data, this
trend might be interpreted as being due in part to the introduction of new, advanced aircraft technologies.
Figure 3. Annual general aviation accident and fatal accident totals, 1999– 2008.
However, general aviation activity has also been decreasing. Normalizing the number of
accidents by annual exposure data—in this case, the FAA’s annual general aviation flight hour estimates —results in a rate that more accurately represents safety risk.
33 See chapter 2, Study Design and Methodology, for a detailed discussion of the FAA’s General Aviation and
Air Taxi Activity and Avionics (GAATAA) Survey. In contrast to annual
accident totals, general aviation accident rates and fatal accident rates per 100,000 flight hours have remained relatively steady over the last decade. Annual accident rates and trends from 1999
through 2008 are presented in figure 4.
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Figure 4. Annual general aviation accident and fatal accident rates, 1999– 2008.
It should be noted that the diversity of aircraft, operations, and pilots comprising U.S.
general aviation can easily mask localized safety issues and trends. Further, most analyses of
aggregate activity and accident data lack the specificity and detail necessary to assess the effect of glass cockpits. Therefore, this study compared cohorts comprising conventional and glass
cockpit aircraft of similar age and type, and a corresponding subset of activity data for both cohorts, to better assess how the introduction of glass cockpit display technology into light aircraft has affected the safe operation of those aircraft.
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11 Chapter 2: Study Design and Methodology
To determine how the introduction of glass cockpit avionics has affected the safe
operation of light aircraft, the NTSB conducted both qua ntitative and qualitative assessments, as
well as a case study review. The goals for the quantitative portion of this study were to identify
any differences in the operational characteristics of conventional and glass cockpit aircraft and to determine how the introduction of glass cockpit avionics into light aircraft has affected safety.
These goals were accomplished by comparing the accident records of two cohorts of airplanes
produced during the 5 years from 2002 to 2006, as well as aircraft activity and usage data
collected from 2 years of owner surveys. The cohorts selected had similar airframes, number s of
engines, and engine types but differed principally in their type of primary flight instrumentation: that is, one cohort comprised glass cockpit aircr aft and the other included aircraft equipped with
conventional displays.
For the qualitative assessment, which is discussed in chapter 4, the NTSB reviewed
changes in training, resources, and requirements associated with the transition to glass cockpit s.
To that end, the NTSB reviewed FAA and manufacturer -provided training materials, visited
aircraft manufacturers to observe factory transition training, and spoke with representatives of the aviation insurance industry about their requirements for owners and operators of glass
cockpit aircraft. For the case study review, described in chapter 5, the NTSB reviewed the
circumstances of accidents involving the glass cockpit cohort to identify safety issues unique to glass cockpit displays.
Study Design Issues
An assessment of the safety consequences of a specific aircraft equipment change is
easily confounded34 if that change is associated with differences in aircraft use, pilot
demographics, or additional equipment changes. For example, the average number of annu al
flight hours is known to decrease with aircraft age (see figure 5).35
34 A statistical confound is a variable not accounted for in statistical comparisons but correlated to study
variables in such a way that may result in misleading study findings. For example, a study may find that drownings
increase when ice cream sales increase. Without additional study controls, one might erroneously conclude that there
is a causal relationship between t hese variables. However, the confounding variable in this case is likely the time of
year because ice cream sales and swimming activity both increase during the summer months. Comparisons of newly built
aircraft with all aircraft or with older aircraft of similar type are therefore likely to mischaracterize risk exposure. New aircraft with new equipment capa bilities may also attract a
new demographic of pilots to general aviation who may use their aircraft differently than pilots flying older models.
35 General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity and Avionics Survey , 2006 (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation
Administration, 2007), < http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/CY2006/ >.
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Figure 5. General aviation and on- demand Part 135 average annual
flight hours by a ge of aircraft, 2006.
Potential confounds related to aircraft age, equipment, and usage were controlled for to
the extent possible36
Methodology in the present study by identifying groups of similar aircraft of similar age,
with and without glass cockpits, and then gat hering the information necessary to further identify
any differences in use or user population.
Quantitative data analyses in the current study included (1) a comparison of specified
aircraft models manufactured during the 5 years from 2002 through 2006, the years that spanned
the transition of the fleet from conventional to glass cockpit displays, (2) statistical comparisons
of retrospective accident data for the years 2002 through 2008 by display type, and (3) a comparison of aircraft and fli ght activity data obtained from the FAA aircraft registry and an
analysis of GAATAA Survey data for the years 2006 and 2007.
36 The models of aircraft included in the study vary to some degree with regard to performance, range, and
capability, but the study fleet represents a more homogenous group of aircraft than is typical of general aviation
operations as a whole. Aircraft cockpit display
configuration was determined using aircraft manufacturer records. All accident data were
extracted from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database. Study analyses were limited to accidents involving U.S.- registered aircraft.
37 The FAA conducts an annual survey of aircraft owners to generate information on general aviation and
on-demand Part 135 aircraft use and activity. The stated purposes of the survey are to (1) anticipate and meet
demand for National Airspace System facilities and services, (2) evaluate the im pact of safety initiatives and
regulatory changes, and (3) build more accurate measures of the safety of the general aviation community.
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13 The NTSB wor ked with GAMA and individual manufacturers to identify the airplanes of
interest manufactured from 2002 through 2006 and to classify the instrumentation of each
airframe by serial number. Once this study fleet was identified, the NTSB worked with the FAA
and its survey contractor to generate activity estimates from the survey responses collected from
owners of those aircraft, grouped by type of cockpit display. The resulting activity estimates derived from the subset of GAATAA Survey data from 2006 and 2007 were used along with
NTSB Aviation Accident Database records to develop accident rate measures by cockpit display type for those years.
The period of study represented a unique window of opportunity during which both the
aircraft equipment information and activity records necessary to compare similar aircraft , both
with and without glass cockpits , were available. Before the FAA changed its GAATAA S urvey
methodology in 2006, the activity data needed to compare newly manufactured aircraft were
insufficient .
Study Aircraft Fleet Similarly, such comparisons will become increasingly challenging in the future
due to the growing number of glass cockpit retrofit options, which will make it difficult to
readily identify aircraft equipped with this technology.
The NTSB Aviation Accident Database does not contain sufficient detail to identify
accident aircraft by both year of manufacture and cockpit equipment. The NTSB therefore used
supplemental data available in the FAA aircraft registry, which includes build d ate information.
Because some of these data are missing, the NTSB worked with GAMA and aircraft
manufacturers to identify —by serial number —single -engine piston airplanes manufactured in
the 5 years from 2002 through 2006 and the cockpit display configurati on of each aircraft. In
addition to being selected because they bridged the introduction of PFDs into this group of
aircraft, the years 2002− 2006 were selected because they were covered by an expanded sampling
methodology introduced in the 2006 GAATAA Survey, which included contacting the owners of
all aircraft manufactured during the preceding 5 years for participation in the survey .
Once the list of aircraft was compiled, that information was used to summarize the data
and compare accident involvement by cockpit display type. Aircraft selected for the study
included the following makes and models of airplanes manufactured between 2002 and 2006.
• Cessna Aircraft Corporation
• 172
• 182 series
• 206 series
38 Starting with the 2006 survey, the FAA modified its GAATAA Survey methodology to include a 100 -percent
sample of airc raft manufactured during the preceding 5 years. In comparison, the 2005 survey sampled only about
16 percent of single -engine piston airplanes. The final number of valid survey responses was still limited, however, by
aircraft owners who declined to participate and aircraft that were subsequently exported, destroyed, or otherwise inactive.
For specific details associated with the sampling methodology used in previous surveys, see the 2005 GAATAA Survey,
appendix A, < http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/CY2005/ >. Washington, DC:
Federal Aviation Administration, 2006.
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14 • Cirrus Design Corporation
• SR20
• SR22
• Diamond Aircraft
• DA40
• Lancair/Columbia Aircraft /Cessna Aircraft Company
• 300/35039
• Mooney and 400
• M20 series
• Piper Aircraft Inc.
• PA-28-161
• PA-28-181
• PA-28-201
• PA-32-301 series
• PA-46-350P
• Hawker Beechcraft Corporation
• 36 series
A total of 8,364 airplanes were identified from FAA registry records for inclusion in the
study. Of those, 2,848 were identified for inclusion in the conventional cockpit display cohort,
and 5,516 were included in the glass cockpit cohort.
Activity Survey
As stated above, the FAA modified its GAATAA S urvey methodology in 2006 by
increasing its survey sample to include all aircraft manufactured during the preceding 5 years.
The NTSB took advantage of this change to obtain the activity and usage data necessar y to make
statistical comparisons based on cockpit display type. Working with the FAA and the contractor responsible for conducting the survey,
39 The Lancair 300 was only produced with conventional cockpit displays, but it is similar to the
Columbia/Cessna 350 produced with glass cockpit displays. the NTSB was able to obtain analyses of survey
responses from the selected aircraft models manufactured from 20 02 to 2006 that had undergone
a change in standard equipment from conventional to glass PFD cockpit displays. Limiting the sample to a group of aircraft manufactured within a 5 -year period also reduced the likelihood of
confounding effects from changes known to occur as aircraft age, such as declining levels of flight hours. The study sample was further defined to include single -engine, piston- powered
airplanes to allow direct comparisons between aircraft of relatively similar operational and performance capability.
40 The FAA conducts the GAATAA Survey under a contract with PA Consulting Group , Madison, Wisconsin .
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15 Because the 2006 survey included aircraft that were manufactured during 2006—and
therefore had not experienced a full year of operation—activity estimates for those aircraft were
also calculated from the 2007 GAATAA Survey responses. Due to the new survey sampling methodology, a total of 2,738 responses from the 2006 survey and 2,357 total responses from the
2007 survey were identified for inclusion in this study. The targeted aircraft activity and usage
data obtained for the study were similar in format and content to the published GAATAA Survey
results, with separate datasets for conventional aircraft and glass cockpit -equipped aircraft. The
NTSB conducted several summary analyses of active aircraft, flight activity, and usage data from
GAATAA S urvey responses to identify any differences associated with the type of cockpit
display.
Accident Data
Data from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database were used, along with the registration
and serial number information provided by manufacturers, to identif y aircraft in each cohort that
were involved in accidents between 2002 and 2008 and to capture the details of those accidents. NTSB accident data include details of the accident event, such as type of occurrence, phase of flight, and environmental conditi ons; pilot demographics and experience ; and accident
investigation findings.
Analyses These data were used to compare the accident experience of the two
cohorts and to make statistical comparisons of the accidents each cohort experienced.
Summary statistics were calculated to compare the aircraft cohorts on variables such as
the number of aircraft, hours flown, usage details, and accidents. For those aircraf t in the study
sample that had been involved in accidents,42 univariate comparisons w ere made between the
conventional and glass cockpit groups on the basis of data collected during the accident investigation, including accident occurrences and findings, weather and operational details, and accident pilot demographics and experience.
Statistical tests appropriate to the various accident- related variables were used to
determine the extent to which the conventional and glass cockpit cohorts differed. Because the study was targeted at a relatively
small set of aircraft, the number of comparisons that could be made between glass cockpit and conventional aircraft as a function of operational and pilot characteristics was limited by the sample sizes (number of accident cases) for each comparison.
41 See appendix for the list of accidents included in th e study.
42 Study accident analyses were limited to U .S.-registered aircraft.
43 Univariate comparisons are those that compare differences between two groups based on one variable in
isolation —for example, percentage of accidents resulting in fatality by cockpit type.
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16 Statistical Comparisons
Chi-square statistics44 were used to compare the cohorts on categorical accident variables
such as weather, time of day, and purpose of flight. Mann- Whitney U tests45
Accident flight information were used to
compare differences in continuous variables, including planned flight distance, pilot age, and
flight experience. The following variables were selected for analysis:
• Accident severity
• Planned length of flight
• Purpose of flight
• Day/night and visual meteorological conditions
• Visual/instrument meteorological conditions
• Instrument/visual flight rules flight plan
• Accident phase of flight and event details
Pilot information
• Number of pilots aboard accident aircraft
• Age at the time of the accident
• Highest certificate level
• Instrument rating
• Flight hours
44 Chi-square is a statistical test that can be used to determine whether two or more groups differ significantly
with respect to the proportional distribution of a given character istic or quality. The chi- square statistic compares the
observed counts of a categorical variable for one or more groups to those expected by the relative distribution of the
groups. The chi -square test results in a measure of significance or probability t hat the observed distributions of a
variable were similar for the study groups. A very low probab ility, such as 5 percent or less, indicates that the groups
likely differed with regard to the variable of interest.
45 Mann -Whitney U is a statistical test for assessing differences between two groups with regard to the
distribution of a continuous variable. The test results in a measure of the probability that observations of a variable
from both groups are similar, which is also an indication of whether observ ations of that variable are greater for one
group than the other.
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17 Accident rates were calculated for comparison with the applicable exposure data, such as
number of aircraft or flight hours. Standard error values were included with GAATAA S urvey
results and calculated rate comparisons when appropriate.46
The following rate comparisons were calculated:
• Accidents and fatal accidents per active aircraft
• Accidents and fatal accidents per flight hour
• Accidents and fatal accidents by time of day
• Accidents and fatal accidents by weather condition
• Accidents and fatal accidents by purpose of flight
Accident records for the 2002–2008 period covered by this study provided enough data to
make statistically reliable comparisons between the two study groups. While the activity data
were limited to 2 years of FAA surveys, the similarities between the patterns of aircraft usage reported by survey respondents and the patterns in the accident data for the 7- year study period
indicate that the accident rates derived from the activity data provide valid comparisons between
the conventional a nd glass cockpit groups.
46 Rate calculations, such as the number of accidents occurring annually per flight hour, are estimates of the
“true” rate of an event based on historical occurrences of that event. Accident rates are subject to variability due to
chance, particularly when the number of events and/or the size of the population of interest is small. The larger the
population and/or number of events being studied, the more likely it is that the computed rate will be close to the
true rate. The variability of a rate can be evaluated by computing a standard error that includes both the number of
events and the size of the denominator (for example, registered aircraft, active aircraft, or flight hours) measured. In
this report, standard error values are presented as a percentage of the associated value or rate. Rates based on small
numbers are particularly unstable, which is reflected in a high percent of standard errors. Standard error values were
either excluded f or rates based on fewer than 10 events or noted as such. Note that most of the accident rates
calculated from the 2006 and 2007 GAATAA Survey data are based on small numbers and that the resulting differences are therefore not statistically significant but are provided as possible further explanation of the
differences in the 2002 –2008 accident record for these aircraft.
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18 Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis Results
Description of Study Fleet
By comparing manufacturer aircraft serial number data with FAA aircraft registration
records, the NTSB identified 2,848 single -engine piston airplanes for the conventional cockpit
display cohort and 5,516 for the glass cockpit cohort, all manufactured between 2002 and
Figure 6 illustrates the rapidly changing distribution of the aircraft included in the study.
Most aircraft in the conventional display cohor t were manufactured between 2002 and 2004,
while aircraft in the glass cockpit cohort first appeared on the FAA registry in 2003.
Figure 6. New registrations of aircraft study fleet by cockpit display configuration
and year.
After 2004, the size of the conventional cohort remained relatively constant, while the
size of the glass cockpit cohort increased rapidly, surpassing the conventional cohort in 2005 and nearly doubling it in 2006. Figure 7 shows the accumulated size of the study fleet for each year from 2002 through 2006 and the accumulated number of aircraft in the conventional and glass cockpit cohorts each year.
47 The study aircraft fleet was identified by comparing the aircraft serial number and cockpit display data
provided by manufacturers with FAA aircraft registry data. An aircraft was included in the study fleet if it ever
appeared on the registry, regardless of whether it was subsequently deregistered or exported, or the registration later
became inactive.
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Figure 7. Accumulated study aircraft fleet size by cockpit configuration and year.
Description of Study Accidents
Study analyses of accidents included the years from 2002 through 2008. The years of
aircraft manufacture from 2002 –2006 were selected to correspond with the 2006 GAATAA
100-percent sampling methodology for newly built aircra ft. However, although the activity and
accident data included aircraft manufactured throughout 2006, the number of study aircraft did
not stabilize until the end of that year. Accident records for 2007 and 2008 were therefore included to represent 2 full y ears of accidents associated with the study aircraft, unaffected by
the addition of newly manufactured aircraft.
Accident Information
This section contains summary analyses of the relative accident occurrences and rates
associated with the conventional and glass cockpit cohorts defined in this study. Comparisons of
accident numbers are limited because aircraft can be used differently and in ways that expose one group of aircraft to more or less risk for severe accident outcomes than another. The validity of
comparisons of accidents with aircraft manufacturing and registration records is likewise limited
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20 by the possibility that aircraft may be sold, exported, deregistered, or placed in storage .48
Accident Involvement
Therefore, the accident data provided in this section should be considered within the context of
corresponding activity data. Active aircraft information, flight activity, and aircraft usage data
from the 2006 and 2007 GAATAA Surveys are presented throughout this section for comparison with FAA aircraft registry information and NTSB accident records from 2002 through 2008. Due
to the unequal cohort sizes, the aircraft and accident data are presented as percentages of the respective cohort totals to facilitate interpretation. The complete list of study accidents is
inclu ded in the appendix.
A comparison of the list of study aircraft with NTSB records identified 266 total
accidents involving study aircraft between 2002 and 2008, 62 of which resulted in one or more fatal injuries.
Comparisons of accident involvement from 2002 through 2006 must account for changes
in the size of the study fleet due to the newly manufactured aircraft added to the fleet each year.
The distribution of study aircraft and accident s associated with the glass cockpit cohort (as
shown in figure 8) shows that the percentage of accidents involving glass cockpit aircraft was
smaller than wo uld be expected based on the percentage of the study fleet that those aircraft
represented. During 2004 and 2005, fatal accidents for conventional and glass cockpit aircraft were proportional to the percentage of the study fleet they represented, but start ing in 2006, the
glass cockpit group began to experience proportionately more fatal accidents. Over the entire period from 2002 through 2008, aircraft in the glass cockpit cohort showed a disproportionately lower rate of total accidents per registered aircraft but a disproportionately higher rate of fatal accidents per registered aircraft than those i n the conventional cohort. Of the 266 study ac cidents, 141 accidents —23 of them fatal —involved
conventionally equipped aircraft. The remaining 125 total accidents and 39 fatal accidents involved glass cockpit aircraft. It is important to note that direct comparisons of the overall accident totals woul d be misleading in this case because of the changes in the sizes of the cohorts
during the time period analyzed.
48 For example, data provided by GAMA indicate that approximately 30 percent of aircraft produced in 2007
and 2008 were exported. Similar data do not exist for 2002– 2006, but the number of aircraft that remained active in
U.S. civil aviation is likely well below the 8,354 total aircraft that had appeared on the FAA aircraft registry. Further
support for this suggestion comes from the active aircraft estimate results of the 2006 and 2007 FAA GAATAA
Survey cited in table 2 of the Activity, Exposure Data, and Accident Rates section later in this chapter.
49 One accident (SEA03LA180) was excluded from study analyses because it occurred during the factory flight
test.
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a The study aircraft fleet included aircraft manufactured between 2002 and 2006; therefore, the distribution of glass
cockpit air craft in the study aircraft fleet remained constant from 2006 through 2008.
Figure 8. Distribution of glass cockpit cohort aircraft and accidents per year.
Accident Severity
Statistical comparisons of the 2002 through 2008 accident data, independent of the
registry or survey information, show similar differences in accident severity by cockpit display
type. As shown in figure 9, the percentage of accidents resulting in fatality was about twice as
high for the glass cockpit cohort as for the conventional cohort. Of the 266 accidents involving
study aircraft between 2002 and 2008, accidents involving aircraft in the glass cockpit cohort
were significantly more likely to be fatal: χ2 (1, N = 266) = 8.216, p = 0.004.50
50 Throughout this report, the results of chi -square ( χ2) statistical tests are included in the text using the
following notation (degrees of freedom, N = number of cases compared ) = resulting chi -square value, p =
probability (that is, significance) o f the result. The p value can be interpreted as the percent likelihood that the
observed value occurred by chance. Therefore, a difference that results in a small p value is unlikely to have resulted
from chance and is more likely the result of differences between the two groups. For the purposes of this study, p
values of 0.05 (5 percent) and less are considered statistically significant. Refer to table 7 at the end of this chapter
for a summary of all study chi -square statistical test results.
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Figure 9. Comparison of study accidents by severity of outcome.
In addition to the statistical comparisons of accident data from 2002 through 2008,
GAATAA Survey data were used to develop rates for the years 2006 and 2007 that represent
accident risk by providing estimates of the number of aircraft actively operated, the number of
hours flown, and specific characteristics of how those aircraft were operated. Rates based on flight activity provide a clearer indication of the relative safety of the conventional and glass
cockpit configurations by identifying differences in the number of aircraft that were actively
flying versus those that may have been sold or placed into storage, or that may have become inactive for other reasons. Differences between aircraft buyers who opted for a glass cockpit
airplane can contribute to differences in accident risk, and pilots may use aircraft differently
based on their avionics capabilities. The 2 years of available GAATAA Survey data were used to
further explore these possibilities and provide evidence of activity and usage differences to aid interpretation of the aircraft’s accident record to date.
Activity, Exposure Data, and Accident Rates
Of the 2,848 airplanes included in the conventional display cohort, 935 of the owners
responded to the 2006 GAATAA Survey, and 472 responded to the 2007 survey. Of the 5,516 aircraft in the glass cockpit cohort, 1,803 owners responded to the 2006 GAATAA Survey , and
1,885 responded to the 2007 survey. These responses were used to calculate estimates of the
number of active aircraft and total hours flown, as well as the number of hours flown by purpose of flight, day/night operations, and visual/instrument flight activity in accordance with the
51 Note that the study includes statistical comparisons of all accidents involving the study aircraft fleet from
2002 and 2008. However, GAATAA Survey data were only available for the years 2006 and 2007. No attempt was
made to apply the 2006 and 2007 survey results t o the prior years 2002 through 2005.
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23 normal GAATAA Survey methodology .52
Table 1. GAATAA Survey analysis results. Results of the active aircraft and flight hour analyses
are presented in table 1 below .
Year Active Aircraft Flight Hours
Conventional Glass Cockpit Conventional Glass Cockpit
2006 2,412 4,203 593,853 805,152
(0.2% Std. Error) (0.2% Std. Error) (2.6% Std. Error) (1.6% Std. Error)
2007 1,738a 4,205 565,370 838,573
(0.2% Std. Error) (0.2% Std. Error) (4.0% Std. Error) (1.6% Std. Error)
aThe large drop in the estimated number of active conventional aircraft in 2007 was likely due in part to
increased variability in survey estimates for this group because aircraft manufactured during 2002 were not
included in the 100- percent 2007 survey sample. This subsequently resulted in fewer total responses for aircraft
built during 2002, which were exclusively of the conventional cockpit design. The effect of this change is that the
number of conventionally equipped aircraft and their associated activity were likely higher than the survey
results indicate for 2007. The effect of this change is also evident in the higher standard error value associated
with the flight hours for the conventional cohort in 2007.
Dividing the flight hours from the GAATAA Survey by the number of active aircraft
provides an estimate of the average number of hours flown per aircraft. For the years 2006 and
2007, the average estimated hours flown per aircraft was 286 for the conventional cohort (246
hours/aircraft in 2006 and 325 hours/aircraft in 2007) and 195 for the glass cockpit cohort (192 hours/aircraft in 2006 and 199 hours/aircraft in 2007).
As illustrated in table 2, accident rates calculated from NTSB accident records and
GAATAA Survey data indicate that the 2006 and 2007 accident rates per 1,000 active aircraft were higher for the conventional displa y cohort, but the fatal rates were higher for the glass
cockpit cohort for both years.
Because the study cohorts included only a few thousand aircraft, and the numbers of total
and fatal accidents within the cohorts were relatively small each year, the 20 06 and 2007 activity
and accident data were summed for comparisons of accident rates and specific accident details to provide more stable rate estimates and to reduce the potentially distorting effect of small numbers of events on rate calculations. Even w hen using this approach, the standard errors
associated with the fatal rates are high due to the relatively small number of total events.
52 Analyses of the subset of GAATAA S urvey data were done by the contractor responsible for conducting the
survey in accordance with the established survey methodology; however , this is the first published use of a subse t of
GAATAA Survey data for targeted analyses like those included in this report.
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24 Table 2. Accident rates for 2006 and 2007 per 1,000 active aircraft, by aircraft cockpit
configuration.
Year Accident Rate Per 1,000 Active Aircraft
Total Fatal
Conventional Glass Cockpit Conventional Glass Cockpit
2006 9.12 7.85 1.24* 2.62
2007 12.08 6.9 1.15* 1.43*
Combined
2006- 2007 10.36 7.37 1.20* 2.02
(15.3% Std. Error) (12.7% Std. Error) (44.9% Std. Error) (24.3% Std. Error)
*Rate based on fewer than 10 events.
As previously stated, comparisons of accident rates based on active aircraft provide a
better indication of risk than those based on numbers of aircraft manufactured because they do
not include aircraft that were subsequently exported, placed in storage, or not flown. However, accident rates based on owner -reported flight activity provide the best indication of risk because
they include both the extent of operation and the way the aircraft was op erated. Accident rates
calculated from the survey responses regarding the number of hours flown annually are shown in
table 3, along with comparison accident rates for all general aviation operations.
Those results indicate that the total accident rate p er 100,000 flight hours was higher for
the glass cockpit cohort in 2006, but higher for the conventional cohort in 2007. The combined 2-year accident rates per 100,000 flight hours for 2006 and 2007 were similar for both the glass
and conventional cohorts (3.77 and 3.71 respectively). The total accident rate for both cohorts was less than the 6.63 accidents per 100,000 flight hours for all general aviation operations for the same period , reflecting the wide range of aircraft and flight operations included i n general
aviation.
The fatal accident rate for the glass cockpit cohort exceeded the rate of fatal accidents per
100,000 hours for the conventional cohort for both years, and for all general aviation operations
in 2006. Like the rates per active aircraft discussed previously, t he fatal rates per 100,000 flight
hours for both cohorts —especially the conventional cohort —have large standard errors due to
the small number of events . The resulting rates , however, are consistent with the results of other
study analyses , indicating that accidents involving the glass cockpit cohort were more like ly to
be fatal. The combined fatal accident rate for 2006 and 2007 was higher for the glass cockpit
cohort (1.03) than for the conventional cohort (0.43). The combined 2006 and 2007 fatal rates for both study cohorts were less than the 1.24 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours for all general aviation operations for the same period.
53 Includes all study accidents.
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25 Table 3. 2006 and 2007 accident rates per 100,000 flight hours, by cockpit configuration.
Year Accident Rate Per 100,000 Flight Hours
Total Fatal
Conventional Glass Cockpit All General
Aviation† Conventional Glass Cockpit All General
Aviation†
2006 3.70 4.10 6.33 0.51* 1.37 1.28
2007 3.71 3.46 6.92 0.35* 0.72 * 1.20
Combined
2006 -2007 3.71 3.77 6.63 0.43* 1.03 1.24
(15.3 % Std. Error) (12.7 % Std. Error) ― (44.2% Std. Error) (19.2% Std. Error) ―
*Rate based on fewer than 10 events.
†National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident Statistics: Accidents, Fatalities, and Rates, 1989 - 2008, U.S. General
Aviation. Available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table10.htm .
At the time of writing, targeted GAATAA Survey flight- hour data were not available to
calculate 2008 accident rates for the study cohorts. If the hours flown for both cohorts during
2008 were similar to the average s in 2006 and 2007, the total accident rates for both the
conventional and glass cockpit cohorts would again be less than the overall general aviation rate.
However, with 13 fatal accidents during 2008, the fatal rate of aircraft in the glass cockpit cohort in this study would well exceed both the conventional cohort and the overall general aviation fatal rates for the year.
Flight Conditions
Accident details and survey responses associated with both cohorts were compared to
identify any differences in accident circumstances, aircraft use, or pilots that could affect the severity of accident outcomes and explain the observed differences between the acci dent and
fatal accident rates for the conventional and glass cockpit cohorts. For example, accidents that occur at night or in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) have historically been more likely to result in fatality than those that occur during the day in good weather.
Time of Day
As illustrated in figure 1 0, the 2002 through 2008 accident data indicate that a higher
percentage of accidents involving aircraft in the glass cockpit group occurred at night, but the
difference was not statistically significant: χ2 (1, N = 266) = 3.058, p = 0.080.
54 For example, if total flight hours were estimated for the study groups by averaging the 2006 and 2007 survey
results, the 2008 fatal rate f or the conventional group would be 0.35 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours, and the
rate for the glass cockpit group would be 1.58, compared to the overall general aviation fatal rate of 1.20 in 2008.
55 Risk Factors Associated with Weather -Related Ge neral Aviation Accidents, Safety Study NTSB/SS- 05/01
(Washington, DC : National Transportation Safety Board, 2005).
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Figure 10. Comparison of study accidents by time of day.
As figure 1 1 shows, distribution of GAATAA Survey flight hour estimates by time of day
for 2006 and 2007 was similar for both cohorts. However, when compared with the accident data
for those years, the rates of total and fatal accidents per flight hour at night were higher for the glass cockpit cohort (see table 4).
Figure 11. Combined 2006 and 2007 flight hour distribution by time of
day and cockpit configuration.
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27 Table 4. Combined 2006 and 2007 accident rates per 100,000 flight hours by tim e of day
and cockpit configuration.
Total Fatal
2006- 2007 Conventional Glass Cockpit Conventional Glass Cockpit
Day 4.01 3.86 0.30 0.87
Night 1.85 3.31 1.23 1.84
Weather Conditions
As shown in figure 12, the 2002 through 2008 accident data indicate that a higher
percentage of glass cockpit accidents occurred in IMC. The difference in accident weather
conditions was marginally significant: χ2 (1, N = 264) = 3.639, p = 0.056.
Figure 12. Comparison of study accidents by weather.
GAATAA Survey data regarding flight hours by weather conditions, shown in figure 13,
indicate that glass cockpit aircraft owners reported a larger percentage of flight time in IMC. A
comparison of accidents and flight hours during 2006 and 2007 (table 5) shows similar total
accident rates for both groups in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) but higher total and fatal accident rates per flight hour in IMC for the glass cockpit cohort .
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Figure 13. Combined 2006 and 2007 flight hour distribution by weather
and cockpit configuration.
Table 5. Combined 2006 and 2007 accident rates per 100,000 flight hours by weather and
cockpit configuration.
Total Fatal
2006- 2007 Conventional Glass Cockpit Conventional Glass Cockpit
IMC 1.63 2.68 1.63 2.34
VMC 3.86 3.94 0.29 0.67
Flight Plan Filed
Consistent with the previous results showing that glass cockpit aircraft spent a higher
percentage of flight hours in IMC, the aircraft cohorts also differed with regard to flight plan
filed for the accident flight. Figure 14 shows that among those accidents during 2002 through
2008 with flight plan information available, pilots in the glass cockpit cohort were signif icantly
more likely to have filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan for the accident flight:
χ2 (1, N = 250) = 11.718, p = 0.001. GAATAA Survey data do not provide estimates of the
number of hours flown by type of flight plan.
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Figure 14. Comparison of study accidents by flight plan filed.
Purpose of Flight
The study cohorts differed noticeably with regard to aircraft usage. Figure 15 shows that
accident flights involving aircraft in the conventional cohort were almost equally split between
instructional flights and personal/business flights, while glass cockpit accidents were significantly
more likely to involve personal/business flights: χ2 (1, N = 258) = 31.616, p < 0.001.
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Figure 15. Comparison of study accidents by purpose of flight.
GAATAA Survey results regarding reported aircraft use indicated that a larger percentage
of the conventional cohort ’s activity during 2006 and 2007 involved instructional flights, while
the glass cockpit aircraft were more often used for personal and business flying (see figure 1 6). A
comparison of accidents with reported aircraft use from 2006 through 2007, summarized in
table 6, indicates that the conventional aircraft experienced higher total accident rates during
both instructional and personal/business flying. Both cohorts experienced equally low fatal accident rates for instructional flights, but the glass cockpit cohort experienced a higher fatal
accident rate during personal/business flights.
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Figure 16. Combined 2006 and 2007 flight hour distribution by purpose of
flight and cockpit configuration.
Table 6. Combined 2006 and 2007 accident rates per 100,000 flight hours by purpose of flight
and cockpit configuration.
Total Fatal
2006- 2007 Conventional Glass Cockpit Conventional Glass Cockpit
Instructional 3.98 2.79 0.20 0.20
Personal/Business 6.62 5.05 1.26 1.65
Planned Length of Flight
Among those accidents for which both point of departure and intended destination were
known, the median planned length of accident flights associated with the glass cockpit cohort
was 96 nautical miles (nm), compared to a median of 25 nm for conventional a ircraft flights.
Differences in the planned length of study flights for both cohort s were evaluated using the
Mann -Whitney U test statistic. Results indicated that accident flights involving the glass cockpit
cohort were significantly longer than those for aircraft in the conventional cockpit cohort
(U = 5649.5, N (conventional) = 140, N (glass cockpit) = 122, p < 0.001) .56
56 Throughout this report, the results of Mann -Whitney U statistical tests are included in the text using the
following notation (calculated value of the U statistic, n 1 and n2 = number of cases in each study cohort, p =
probability, or significance of the re sult). Like the results of the chi -square test previously discussed, the p value can
be interpreted as the percent likelihood that the observed value occurred by chance. The Mann -Whitney test is
calculated by ranking each of the observed values and summing the rank scores within the groups being compared.
The sums of ranks are compared for both groups to identify the group with the higher result. In this case the sum of
ranks for the conventional group is less than the sum of ranks for the glass cockpit gro up, so the significant U score
can be attributed to accident flights involving glass cockpit aircraft being longer than those involving aircraft with
conventional cockpit instruments. Refer to table 8 at the end of this chapter for a summary of all study
Mann-Whitney U statistical test results. Much of the
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32 difference in planned flight distance between the two cohorts can be attributed to the large
percentage of conventional aircraft operating on local or very short flights, versus the percentage of glass cockp it aircraft, which were more likely to be operating on longer flights. Of the 140
conventional aircraft accidents with flight length information, 71 (51 percent) were conducting local flights that were planned to return to the departure airport or very short flights of less than 25 nm. Only 26 percent of glass cockpit accident flights were local —or less than 25 nm—but
42 percent of accident flights involving glass cockpit aircraft were planned for more than 150 nm versus only 16 percent of flights associated with conventional aircraft.
Phase of Flight
In general, aircraft in the glass cockpit cohort were involved in a higher percentage of
accidents during the in- flight phases from initial climb to approach, while conventional aircraft
were involved in highe r percentages of accidents during takeoff, landing, and “other,” which
include taxiing and standing (see figure 17).
Figure 17. Comparison of study accidents by phase of flight. 57
57 Totals do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
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33 Accident Event Type
Glass cockpit aircraft were involved in higher percentages of loss -of-control in flight and
collision -with-terrain events, and conventional aircraft were involved in more loss -of-control on
ground and hard -landing events. This is consistent with the results of the previous comparison
showing more glass cockpit accidents during in- flight phases and more takeoff and landing
accidents for the conventional cohort. A summary comparison of accident event types is
presented in figure 18.
Figure 18. Comparison of s tudy accidents by event type and aircraft configuration. 58
The higher percentage of collision s with terrain versus all other events for the glass
cockpit cohort was the only statistically significant difference between the two cohorts in
accident events: χ2 (1, N = 255) = 3.980, p = 0.046.
58 Totals do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
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34 Accident Pilot Information
Information regarding accident pilots was compared to identify differences that might
have affected the safety record of study aircraft. For example, if one cohort was more likely to be
flown by less experienced pilots, the accident record would likely be worse for those aircraft.
Number of Pilots
As illustrated in figure 19, aircraft with conventional cockpits were more likely to have
two flight crewmembers aboard than those with glass cockpits , which were more likely to be
operated by a single pilot. The difference in the number of flight crew was statistically
significant: χ2 (1, N = 266) = 7.063, p = 0.008. In approximately half of the conventional aircraft
cases with two pilots, the second pilot was identified as a flight instructor, which is consistent
with the previously presented results indicating that conventional aircraft were more likely to be used for instructional flights.
Figure 19. Comparison of number o f pilots aboard study accident aircraft.
Pilot Age
Age data were available for 257 of the 266 accident pilots considered in the study.
Accident pilots in the glass cockpit cohort ranged in age from 18 to 76, with a median age of 47.
Accident pilots in the conventional cohort ranged in age from 17 to 77, with a median age of 43.
Accident pilots flying glass cockpit aircraft were significantly older than those flying conventional aircraft (U = 6736.5, N (conventional) = 139, N (glass cockpit) = 118, p = 0.014).
Much of the difference between the conventional and glass cockpit study cohorts with regard to age can be attributed to differences in the percentage of young pilots. Of the 139 accident pilots
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35 in the conventional aircraft cohort whose age was known, 38 (27 percent) were under 30 years
old. In contrast, for the glass cockpit cohort, only 14 of the 118 accident pilots (12 percent) for
whom age information was available were under 30 years old.
Pilot Certifi cate Level
Of those accident pilots for whom certificate information was available, 26 percent held
airline transport pilot (ATP) or commercial certificates, 50 percent held private pilot certificates, and 24 percent held student pilot certificates. As sho wn in figure 20, nearly equal
proportions of the two cohorts held commercial or ATP certificates, but the two cohorts
differed significantly with regard to student and private pilot certificates: χ
2 (2, N = 261) =
21.931, p < 0.001. In comparison, the data concerning the FAA’s U.S. civil airman certificate
for 2002 through 200859
indicate that an average of approximately 14 percent of active pilots
held a student pilot certificate, 38 percent a private pilot certificate, and 43 percent a
commercial pilot cer tificate or ATP.
Figure 20. Comparison of study accident pilots by certificate level.
Pilot Instrument Rating
As illustrated in figure 2 1, approximately 65 percent of accident pilots in the glass
cockpit cohort were rated for instrument flight, compared to 37 percent of those in the
59 See < http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/civil_airmen_statistics/2008/ >.
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36 conventional cohort.60
The difference in instrument rating between the aircraft cohorts was
statistically significant: χ2 (1, N = 257) = 20.828, p < 0.001. In comparison, the FAA’s U.S. civil
airman statistics indicate that, on average, 51 percent of the active pilot population from 2002 to
2008 held an instrument rating.
Figure 21. Comparison of study accident pilots by instrument rating.
Pilot Flight Hours
The most common ly available measures of accident pilot flight experience were total flight
hours in all aircraft and total time in the accident aircraft make and model. The total flight time of
accident pilots in glass cockpit aircraft ranged from 22 to approximately 25,000 hours, while the total flight time for accident pilots in conventional aircraft ranged from 1 to 23,000 hours. The median number of total flight hours for glass cockpit pilots was higher than the median total flight hours for pilots of conventional air craft (466 hours and 167 hours, respectively) , and accident
pilots in the glass cockpit cohort had significantly more total flight hours than those in the conventional cohort : U = 5503.0, N (conventional) = 138, N (glass cockpit) = 118, p <0.001.
Flight experience in the accident aircraft make and model for pilots in glass cockpit
aircraft ranged from 11 to approximately 1,430 hours and for accident pilots in conventional aircraft, from 1 to approximately 6,200 hours. Median flight experience in ma ke and model for
glass cockpit pilots was higher than for those flying conventional aircraft (99 hours and 70 hours,
60 Insufficient data were available to compare instrument flight experience and currency at the time of the
accident.
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37 respectively). However, the overall distributions of flight time in the accident make/model were
not significantly different: U = 6087.5 , N (conventional) = 129, N (glass cockpit) = 106, p= 0.148.
It is important to note that data concerning flight experience in aircraft make and model made no distinction in cockpit design, so some pilots may have been experienced in the aircraft type while having little experience with the particular cockpit display in the aircraft.
Summary of Quantitative Analysis Results
Study comparisons of total and active aircraft, flight hours, and accidents showed similar
pattern s of accident rates for study aircraft. A comparison of the accidents from 2002 through
2008 involving the glass cockpit and conventional study cohorts with the number of registered aircraft indicates that the glass cockpit aircraft study cohort experienced a lower accident rate but
a higher fatal accident rate. Analyses of the study -specific estimates obtained from the FAA’s
2006 and 2007 GAATAA Surveys indicate that the 2- year, 2006 and 2007 accident rate per
100,000 flight hours was similar for both study groups, but the fatal accident rate per flight hour
was higher for the glass cockpit cohort.
Statistical comparisons of accident characteristics identified several variables with
distributions significantly different between the conventional and glass coc kpit groups, including
(1) accident severity, (2) purpose of accident flights, (3) planned length of accident flight, (4) number of pilots, (5) pilot age, (6) pilot certification level, (7) pilot total flight experience, and (8) pilot instrument rating. Ac cidents involving glass cockpit aircraft were more likely to be
associated with personal/business flights, longer flights, and single -pilot operations, while
conventional aircraft were more likely to be associated with instructional flights, shorter flights, and two- pilot operations. Accident pilots of glass cockpit -equipped aircraft were older, held
higher levels of pilot certification, were more likely to hold an instrument rating, and had more flight hours than those flying aircraft with conventional ins truments. The glass cockpit cohort
was involved in more accidents in IMC, but the difference was only marginally significant.
These results are consistent with GAATAA Survey data indicating that the conventional
cohort flew more instructional flight hours . A younger pilot group, two -pilot crews, and shorter
flights are consistent with new pilots learning to fly. Aircraft in the conventional cockpit cohort were more likely to be involved in an accident but less likely to be involved in a fatal accident, which is also consistent with the conventional aircraft being used to conduct more instructional
flights, which historically have had lower fatal accident rates than personal flying.
Differences in accident rates between the study cohorts followed a similar pattern. The
2-year fatal accident rates for 2006 and 2007 were similarly low for both cohorts during
instructional flights. The total accident rate was higher for conventional aircraft during both instructional and personal/business flying, but the fatal accident rate was highest for glass cockpit aircraft during personal /business flights.
61 Annual Review of U.S. General Aviation Accident Data, 2005, Annual Review NTSB/ARG -09/01, “Focus on
General Aviation Safety: Instructional Flight” (Washington, DC : National Transportation Safety Board, 2009).
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38 Finally, accident and fatal accident rates were higher for the glass cockpit cohort in IMC
and at night despite the aircraft being flown by pilots with higher levels of certification and more
flight experience— and the additional capabilities of glass cockpit displays, which were intended
to improve the safety of those flight operations. The tables that follow summarize the results of
all statistical tests included in this study. Table 7 summarizes all comparisons of categorical
accident variables in this chapter, with total numbers of cases included in each comparison, relative percentages, chi -square values, and significance.
Table 7. Summary of chi -square analyses .
Total
Accidents Conventional Glass cockpit χ2 p
N % within cohort N % within cohort
Accident Severity 266 8.216 0.004
Fatal 23 16% 39 31%
NonFatal 118 84% 86 69%
Total 141 125
Light Condition 266 3.058 0.080
Day 122 87% 98 78%
Night 19 13% 27 22%
Total 141 125
Weather 264 3.639 0.056
VMC 129 92% 105 85%
IMC 11 8% 19 15%
Total 140 124
Flight Plan 250 11.718 0.001
VFR/None 110 83% 76 64%
IFR 22 17% 42 36%
Total 132 118
Purpose of Flight 258 31.616 < 0.001
Instructional 66 49% 19 16%
Personal/Business 70 51% 103 84%
Total 136 122
Accident Event Type 255 3.980 0.046
Collision with Terrain 11 8% 19 16%
Other 126 92% 99 84%
Total 137 118
Flight Crew Aboard 266 7.063 0.008
Single Pilot 117 83% 117 94%
Two Pilots 24 17% 8 6%
Total 141 125
Highest Pilot Certificate 261 21.931 < 0.001
Student 49 35% 14 12%
Private 55 40% 76 62%
Commercial or ATP 35 25% 32 26%
Total 139 122
Pilot Instrument Rating 257 20.828 < 0.001
Not Instrument Rated 88 63% 41 35%
Instrument Rated 51 37% 77 65%
Total 139 118
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39 Table 8 summarizes all comparisons of continuous accident variables in this chapter, with
total numbers of cases included, median values, sums of ranks, Z -scores and Mann -Whitney U
values, and significance.
Table 8. Summary of Mann- Whitney analyses.
N Median Sum of Ranks Z U p
Pilot Age 2.467 6736.5 0.014
Conventional 139 43yrs 16466.5
Glass Cockpit 118 47yrs 16686.5
Total 257
Pilot Total Flight Time 4.469 5503.0 <0.001
Conventional 138 167hrs 15094.0
Glass Cockpit 118 466hrs 17802.0
Total 256
Pilot Flight Time in Make/Model 1.445 6087.5 0.148
Conventional 129 70hrs 14472.5
Glass Cockpit 106 99hrs 13257.5
Total 235
Planned Flight Length 4.807 5649.5 <0.001
Conventional 140 25nm 15519.5
Glass Cockpit 122 96nm 18933.5
Total 262
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40 Chapter 4: Qualitative Assessment
In addition to conducting the retrospective data analyses included in this study, the NTSB
reviewed FAA and manufacturer training materials and programs applicable to glass cockpit
aircraft and visited aircraft manufacturers to observe factory training available to general aviation pilots transitioning to glass cockpit avionics. The NTSB also spoke with several representatives of the aviation insurance industry regarding experience and training requirements for coverage of
glass cockpit -equipped light aircr aft. This review enabled the NTSB to understand and assess the
current state of training requirements and glass cockpit training available to general aviation pilots.
FAA Requirements and Guidance Materials
The FAA has established minimum requirements fo r persons wishing to obtain initial or
additional pilot certification and ratings. Pilot applicants must log a minimum number of flight
hours, meet specified flight and ground training requirements, and pass a knowledge and/or practical test to receive a p ilot certificate or additional qualifications, such as an instrument
rating. Knowledge tests are designed to sample an applicant’s understanding of the information necessary to exercise the privileges of a particular certificate or rating. Prospective pilo ts must
pass the required knowledge test and obtain an instructor’s endorsement to be eligible to take the practical test for a certificate or rating. The current pool of questions for FAA airman knowledge tests, such as private pilot, instrument rating, c ommercial pilot, and flight instructor certificates,
do not assess pilots’ knowledge of the functionality of glass cockpit displays.
The FAA currently has no specific initial or recurrent training requirements for pilots of
Part 23 certified However, most of
the FAA’s training handbooks and Practical Test Standards (PTS) have been updated to incorporate informat ion about electronic flight instrument displays.
63 aircraft related to cockpit equipment or avionics. There are general requirements
for all pilots to be knowledgeable about the operation and limitations of the aircraft they fly —
including all aircraft systems —and to be proficient in the use of those systems. The FAA PTS
requires that applicants be able to demonstrate proficiency with all equipment in stalled in their
airplanes, and the FAA’s most recent Instrument Rating64 and Flight Instructor, Instrument65
62 Based on the June 26, 2009, revision of FAA airman knowledge test banks, available online:
< PTS
mentions electronic flight displays with regard to knowledge of the operating characteristics of installed equipment and operating procedures su ch as preflight checks. The Aircraft and Equipment
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/airmen/test_questions/ >.
63 Title 14 CFR Part 23 contains airworthiness standards for airplanes in the normal, utility, acrobatic, and
commuter categories. The maximum takeoff weight of an airplane in the normal, utility, or acrobatic category
cannot exceed 12,500 pounds, and the maximum takeoff weight of an airplane in the commuter category cannot
exceed 19,000 pounds. In comparison, 14 CFR Part 25 contains airworthiness standards for airplanes in the transport
category, which typically have a maximum gross weight of more than 12,500 pounds.
64 FAA -S-8081- 9C, available online:
<http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/airmen/test_standards/media/FAA -S-8081- 9C.pdf >.
65FAA -S-8081- 4E, available online:
<http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/airmen/test_standards/media/FAA -S-8081- 4E.pdf >.
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41 Required for the Practical Test section of the PTS also mentions electronic primary flight
instrument and abnormal or emergency procedures for instrument failures.
The FAA Instrument Rating PTS specifically addresses electronic flight instruments in its
guidance to pilot examiners regarding the evaluation of an applicant’s response to instrument failures as follows:
The loss of the primary electronic flight instrument display must be tailored to failures
that would normally be encountered in the aircraft. If the aircraft is capable, total failure
of the electronic flight instrument display, or a supporting component, with access only to
the standby flight instruments or backup display shall be eva luated.
Equipment -Specific Training
Even before it began updating its training materials and PTS, the FAA recognized a need
to improve general aviation pilot training. The FAA developed its FITS initiative in anticipation
of the increasing demands of manag ing advanced technology in general aviation cockpits. With a
focus on scenario -based training techniques, the FITS initiative attempted to make pilot training
more engaging and more relevant to real -world demands. Another element included in the initial
FITS initiative was aircraft- and equipment -specific training.
Findings of the 2003 General Aviation Technically Advanced Aircraft: F AA –Industry
Safety Study noted a divide between the potential safety benefits of increased use of technology
and the realization of those benefits, as described below:
TAAs provide increased “available safety ,” i.e., a potential for increased safety.
However, to actually obtain this available safety, pilots must receive additional training in
the specific TAA systems in their aircraft that will enable them to exploit the
opportunities and operate within the limitations inherent in their TAA systems.66
and
The template for securing this increased safety exists from the experiences with previous new technology introductions —the current aircraft model -specific training and insurance
requirements applicable to high -performance single and multi engine small airplanes.
However, the existing training infrastructure currently is not able to provide the needed
training in TAAs.
The FIT S program plan ,
66 Finding 4 of the FAA -Industry study. published by the FAA in 2003, cited several intended product
categories. In addition to general FITS training, the program sought to produce a “specific FITS
67 Finding 5 of the FAA -Industry study.
68 FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS) Program Plan (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration,
2003).
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42 program for a specific aircraft or technology.” The FITS program plan described t he intended
product as follows:
Specific standards will be initially developed in partnership with [manufacturers and
training centers]. They will prototype and implement initial, transition, recurrent, and
flight instructor training requirements of their customers and flight operations. Incentive
mechanisms in these programs will include regulatory incentives within the current [Code of Federal Regulations ] CFR (i.e. 141.57, Special curricula) as well as industry
incentives such as insurance. Development will be in conjunction with certification under
14 CFR P art 142 and Part 141.
The description went on to suggest that similar specialized training was expected to be
developed for individual avionics systems and displays and for pilots transitioning to upgraded
equipment that was being retrofitted into existing aircraft.
The NTSB identified the need for pilots to receive specialized training for advanced
aircraft equipment in a 1992 special investigation and analysis of several accidents involving the
Piper Aircraft Corporation model PA -46 airplane.69
Amend 14 CFR 61.31(f) to include integrated flight guidance and control systems as part
of the ground and flight training requirements specified in subparagraphs (f) (1) (i) and
(ii). (A -92-88) The PA -46 included an autopilot and flight
director system that was an advanced technology for single -engine light aircraft at that time. In
response to the investigation of several accidents and one incident in which pilots misunderstood
or misused that system, the NTSB issued the following recommendation to the FAA:
The FAA did not establish the recommended training requirements, but in 1997, it
enacted 14 CFR 61.31(h) requiring pilots to receive aircraft type -specific training and a logbook
endorsement for aircraft identified by the Administrator as requiring such training.70
Since publication of the 2003 TAA repor t and FITS program plan, the FAA has shifted
the focus of FITS away from equipment -specific training for advanced aircraft systems, as
mentioned in the original program plan, and has focused instead on updating training manuals
and promoting instructional techniques , such as scenario -based training and student -led
performance reviews , for pilots of all aircraft. To date, the FAA has encouraged manufacturers On July 30,
1998, the NTSB noted that the FAA did not plan to make the recommended regulatory changes
and classified Safety Recommendation A -92-88 “Closed —Unacceptable Action .” One of the
anticipated action s described in the FITS program plan was development of mandatory pilot
training and qualification standards in accordance with 14 CFR 61.31(h). This approach would have created equipment -specific requirements akin to a type rating for a Part 23 aircraft. The
program plan suggested that “Promulgation could be through an amendment to the aircraft flight manual, which refers to the FITS standard directory.”
69 Piper Aircraft Corporation PA -46 Malibu/Mirage Accidents/Incident , May 31, 1989, to March 17, 1991,
Special Investigation Report NTSB/SIR -92/03 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1992).
70 The type -specific training requirement of 14 CFR 61.31(h) was never applied to the PA -46.
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43 and training providers to develop specific training but has not incorporated equipment -specific
elements into its training, testing, or currency requirements.
Manufacturer Training Programs and Materials
The NTSB observed FITS -accepted training programs provided by two of the large
manufacturers of aircraft included in this study and reviewed training ma terials provided by
several glass cockpit display manufacturers.
Aircraft Manufacturers
In general, aircraft manufacturers provide transition training for buyers of new aircraft ,
and most include training or require that pilots take a training course as pa rt of the purchase
contract. Manufacturer training includes several components. Written and electronic study
materials, typically completed by the new owner before arriving at the factory to begin flight training, include several hours of familiarization s tudy on aircraft systems, checklists, and
operating procedures. Ground training and flight training, which generally occur at the factory, include 2 to 3 days of instruction, with the possibility of additional instruction if desired. Flight and ground trai ning includes takeoffs/landings and flight maneuvers, normal and emergency
procedures, and aircraft systems and equipment. Pilots who are instrument rated typically also
practice instrument flying and instrument approaches. NTSB observations and anecdotal reports
from pilots and instructors suggest that for many general aviation pilots, the transition to new avionics requires as much—or often more —effort than the transition to the new aircraft itself.
Both manufacturers visited by the NTSB incorporated flig ht training devices and avionics
simulators into their training to provide additional avionics instruction.
Typical factory training is designed as familiarization training or as a “checkout,” rather
than as a proficiency evaluation. Persons who complete the course receive a certificate or proof of completion that insurance companies accept —and often require —and that can be credited
toward the FAA’s WINGS pilot proficiency program.
71 Factory training typically does not result
in an endorsement for a flight review or instrument proficiency check,72
71 See < but manufacturers will
provide the additional instruction necessary to complete a flight review or instrument proficiency check at additiona l owner expense. Manufacturers can also arrange to have a flight instructor
accompany the owner on the flight home in the new aircraft, and most maintain networks of training centers and/or factory -trained instructors to provide additional and recurrent tr aining
throughout the country. Although aircraft manufacturers will provide training to anyone, free factory training programs almost exclusively target the original aircraft owner. Some new owners choose to allocate the transition training included with t he purchase of a new aircraft to local
flight instructors so that they can continue to receive factory -approved training after returning
home. Buyers of used aircraft, or other pilots wishing to receive factory -approved training, can
also purchase training at the factory, but they would typically receive training through the
https://www.faasafety.gov/WINGS/pppinfo/default.aspx > for an explanation of the FAA Safety Te am,
WINGS pilot proficiency program.
72 See 14 CFR 61.57 for the requirements of the flight review and instrument proficiency check.
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44 distributed network of training centers or factory -approved instructors. Some aviation insurance
providers require periodic factory -approved recurrent training or encourage such trainin g through
discount incentives.
In some cases, manufacturers and aviation insurance companies have collaborated with
academic institutions to develop training programs and accident reduction initiatives. In addition
to the FAA’s FITS program and the traini ng materials and programs currently in place, industry
efforts are underway to identify new methods for reducing accidents.73
Avionics Manufacturers
Most manufacturers of glass cockpit avionics produce training materials to support their
products. A common training tool produced by some of the larger avionics manufacturers is a
software simulator for use on a personal computer that allows pilots to interact with the display interface to become familiar with display operation and capabilities, menu organization, and control functions. These software simulators are not intended to replicate the functionality of a n
approved flight simulator or training device
Some glass cockpit avionics manufacturers also produce training curricula and manuals.
For example, Garmin produces a guide to its cockpit avionics for flight instructors and pilot
examiners but rather to serve as interactive procedural
trainers that allow pilots to practice using glass cockp it avionics and experience various display
system malfunctions and failures that may not be easily or safely replicated in the aircraft. Some avionics manufacturers provide free software simulators, while others charge a small fee but provide a free copy w ith purchase of the avionics equipment.
75 that includes an overvie w of potential failure modes and operational scenarios that
correspond to pilot knowledge and performance requirements of the FAA Instrument Rating PTS. Garmin also produces a pilot training guide and knowledge test, along with resource materials for fligh t instructors to train and evaluate pilots on the operation of its G1000 glass
cockpit system.
Insurance Requirements
Although the FAA currently has no specific training requirements for pilots of light
aircraft related to aircraft avionics and displays, aviation insurance providers often require pilots to complete training to receive and maintain coverage. The NTSB spoke with several aviation
73 For example, the Airmanship Education Research Initiative (AERI) is a collaborative research effort by Cirrus
Design Corporation, Avemco Insurance, and the University of Illinois Urbana -Champaign aimed at identifying methods
for teaching improved decision- making techniques: <http://www.humanfactors.illi nois.edu/news/news.aspx?29 >.
74 Title 14 CFR Part 60 and FAA Advisory Circular AC -61-136 provide guidance for the approval of flight
simulators and training devices for pilot training and certification.
75 Garmin International, Inc., Integrated Flight Deck, Guide for Designated Pilot Examiners and Certificated
Flight Instructors, 190-00368- 02 Revision C, May 2008. (Olathe, Kansas). Available online at:
<http://www8 .garmin.com/manuals/G1000:Non -AirframeSpecific_GuideforDPEsandCFIs.pdf >.
76 Garmin International, Inc., Integrated Flight Deck, Pilot’s Training Guide, Instructor’s Reference ( -06). 190-
00368- 06 Revision B, May 2008 (Olathe, Kansas). See < http://www8.garmin.com/manuals/G1000:Non -
AirframeSpecific_PilotsTrainingGuide_InstructorsReference -06_.pdf >.
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45 insurance company representatives and insurance underwriters to better assess the nonregulatory
training requireme nts for pilots and owners of glass cockpit -equipped aircraft.
Actuarial data, including claims information and person- specific details, allow insurance
companies to determine coverage costs and establish tailored training requirements for pilots transition ing to glass cockpit aircraft. Insurance companies consider each pilot’s history and
flight experience, as well as the pilot’s record as a customer with a particular company, when establishing requirements for coverage. A private pilot with an instrument r ating, 1,000 hours of
flight time, and no history of major claims may be required to complete factory transition training, while a new private pilot who does not hold an instrument rating may be required to receive additional initial and/or recurrent facto ry-approved training beyond the basic transition
course. Some providers suggested that they may decline coverage to pilots wanting to insure high-performance aircraft with glass cockpit avionics unless the pilots were previous customers
with a good claims history. The exact details of insurance company requirements a re tailored to
individual pilots and vary from one company to the next . However, these requirements are often
more rigorous than the regulatory requirements that the FAA has established for gene ral aviation
pilots based on other equipment -specific properties, such as high performance, complexity, or
conventional landing gear.
In some cases, however, insurance requirements are not particularly rigorous or do not
establish additional requirements for pilots transitioning into aircraft with glass cockpit avionics.
For example, the NTSB spoke with some insurance providers who suggested that they would not require additional training for an existing customer upgrading from an older aircraft with conventional instruments to a similar new aircraft with glass cockpit displays (for example, from a 1980 Cessna 172 to a 2006 Cessna 172), but that they would adjust coverage and premiums based on the value of the airframe. Other providers said they would requ ire a one- time,
equipment -specific checkout. With regard to new glass cockpit displays retrofitted to existing
aircraft, insurance providers said that they typically would not be aware of the new equipment unless owners contacted them to increase their coverage, and that in that case, they would be unlikely to impose additional requirements for training. Manufacturers and insurance company representatives also mentioned that they are aware that in some cases, owners have chosen to “self -insure” their aircra ft or forgo coverage and assume the responsibility for any problems they
might encounter.
The lack of equipment -specific training requirements from the FAA and the variability of
insurance company requirements result in a wide range of initial and recurren t training
experiences among pilots of glass cockpit aircraft. With the exception of the training provided by manufacturers with the purchase of a new aircraft, pilots must currently seek out equipment -specific training.
77 Title 14 CFR 61.31 details requirements fo r aircraft -specific training required to act as pilot- in-command.
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46 Chapter 5: Case Study Review
In addition to the data analyses and the assessment of training resources and requirements
described above, the NTSB reviewed accident investigations involving glass cockpit -equipped
aircraft to identify cases in which glass cockpit displays either malfunc tioned or functioned in a
manner that was different from a conventional display and/or pilot expectation. This chapter
discusses those case studies and several issues identified in those reviews.
Pilot Expectations Regarding Glass Cockpit Displays
On April 9, 2007, at 1159 mountain daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22,
N953CD, piloted by a private pilot, sustained substantial damage when it collided with trees 16
miles north of Luna, New Mexico, following a ballistic parachute deployment.78
The pilot said he was climbing from 15,000 feet to 16,000 feet to avoid building
thunderstorms and snow showers. The pilot reported that he was in IMC when the airspeed indication started to decrease and the airspeed and altimeter readouts on the PFD went to “hash marks” (an indication of s ystem malfunction or data loss , which would have appeared on the
display as red Xs). The pilot stated that he manually overrode the autopilot to initiate a descent and turned the pitot heat on. The pilot reported that shortly thereafter, the airspeed indic ation
returned. The pilot sensed that he was in a descent and “pulled back” to slow the airplane down, and the attitude indicator went “haywire.” The terrain warning system activated, and the pilot elected to activate the ballistic recovery parachute on th e airplane. The airplane impacted trees
and came to rest inverted at the top of several trees. The empennage separated from the airplane. The outboard portion of the right wing was crushed aft and had partially separated. The pe rsonal
flight was being conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 on an IFR flight plan. The pilot was not injured. The cross -country flight originated at Tucson, Arizona, and was en route to
Englewood, Colorado.
The pilot’s written statement ind icated that the airplane was “getting hit by snow pellets.”
He stated that he “turned the TKS [supplemental ice protection system] on to maximum and set the windshield defroster to its highest setting.” The pilot contacted air traffic control and requested another altitude to “get out of the clouds,” as he was “in light icing.” The pilot wrote
that when he completed a routing change, he noted that the numbers on the airspeed indicator were red.
78 See DEN07LA082 < The pilot stated that he “immediately pushed the nose down.” S hortly thereafter, the
airspeed indication went to “hash marks.” He stated that the “altitude indicator also gave no indication of altitude and appeared to have completely failed.” The pilot wrote that a cross -check
of the backup airspeed indicator showed no readings, and in a followup telephone interview, he stated that the event happened so quickly that he did not initially look at the backup airspeed
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DEN07LA082&rpt=fa >.
79 Numbers changing to red is consistent wi th the aircraft ’s approaching stall speed.
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47 indicator, but when he did, it was at zero. The pilot also stated that he did not look at either the
back up altimeter or backup attitude indicator.80
Data recovered from the aircraft PFD indicated that when the airspeed indication decreased
to zero, internal validity checks in the PFD flagged the pitot data input as “invalid.”
81 The
extracted data further indicated that system logic checks identified the invalid airspeed value as an air data computer failure and subsequently flagged all air data parameters as invalid. According to
the manufacturer, the result would be to replace all air data information on the d isplay : airspeed,
altitude, and vertical speed with red “X” indications , and outside temperature with dashed lines .
The display operated as designed in this case, but the resulting behavior was different from that of conventional cockpit instruments. (If the pitot tube drain remains open, blockage of the pitot tube intake will typically result in a decreased or zero air speed indication on a conventional airspeed
indicator while the remaining instruments will continue to function normally.) In this case, the PFD displayed failure indications for all air data parameters,
During the investigation of an accident only a few months later, which involved a Piper
Aircraft PA-46-500TP Meridian equipped with dual PFDs produced by the same avionics
manufacturer as in the previous accident example, NTSB investigators found similar flagging of air data parameters in response to suspected pitot tube intake blockage due to airframe icing. which led the pilot to initially interpret a
likely pitot tube intake blockage due to icing to be an air data computer failure.
Data recovered from the accident aircraft indicated that the PFD softwar e had also flagged as
invalid the airspeed, altitude, and vertical speed information as the dynamic pressure sensed by
the system decreased to zero. In that case, the pilot and copilot PFDs in the accident airplane were fed from separate pitot inputs, and the backup airspeed was fed from the pilot’s side pitot input. According to the manufacturer,
84 blockage of both pitot tube intakes would have resulted
in loss of all air data on both primary displays and a loss of usable information on the backup
analog ai rspeed indicator. The flagged air data would also have resulted in the autopilot
automatically disengaging with an audible warning.85
Although the PFD displays in these accidents functioned differently than conventional
displays would have under similar circumstances, they performed in accordance with the The Piper Meridian was not equipped with
a ballistic parachute as was the Cirrus involved in the earlier accident . The acci dent aircraft
experienced a loss of control and subsequent in- flight breakup, resulting in fatal injuries to the
pilot and two passengers.
80 Refer to the document “Statements” in the NTSB Docket Management System records for accident case
DEN07LA082.
81 Refer to the flight data recorder group chairman’s factual report in the NTSB Docket Management System
records for accident case DEN07LA082.
82 The other data parameters affected in this case included altitude and vertical speed.
83 NTSB investigation numbe r CHI07FA183, June 28, 2007. This accident is included here as an example of the
PFD function, but it was not included in the statistical study analyses because it involved a turboprop -powered
aircraft.
84 Refer to manufacturer letter dated August 12, 2009, in the NTSB Docket Management System records for
accident case CHI07FA183 .
85 For a complete discussion of system operation, see final accident report in the NTSB Aviation Accident
Database at < http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=CHI07FA183&rpt=fa >, as well as the manufacturer and
FAA correspondence included in the official NTSB docket for this case.
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48 intended design and software logic. Title 14 CFR 23.1309(b) requires that warning i nformation
be provided to alert pilots to unsafe operating conditions to enable them to take appropriate
corrective action, and the requirements of 14 CFR 23.1581 state that an aircraft flight manual (AFM) —which must contain information about the safe oper ation of aircraft systems in the
event of malfunction—must be furnished for each aircraft.
Given its concerns about pilots’ need to understand complex aircraft system operation,
which was established in its 1992 special investigation of several Piper Airc raft model PA -46
airplane accidents,
Require the manufacturers of integrated flight guidance and control systems, for which
supplements to the airplane flight manual and pilots operating handbook m ust be
provided, to develop and make available to operators detailed training information that
will enable pilots to diagnose system failures, understand pilot -induced flight control
system problems, and use the system in a safe and proficient manner. (A -92-89) the NTSB issued the following recommendation to the FAA:
In response to NTSB recommendation A -92-89, the FAA issued Change 1 to AC 23- 8A,
Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes , and AC 23.13091B, Equipment, Systems,
and Installations in Part 23 Airplanes , emphasizing that complex integrat ed systems may dictate
that cockpit warning indicators and/or detailed emergency procedures information be included in
the FAA -approved AFM or AFM Supplement. Based on this action by the FAA, the NTSB
classified Safety Recommendation A -92-89 “Closed— Accept able Action” on June 28, 1996.
The AFM Supplement for the PFD installed in the Piper Aircraft Corporation Meridian
included a full description of a loss of air data computer information, along with guidance to use
the analog backup instruments in the event of failure. However, the manual did not provide
specific information about system behavior in response to the loss of specific data inputs, such as a pitot tube intake blockage. In response to communication from NTSB investigators, the FAA
and the avionic s manufacturer reviewed this case and determined that flagging all air data
parameter indications as invalid in response to a loss of pitot input was not ideal. The
manufacturer agreed to change the functionality in future software revisions, and the FAA a greed
that a revision would be added to the AFM to better inform pilots of the system functionality until the software could be changed.
Equipment Design and Reliability
Like all aircraft systems and equipment installations, glass cockpit displays are subject to
14 CFR Part 23 requirements for reliability and safety assessment. The reliability of electronic
PFDs is generally assumed by the FAA and the pilot community to ex ceed that of their
conventional analog equivalents due to the mechanical reliability of solid- state systems and the
additional redundancy often required for electronic systems. For example, guidance provided in 14 CFR 23.1311—and in the associated AC 23.1311 -1B, Installation of Electronic Display in
86 Piper Aircraft Corporation PA -46 Malibu/Mirage Accidents/Incident, May 31, 1989, to March 17, 1991,
Special Investigation Report NTSB/SIR -92/03 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1992).
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49 Part 23 Aircraft —specifies that to satisfy the requirements of 14 CFR 23 for IFR flight,
electronic displays of airspeed, attitude, and altitude information require either dedicated standby
instruments or dual i ndependent PFDs. Similar redundant instrumentation is not required for
Part 23 aircraft in order to be certified for IFR flight with conventional analog instruments. The
general principle guiding this and similar requirements for electronic displays is tha t the safety,
workload, and operational consequences of a new technology should be at least as good as the equipment it replaces. Manufacturers must provide evidence that the operational reliability aspect of this requirement is met during initial certific ation. Following certification,
manufacturers must report certain equipment failures to the FAA , and their manufacturing
processes are subject to inspection by the FAA, but reliability information is generally not
available outside the manufacturer.
Human performance objectives of increasing pilot awareness while simultaneously
reducing workload and error are more difficult to achieve and validate than equipment reliability .
AC 23.1309- 1D addresses this difficulty in section 19(a), Flight Crew and Maintenance Task,
stating that “quantitative assessments of the probabilities of flight crew and maintenance errors are not considered reasonable.” The qualitative standard is that crews should respond to equipment malfunctions in a timely manner without jeopardiz ing other safety -related tasks and
that such a response should not require exceptional skill or strength.
While arguably difficult to validate, assessments of the interaction between equipment
design and human performance could greatly improve safety, esp ecially in light of the criticality
of human/equipment interactions. In its 2006 Safety Report on the Treatment of Safety -Critical
Systems in Transport Airplanes ,
Amend the advisory materials associated with 14 CFR 25.1309 to include consideration
of structural failures and human/airplane system interaction failures in the assessment of
safety -critical systems. (A -06-37) the NTSB expressed concern about the failure to consider
guidance for human performance evaluation of Part 25 aircraft and issued the following
recommendation to the FAA to consider human/airplane system interactions in the assessment of safety -critical s ystems in transport aircraft certification:
This recommendation was directed at Part 25 aircraft, but human/airplane system
interaction failures are also a safety concern in Part 23 aircraft. At the time of writing, the FAA is reviewing the Part 23 certification process and related guidance. In add ition, several FAA ACs
that address avionics systems are currently open for comment, such as AC 23- 17C, Systems and
Equipment Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes and Airships ; AC 23.1309- 1E, System
Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes ; and AC 23.1311- 1C, Installation of
87 Title 14 CFR 21.3 requires holders of TSO authorization to report certain equipment failures to the FAA, and
14 CFR 21.615 requires that each manufacturer of equipment under TSO authorization allow the FAA to inspect
equipment, inspect manufacturing facilities, review technical data files, inspect the manufacturer ’s quality control
system, and observe any equipment tests upon request of the Administrator. However, these activities are typically
prompted by specific events rather than being part of a continuous review process.
88 Safety Report on the Treatment of Safety -Critical Systems in Transport Airplanes , NTSB/SR -06/02.
(Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2006).
89 As of November 2009, this recommendation was classified “Open —Acceptable Response.”
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50 Electronic Display in Part 23 Airplanes . In July 2009, the FAA released its Part 23 - Small
Airplane Certification Process Study (CPS),90
One area identified in the CPS report as needing greater uniformity was the application of
good human factors design principles to keep pace with the increasing capabilities and
complexities of avionics systems. The aviation industry has attempted to devel op design
frameworks and voluntary guidance for the design of glass cockpit avionics, which included findings and recommendations
from the FAA and industry groups, s uch as the AOPA, GAMA, the Experimental Aircraft
Association, and the National Business Aviation Association. This report , which predicted that
the introduction of new 14 CFR Part 23 technologies would continue to accelerate over the next two decades , went on to recognize increased responsibility on the part of the FAA: “This is good
news for [general aviation], but it increases the FAA oversight burden. The FAA must develop new regulatory, policy and guidance materials to address such technologies. ”
91 and the FAA
includes human performance considerations in its ACs92 and Policy Statements93
Avionics and aircraft systems in Part 23 airplanes are offering more features and
integration of these features . There is a broad range of system complexities offered in
Part 23; some intuitive and others non- intuitive for pilots. for
certification. Nevertheless, design challenges persist due to the complexity and rapid
development of display technology. FAA and industry representatives included a finding in the
CPS report acknowledging the following:
Not all airplane and avionics designers have considered the pilot -machine interface by
using good human factors practices. General aviat ion needs airplanes that are intuitive to
operate, requiring as little training as possible.94
Analyzing Part 23 certification requirements was not within the intended scope of this
NTSB study, other than to highlight the historic emphasis on equipment rel iability —despite an
acknowledgment of human performance as a leading factor in aviation safety. The approach to
certification of Part 23 aircraft equipment has implied that human error can be reduced with increased use of technology. This approach and the importance placed on avionics technology are summarized in AC 23.1309- 1D:
90 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Part 23 - Small Airplane Certification
Process Study (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, July 2009).
91 See for example, GAMA Publication 10 - Recommended Practices a nd Guidelines f or Part 23 Cockpit/Flight
Deck Design (<http://www.gama.aero/files/gama_publication_10_hf_september_2000_pdf_498cad6edd.pdf >) and
GAMA Publication 12 - Recommended Practices and Guidelines for an Integrated Cockpit/Flightdeck in a 14 CFR
Part 23 Airplane < http://www.gama.aero/files/gama_publication_12_p23cockpit_april_2005_pdf_498cadb978.pdf >.
92 FAA AC 23.1311- 1B, available online at
<http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/48bc1051f079b7418625702100639
56c/$FI LE/AC23.1311- 1B.pdf >.
93 FAA Policy Statement PS -ACE100- 2001- 004, available online at
<http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/ad52dc6379f1e4e786256c40004a0128/$FILE/
polmen.pdf >.
94 Finding 5.2 .
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51 For all airplanes, but particularly GA [general aviation] airplanes, pilot decision -making
causes most accidents. Pilot decision -making accidents, the largest single cause, often are
the result of a lack of situational awareness relative to terrain or weather, or to a loss of
control due to excess workload. Correct pilot interventions and actions have prevented
some of these accidents. An increase in avionics equipage rates that impro ved pilot
situational awareness or simplify the task had a significant positive impact on the GA
accident rate.
The text of the AC goes on to cite the AOPA Air Safety Foundation study of TAAs as
evidence of that positive effect. However, the AC also acknowledges that increased aircraft
technology must be accompanied by pilot training in that “technologically advanced aircraft has
delivered multiple safety benefits to GA pilots, but pilot training tied to experience has to evolve with it.”
Standardization of Instrument Design and Operation
Unlike glass cockpit displays, the design and operation of conventional flight instruments
is similar regardless of aircraft or manufacturer. The six instruments that make up a conventional cockpit include three pitot /static and three attitude instruments. Pitot/static instruments use
aneroid capsules, calibrated diaphragms that expand and contract in response to changes in static air pressure to provide information about altitude (altimeter and vertical speed indicator) an d the
differential between static and dynamic pressure associated with speed (airspeed indicator). The attitude instruments (attitude indicator, heading indicator, and rate -of-turn indictor) use
vacuum -driven and/or electrically driven gyros to provide inf ormation about aircraft orientation.
Individual manufacturers may vary the design of their instruments or instrument display
face slightly, but the basic operation is so similar for all Part 23 aircraft that instructional materials often explain instrument design and functionality using detai led cutaway views of the
instruments. Not all pilots may share an equal understanding of the inner workings of analog
instruments, but the information is readily available in training material. The following sample
illustration of a conventional airspeed i ndicator (figure 22) is taken from the FAA’s most recent
(2007) edition of the Instrument Flying Handbook .
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Figure 22. Illustration of a conventional airspeed indicator mechanism, adapted from the FAA
Instrument Flying Handbook .
A similar example of instructional materials for analog instruments can be found in the
FAA’s newly revised Pilot’ s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge.95
95 Federal Aviation Administration , Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge , FAA -H-8083- 25. The illustrations in
figure 23 were copied from c hapter 7 of that handbook and show the operating and design
principles at work in the instruments that display attitude and heading information. Like the
altimeter, the basic design of the analog version of these instruments can be explained using
cutaway images.
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Figure 23. Illustrations of the internal mechanisms that drive analog attitude and heading
indicator instruments, copied from the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge.
Unlike the relatively simple system of gyros and linkages that drive s analog instruments,
very little information is available to pilots about the glass cockpit display equivalent. The
computerized systems at the heart of electronic PFDs are combination s of electronic components
and software that are both unique to the manufacturer and equipme nt, and that are subject to
change with any future system software revision. In contrast to the cutaway illustrations for
analog instruments, illustrations of digital instruments do not lend themselves to the same
amount of detail. F igure 24, for example, shows an AHRS, which drives the attitude and heading
indicator displays of a PFD . As this illustration shows, the system is both figuratively and
literally a “black box.” Although the FAA Pilot’ s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge includes
more than five pages of text and illustrations to describe the design and function of the analog gyroscopic instruments, it includes only four sentences describing the design of an AHRS. Rather than being indicative of an incomplete manual, this difference reflects the nature of the design of electronic display systems.
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Figure 24. Illustration of an AHRS, copied from the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge.
The FAA summarizes the problem in its inspector handbook as part of the background
information provided to inspectors regarding FITS acceptance of training courses or materials:
In the past, displays, avionics, and navigation equipment all looked and functioned in a
similar manner regardless of the manufacturer. This is not th e case with today’s advanced
avionics systems and displays. Training in the operation of one manufacturer’s GPS receiver may not give the pilot sufficient knowledge to safely operate another
manufacturer’s receiver. This is even more evident with full glass cockpits. Not only does
the functionality of PFDs and MFDs vary between manufacturers, but also due to aircraft
systems differences, the same avionics equipment in a different type aircraft may
function differently.
Interpretation of Equipment Malfuncti ons
The wide variability in system design has implications for pilots’ ability to identify and
diagnose system malfunctions. For example, one of the fundamental skills required to fly an
aircraft by reference to flight instruments is instrument cross -check ing. Cross -checking, or
scanning, refers to the task of comparing information from individual instruments and integrating that information into an overall understanding of the aircraft’s orientation and performance. If information from one or more instrume nts does not agree with pilots’ understanding of the
aircraft attitude or performance, the pilots must rely on an understanding of instrument design and operation to reconcile discrepancies while ruling out the possibility of instrument malfunction. With conventional cockpit instruments, partially obstructed or blocked pitot tubes
and static ports, vacuum pump failures, and gyro malfunctions exhibit characteristic symptoms
96 FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System (FSIMS), Issue an FAA Industry
Training Standards (FITS) Acceptance When Requested by a Flight School, Training Center, or Other Training
Provider (Vol. 5, Chapter 9, Sec. 5) , 5-1669, CNG 0.
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55 that can be identified by comparing information from all six instruments. Although t hese
instruments use common sources of input, the independence between inputs and the redundancy
among instrument displays are sufficient to enable pilots to diagnose common failure modes. Figure 2 5 is an example of a graphic referenced in questions from t he FAA airman instrument
rating knowledge test in which a pilot applicant must interpret an instrument failure identification. A typical knowledge test question associated with this type of graphic would ask the pilot applicant to identify the system that has failed and/or determine the corrective action necessary to return the airplane to straight -and-level flight. Similar graphics and questions are
included in the knowledge test, requiring pilots to identify unusual aircraft attitudes and determine the co rrective action necessary for recovery.
Figure 25. FAA instrument rating knowledge test sample: instrument malfunction interpretation
(pitot tube intake and drain blockage).
As the pilot of the Luna, New Mexico, accident saw firs thand, however, the task of
interpreting malfunctions and failures in glass cockpit displays is different than for conventional cockpit instruments. Different glass cockpit systems can also behave very differently from one another. For example, the pitot t ube intake blockage in the system installed in the New Mexico
accident aircraft resulted in the air data parameters being flagged as invalid. Further, some manufacturers of glass cockpit systems use designs that combine both the air data computer and
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56 AHRS component functions so that a similar blockage could affect not only the airspeed and
altitude displays but also the aircraft attitude display.97
Most of the current generation of light aircraft equipped with glass cockpit displays
includes conventional ai rspeed, attitude, and altitude instruments as backup in the event of a PFD
malfunction . These backup instruments typically share the same pitot and static inputs as the
PFD. In some cases, a single small PFD -like electronic flight display is provided as a backup
instead of conventional instruments. Due to differences in the design and operation of different
electronic flight displays, it is possible that the backup display and the primary display will
respond differently to a loss of data input, and that both will function differently than conventional instruments would under the same circumstances.
Equipment -Specific Training
Problems associated with pilots learning to operate new and complex aircraft systems are
by no means new, nor are they unique to gla ss cockpits. On February 3, 1959, a Beechcraft
Bonanza , N3794N , crashed just after departure from Mason City Municipal Airport, Mason City,
Iowa. The aircraft collided with terrain in an approximately 90- degree bank, nose -down pitch
attitude, killing the pilot and three passengers: Charles Hardin, J. P. Richardson, and Richard Valenzuela, also known, respectively, as Buddy Holly, The Big Bopper, and Richie V alens.
The CAB considered the problem serious enough that it included as an attachment to the
report a Safety Message for Pilots, stating the following in regard to flight instruments: The
accident gained a level of notoriety in popular culture because of the celebrity of the passengers and subsequent movie and television depictions of the circumstances surrounding the accident. Less well known, however, are the findings of the accident investigation. In its final report on the accident, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) —predec essor to the NTSB —found the probable
cause of the accident to be the pilot’s decision to depart into IFR flight conditions when he was not qualified to do so. In addition, the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the attitude indicator, which provided a pitch displa y opposite that of the “artificial horizon” to which he was accustomed,
was found to be a contributing factor to the accident.
The assumption may be that, providing one is aware of this difference, no difficulty
should be experienced in utilizing either instrument. This assumption, however, is true
only if the pilot has had sufficient training on both instruments .
The attachment went on to issue a warning to pilots:
97 For example, the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement for the Aspen Avionics EFD1000 system (A -01-175-00
Rev. D) contains a warning that, “Because the EFD1000 uses pitot and static pressures as part of the ADAHRS [Air
Data Attitude Heading Reference System] solution, loss or corrupti on of this data, such as from a line blockage, will
impact the accuracy of data output by the ADAHRS. Affected parameters can include the airspeed, altitude and
attitude information displayed by the EFD1000. If erroneous pitot or static inputs are detected by the EFD1000, the
EFD1000 will present a ‘CROSS CHECK ATTITUDE ’ annunciation.”
98 Beech Bonanza, N3794N, Mason City, Iowa, February 3, 1959, File No. 2 -0001 (Aircraft Accident Report,
Washington, DC: Civil Aeronautics Board, September 15, 1959).
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
57 KNOW YOUR AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT, ITS CAPABILITIES AND
LIMITATIONS. DO NOT RELY UPON ANY EQUIPMENT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING ITS USE FOR THE SAFE CONDUCT OF THE FLIGHT U NTIL YOU HA VE AC QUIRED SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE
UNDER SIMULATED CONDITIONS TO INSURE YOUR ABILITY TO USE IT PROPERLY .” (emphasis included in the original)
Pilots transitioning to glass cockpit- equipped aircraft face a situation similar to that of the
Mason Ci ty accident pilot, but glass cockpit avionics present new and unique challenges for
flight training that do not apply to conventional round- dial instruments. Rapidly changing
equipment, the complexity of the systems, and the lack of standardization also increase the burden on flight instructors and pilot examiners to maintain their knowledge and proficiency with the variety of systems they may encounter when providing instruction.
The difficulty or inability to simulate various failure modes and functions can limit an
instructor’s or examiner’s ability to train pilots and evaluate their ability to respond to various emergencies or equipment malfunctions. For example, the easiest type of equipment malfunction to simulate in a typical glass cockpit aircraft is the failure of a display screen or the associated backlighting. This is commonly simulated by decreasing screen brightness until it appears blank. In the event of an actual failure, a pilot would transfer functions to the remaining display and refer to backup instruments as necessary. It is also possible to simulate the discrete failure of the air data computer or AHRS components of some PFDs, depending on the system, by either
switching off the unit or pulling a circuit breaker. However, a circuit break er should not be used
as a switch,
99 and pulling a circuit breaker is therefore not an appropriate method of simulating
failures, even though some avionics manufacturer may suggest the practice.100
99 For example, FAA Advisory Circulars AC 23 -17B and AC 120- 80 include guidance stating that a circuit
breaker (CB) should not be used as a switch. AC 120- 80 (page 11- 12) states, “Since CBs are designed to open an
electrical circuit automatically at a predet ermined overload of current, they should not be used for day -to-day
operational functions because they would not be performing their intended function, which is protection against
overloads. Circuit breakers, even those suitable for frequent operation, sho uld not be used as a switch to turn
protected items on or off.” In aircraft
equipped with analog gauges, failure of an instrument can be simulated by covering that
instrument, using static covers designed for the purpose or “sticky notes.” However, the various flight data parameters of airspeed, attitude, heading, vertical speed, and altitude are combined on a PFD, making partia l failures harder to simulate. Display manufacturers recommend against the
use of sticky notes or static covers because they might harm expensive display screens. Some third -party vendors have developed full -screen overlays to simulate various failure mode s.
100 The “Recommendations for Failure Simulation” section (page 17) of Garmin International, Inc., Integrated
Flight Deck, Guide for Designated Pilot Examiners and Certificated Flight Instructor s, 190-00368- 02, Revision C,
May 2008 (Olathe, Kansas) includes instructions for two methods of simulating failures. The instructions state that
the preferred method is to use the display dimming controls to simulate a display failure and that the other, less
desirable , method is to pull various circuit breakers. However, the guide subsequently (page 19) notes that Cessna
does not recommend this practice for its aircraft : “Cessna does not recommend pulling circuit breakers as a means of
simulating failures on the GIFD [Garmin Integrated Flight Display]. Pulling circuit breakers —or using them as
switches —has the potential to weaken the circuit breaker to a point at which it may not perform its intended
function.” The guide also acknowledges that pulling circu it breakers can interfere with the safe operation of other
equipment.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
58 In summary, accident records have demonstrated the importance of pilots understanding
the capabilities and limitations of their aircraft. The nature and complexity of glass cockpit
displays, and the variety of unique glass cockpit system designs, have created a need for new training procedures and tools to ensure that pilots have that understanding.
Tracking Equipment Function and Reliability
The NTSB identified relatively few instrument failures in the set of study accidents that
involved either conventional or glass cockpit aircraft,101 and the information necessary to compare
the reliability of conventional and glass displays was not available. In fact, one of the issues identified during the review of study accident reports was a lack of information being captured about system malfunctions and service difficulties, which could be used to research ways of preventing future accidents. One accident citing instrument malfunction in a glass cockpit aircraft occurred on January 15, 2005, when a Cirrus Design SR22, N889JB, was destroyed as the result
of impact with a house and terrain following a loss of control in flight.
The pilot departed on an IFR flight plan in instrument meteorological flight conditions
and shortly thereafter, misin terpreted a series of air traffic control instructions. Subsequent
callouts and responses by the pilot indicated confusion, to the point at which he stated, “I gotta
get my act together here.” Less than 1 minute later, the pilot reported “avionics problems ,” and
about 40 seconds after that, during his last transmission, he stated that he was “losin’ it.” The airplane subsequently descended nose -down, out of clouds, and impacted a house and terrain. The certificated
commercial pilot was fatally injured.
NTSB investigators were unable to determine the nature of the failure reported by the
accident pilot due to the severity of impact damage. However, a review of the accident aircraft maintenance records identified a history involving several PFD issues. According to aircraft maintenance records, the PFD was replaced three times before the accident: first in response to an air data failure, then to fix a navigation course indic ator failure, and finally in response to an
AHRS data failure. During the third replacement, maintenance personnel found that the display had been replaced again previously―without logbook entry―due to damage to pitot and static
fittings during installation of an air conditioning system.
The FAA maintains a service difficulty report (SDR) system to collect information about
aircraft or equipmen t problems to accomplish the following:
Provide assistance to aircraft owners, operators, maintenance organizations,
manufacturers, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in identifying aircraft
problems encountered during service. The Service Diffi culty Program provides for the
101 Of those cases with a probable cause published at the time of writing, two accidents in the glass cockpit
cohort (NTSB case numbers IAD05FA032 and DEN07LA082) , and one accident in the conventional cohort (NTSB
case number MIA06FA050) included reported malfunctions or failures of flight instruments.
102 NTSB case number IAD05FA032.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
59 collection, organization, analysis, and dissemination of aircraft service information to
improve service reliability of aeronautical products .103
Title 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 include requirements for air carriers to report c ertain
aircraft and equipment malfunctions, failures, and maintenance difficulties.
104 Title 14 CFR
Part 125 includes a similar requirement for reporting malfunctions or defects involving large
aircraft not engaged in common carriage.105
Any other failure, malfunction, or defect in an aircraft that occurs or is detected at any
time if, in its opinion, the failure, malfunction, or defect has endangered or may endanger
the safe operation of the aircraft. In addition to the lis t of specified failures, operator s
are required to report the following:
Although the SDR system was designed to collect information related to large aircraft, it
also accepts malfunction and defect reports from light aircraft used in general aviation
operations. The NTSB has previously identified the need to improve malfunction and defect
reporting and service difficulty reporting for all aircraft, issuing the following recommendation
to the FAA in 1993:
Review the reporting items and establish standardized reporting formats for malfunction
or defect reports and service difficulty reports that include the capability for electronic
submission. Encourage all operations under 14 CFR Parts 21, 43, 91, 121, 125, 127, 135,
and 145 to use electronic reporting methods for submission of service diffic ulty
information. (A -93-61)106
The NTSB also issued the following recommendation to the FAA to improve malfunction
and defect reporting for light aircraft and general aviation operations in particular:
Encourage all persons or organizations that operate under 14 CFR Parts 43 and 91 to
submit malfunction or defect reports and provide appropriate guidance to improve the
quality and content of the general aviation service difficulty data base. (A -93-62)107
In response, the FAA published AC 20- 109A , providing guidance for use of the SDR
system by the general aviation community , but the reporting of malfunctions or defects is
voluntary and not required for general aviation. A search of the FAA’s SDR system found no
records associated with any of the display failures or the installation damage event involving
N889JB.
The FAA’s Part 23 CPS report included a finding highlighting under -use of the SDR
system by general aviation maintenance personnel as a continuing problem .108
103 FAA Advisory Circular 20 -109A. The report
104 Title 14 CFR 121.703 and 135.415, respectively .
105 Part 125 applies to aircraft with a seating capacity of 20 or more passengers or maximum payload capacity of
6,000 pounds or more when common carriage is not involved.
106 Closed in 2006, “Unacceptable Action .”
107 Closed in 1994, “Acceptable Action .”
108 Finding 4.4 of the FAA CPS Report.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
60 included five recommendations to improve SDR reporting for 14 CFR Part 23 aircraft, covering
issues such as improving maintenance personnel training requirements, communication with the
aviation community about the SDR system, and the usability and functionality of the SDR
database.
In addi tion to collecting voluntary failure, malfunction, or defect reports from operators,
owners, and maintenance personnel, the FAA requires manufacturers to report certain types of
equipment failures. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.3, holders of FAA type certif icates,
supplemental type certificates, parts manufacturer approvals, or technical standard order (TSO) authorizations are required to report to the FAA any failure, malfunction, or defect in any product, part, process, or article manufactured that may res ult in “failure or malfunction of more
than one attitude, airspeed, or altitude instrument during a given operation of the aircraft.” In a
typical scenario, a pilot experiencing an equipment malfunction or failure would report the problem to a maintenance facility for repair. The manufacturer would then be notified of the problem through a warranty claim or an order for repair or replacement of the affected equipment. A manufacturer who determines that the problem involves a failure, malfunction, or defect outlined in 14 CFR 21.3 must notify the FAA through the appropriate Directorate Aircraft
Certification Office. That report must include specific details of the aircraft and equipment involved and the nature of the failure. FAA Order 8150.1B regarding the TSO program explains
that the Aircraft Certification Office will work with the manufacturer to determine the need for corrective action.
The failure, malfunction, and defect reporting requirements for manufacturers under
14 CFR 21.3 are limited to a specifi c set of circumstances, and problems similar to those
experienced by N889JB prior to the January 15, 2005, accident would likely not result in a manufacturer’s report to the FAA. An additional requirement under 14 CFR 21.3(e) states the
following :
Whenever the investigation of an accident or service difficulty report shows that an
article manufactured under a TSO authorization is unsafe because of a manufacturing or
design defect, the manufacturer shall, upon request of the Administrator, report to the
Admi nistrator the results of its investigation and any action taken or proposed by the
manufacturer to correct that defect. If action is required to correct the defect in existing
articles, the manufacturer shall submit the data necessary for the issuance of an
appropriate airworthiness directive to the Manager of the Aircraft Certification Office for
the geographic area of the FAA regional office in the region in which it is located.
In summary, NTSB accident investigations have identified cases in which system
malfunctions and service difficulties with glass cockpit equipment were not captured in a
systematic way prior to an accident. FAA requires equipment manufacturers to report specific
failures and malfunctions and allows for voluntary reports to its SDR s ystem of malfunctions and
defects affecting light aircraft. However, t he reported underutilization of the SDR system for
reporting of problems associated with light aircraft leaves accident and incident investigation as the
only publicly accessible means o f identifying many types of equipment malfunctions and defects .
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
61 Chapter 6: Data Recording in Glass Cockpit
Avionics
One of the biggest changes associated with the introduction of glass cockpit displays in
light aircraft is the capability for onboard recording of flight parameters and system information.
The software -based systems that drive glass cockpit displays and their internal memory provide
recording capabilities previously available only to large aircraft with dedicated flight data recorders.
On August 21, 2006, about 1341 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22- GTS, N518SR,
experienced an in -flight loss of aircraf t control during cruise flight near McRae, Georgia. The
personal flight was operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 under visual flight rules (VFR). Neither the private pilot nor the two passengers were injured, but the airplane was substantially d amaged by aerodynamic forces.
The pilot stated that the aircraft “encountered clear air turbulence … bounced once, and
then after losing altitude , hit a very hard bounce of severe turbulence.” After stabilizing the
airplane, the pilot noticed thin lines of paint missing from the top of the right wing. The pilot slowed the plane and landed at the nearest airport with no issues. The pilot contacted the manufacturer regarding the occurrence, and after examining the airplane, the manufacturer
contacted the NTS B to report that the aircraft had sustained substantial damage.
This case initially generated interest because it involved a relatively new and popular
airframe. Structural damage to the extent sustained by the accident aircraft would not be
expected to result from a transient turbulence encounter. Had this event involved an aircraft equipped with a conventional cockpit, the investigation would have had to rely on analysis of the
airframe structure and materials to estimate the forces encountered. However, the glass cockpit
avionics in this aircraft provided additional information critical to understanding the event.
The Avidyne PFD installed in the accident aircraft contains flash memory that stores
information processed by the unit to generate the various flight data displays. The PFD software
includes a data logging function used by the manufacturer for maintenance and diagnostics. Working with the manufacturer, NTSB investigators were able to retrieve data recorded in the PFD from the AHRS, such as pitch, roll, heading, and accelerations, and by the air data
computer, such as pressure altitude , indicated airspeed, and vertical speed recorded during the
accident flight. The information recorded by the flight displays provided an entirely different descripti on of the accident event than that described in the pilot’s initial report.
Recorded data indicated that the airplane actually climbed to 15,400 feet above mean sea
level, nearly 17,500 feet density altitude, which was the maximum operating altitude for t he
airplane. The airplane then slowed, stalled, and began a rapid descent, losing 13,000 feet of altitude in about 40 seconds before recovering. During the dive, the aircraft experienced several positive and negative pitch excursions (+50 to - 80 degrees), rolled to the right about its
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
62 longitudinal axis through two complete 360- degree revolutions, and started a third roll before
recovering to straight -and-level flight. The airspeed increased from a low of 72 knots at the start
of the dive to a maximum of about 336 knots indicated—135 knots (about 67 percent) above its
published maximum limit.109 During recovery, the airplane sustained a positive loading of at
least 4.733 vertical Gs,110 with an average of more than 4 Gs vertical loading for more than 20
seconds.111
During interviews with the NTSB investigator -in-charge of this accident, the pilot stated
that he did not use oxygen during the flight. The NTSB’s medical officer reviewed the circumstances of this event and determined that the sustained G -loading experienced by the pilot
would likely have resulted in G -induced loss of consciousness (G -LOC) or near -loss of
consciousness. T he NTSB’s medical officer determined further that the pilot’s apparent failure to
accurately recall the events of the flight most likely result ed from the confusion associated with
hypoxia and the subsequent confusion and amnesia associated with G -LOC or near G -LOC.
Data recovered from PFDs and MFDs have significantly changed the understanding of
other accident events. An example is the April 9, 2007, Cirrus accident near Luna, New Mexico,
described in chapter 5 of this report. The pilot initially reported that the accident resulted from a PFD failure. Only after review of data recovered from the aircraft PFD and MFD was th e
mismatch between equipment function and pilot expectation understood.
Another example involved a Piper a ircraft model PA -44-180 operated by the University
of North Dakota on a VFR night cross -country flight.
109 The aircraft pilot operating handbook specifies a maximum never exceed speed (V ne) of 201 knots indicated
airspeed. On October 23, 2007, about 2212
central dayl ight time, the twin -engine PA -44-180, N327ND, was substantially damaged during
an in -flight collision with terrain near Browerville, Minnesota. The accident pilot and flight
instructor were fatally injured. With no additional information, this accident could well have been assumed to have been the result of crew disorientation or loss of control at night. However, data recovered from the aircraft PFD indicated that during cruise flight, the aircraft experienced an abrupt departure from controlled flight in both roll and pitch. Subsequent microscopic
examination and DNA testing by forensic ornithologists identified material recovered from the wing skin section as remains of a Canada goose. As a result, investigators determined that a bird strike resulted in d amage to the aircraft’s left stabilator, causing the airplane to become
uncontrollable. Based on the findings of this investigation, the University of North Dakota provided additional training to its pilots and instructors regarding bird strike hazards and recommended procedures for reducing the probability of bird strikes during night cross -country
flights.
110 The PFD unit is limited to recording a vertical G -loading of 4.733 Gs even though the actual Gs loading may
have been higher.
111 For a detailed description of the recorded data, refer to Specialist’s Factual Report of Recorded Cockpit
Display Data for NTSB case ATL06LA134 in the NTSB Docket Management System.
112 NTSB investigation number CHI08FA027: this accident is included here as an example of glass cockpit data
recording, but it was not included in the statistical study analyses because it involved a twin -engine aircraft.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
63 Prior to the advent of PFDs and the availability of recorded information, techniques used
to collect information from flight instruments during general aviation accident investigations
were often limited to analysis of witness marks from needles striking instrument faceplates and
inspection of internal instrument components. Investigators were similarly limited to the analysis of physical evidence of ground scars, witness marks on flight instruments, postaccident engine tests, and aircraft wreckage when determining details of an aircraft accident or assess ing aircraft
performance prior to an accident. In contrast, software -driven systems typically leave n o physical
evidence of their performance but do allow for the recording of digital flight information that was previously limited to dedicated flight data recorders in large aircraft, enabling investigators to review aircraft and engine performance data fr om the flight.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
64 Chapter 7: Discussion
This study set out to assess the safety effect of advanced avionics capabilities on general
aviation accident rates. To that end, the study compared the operational and accident history of
two selected aircraft cohorts, one with conventional flight displays and the other with glass
cockpit primary displays. Study analyses identified several differences in the activity and accident record s of these two groups of aircraft.
Accident Involvement and Accident Rates
Study analyses showed that glass cockpit -equipped aircraft experienced proportionately
fewer total accidents than a comparable group of aircraft with conventional round- dial
instruments. The 2007 AOPA report, Technically Advanced Aircraft: Safety and Training, included similar findings —that is, that fewer glass cockpit aircraft were involved in accidents
than would be expected, given the percentage of the aircraft fleet they represent. However, unlike
the NTSB analyses, which showed that glass cockpit aircraf t had a proportionately higher
number of fatal accidents than their numbers would indicate, the AOPA study found that glass cockpit aircraft experienced a proportionately lower number of fatal accidents. Differences in the results are due in part to differ ences in the methodologies of the two studies: while the AOPA
study made comparisons throughout general aviation as a whole, the NTSB study limited its comparisons to a defined group of glass cockpit aircraft and a cohort of the same make s/models
of aircraft with conventional instruments to reduce the potential for confounds associated with
comparing aircraft of different age and capability. The NTSB study also used survey data to
make additional comparisons between aircraft using activity -based accident rates that reflect
accident risk.
The fact that the rate of total accidents observed for conventionally equipped aircraft was
higher than that of the glass cockpit aircraft would suggest a safety benefit resulting from the
new technology —if it were not for the glass cockpit cohort’s significantly higher percentage of
fatal accidents during the years 2002 through 2008 and the higher fatal accident rate observed for the cohort in 2006 and 2007. Activity and usage data from the FAA’s GAATAA Survey
confirmed tha t differences in the activity of the two cohort groups were likely to influence the
type and severity of accidents involving the aircraft in each group.
When considered as a whole, the results describe two distinct aircraft operational profiles.
Aircraft w ith conventional cockpit displays were more likely to be used for flight instruction.
Accordingly, these aircraft were also found to have flown more hours per aircraft
113 although
they were used for shorter flights114 and flew less time in instrument condition s.115
113 Based on 2006 and 2007 GAATAA Survey data. As a result,
aircraft in the conventional group were involved in more accidents during takeoffs and landings,
114 Based on statistical comparisons of accident flights.
115 Based on 2006 and 2007 GAATAA Survey data and statistical comparisons of accident flights.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
65 which often resulted in less severe outcomes, most likely due to the relatively low speeds during
those phases and the resulting low impact forces.
Conversely, the operational profile of glass cockpit -equipped aircraft was found to
involve fewer flight hours per year but longer trips. Consequently, the glass cockpit -equipped
aircraft reportedly spent more time than conventional aircraft operati ng on instrument flight
plans . The accident record is consistent with the way the aircraft were reportedly used. Glass
cockpit aircraft experienced more accidents while on long trips and in IMC but also reported
spending more time operating in instrument c onditions .
Previous NTSB research has identified a higher risk of aircraft on longer flights being
involved in weather -related accidents and has noted that accidents occurring in IMC are more
likely to be fatal due to the event profiles and impact forces typically associated with such
accidents.116
Although the study analyses provided clear evidence of a difference in o perational
profiles, they did not reveal whether aircraft owners chose to purchase glass cockpit -equipped
aircraft because they wanted the increased capabilities to support the type of flight operations they engaged in, or if the increased capabilities of their new aircraft encouraged them to conduct longer flights and/or fly in more adverse conditions. Pilot motivation and perception of the capabilities of their aircraft influence the risks they are willing to accept. Additional research is warranted to be tter understand how pilots of light aircraft perceive glass cockpit displays and
how those perceptions influence safety. However, based on the pattern of study results, the
NTSB concludes that study analyses of aircraft accident and activity data showed a decrease in total accident rates but an increase in fatal accident rates for the selected group of glass cockpit aircraft when compared to similar conventionally equipped aircraft during the study period. Overall, study analyses did not show a significant improvement in safety for the glass cockpit study group. The higher number of hours flown during long trips or in IMC result s in increased
exposure to the risks associated with those circumstances, but a comparison of activity -based
accident rates would be expected to reveal similar rates for both cockpit configurations if the
underlying accident risk were similar. The glass cockpit cohort instead experienced higher fatal
accident rates and higher accident rates in IMC than the conventional aircraft —despite the fact
that the pilots had higher levels of certification, were more likely to be instrument rated, had more total flight experience, and had more experience in the aircraft type.
Safety Issues
Training Resources and Requirements
The study included reviews of training resources, requirements, and initiatives indicative
of the FAA’s efforts to address the needs of pilots trans itioning to glass cockpit aircraft. Despite
116 Risk Factors Associated with Weather -Related General Aviation Accidents , Aviation Safety Study
NTSB/SS- 05/01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2005. )
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
66 these efforts on the part of the FAA, the NTSB did identify several safety issues and areas for
improvement during the course of the study.
A review of training resources and requirements showed that the FAA has been updating
its training materials and PTS in response to the introduction of glass cockpit displays in Part 23 aircraft. However, FAA airman knowledge tests, such as those required for the Private Pilot Certificate, Commercial Pilot Certificate, and In strument Rating, do not currently assess pilots’
knowledge of glass cockpit displays. The NTSB concludes that pilots must be able to
demonstrate a minimum knowledge of primary aircraft flight instruments and displays in order to
be prepared to safely operate aircraft equipped with those systems , which is necessary for all
aircraft but is not currently addressed by FAA knowledge tests for glass cockpit displays .
Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA revise airman knowledge tests to include questions regarding electronic flight and navigation displays, including normal operations, limitations, and the interpretation of malfunctions and aircraft attitudes.
A review of the FAA’s training initiatives showed that the FAA worked with
representatives from the general aviation industry and academia to develop its FITS initiative in response to a recognized need for improved training for advanced aircraft systems. Initial
planning documents show that the FITS initiative intended to combine teaching techniques, such as scenario -based training, with requirements for equipment -specific training. The FAA is now
incorporating scenario- based training and pilot decision -making tools, but to date it has not
implemented the equipment -specific training requirements suggested in the original FITS
program documents. Rather, the FAA has recognized several factory and national training provider programs as being “FITS accepted.” T his study relied on a retrospective review of
accident records that did not allow for detailed comparisons of the training history of all accident pilots, but a review of manufacturer training programs suggests that they primarily benefit the first owner (purchaser) of a new aircraft or pilots who seek out such training. In some cases, insurance companies may require pilots to receive equipment -specific transition and/or recurrent
training, but those requirements are neither uniformly nor universally applie d. Further, some
aircraft owners may avoid insurance requirements by choosing to self -insure their aircraft. The
lack of FAA training requirements and the variability of nonregulatory training requirements and programs suggest that additional equipment -specific training requirements are necessary to
ensure that all pilots of glass cockpit -equipped aircraft possess the knowledge and skill necessary
to operate their aircraft safely.
Providing Pilots with Information about Display Operation and Limitations
The study considered several accident case studies that highlighted the complexity and
unique functionality of glass cockpit displays in comparison to conventional instruments, as well as potential safety -critical issues associated with the design and operati on of software -based
systems. The case studies illustrate the importance of pilots’ receiving sufficient information about system operations and limitations so that they are prepared to identify and safely respond to system malfunctions and failures.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
67 The f unctions of conventional instruments can be replicated in many ways using solid-
state systems, and manufacturers have developed unique designs of pressure transducers,
specially mounted gyros, accelerometers, and magnetometers controlled by proprietary sof tware.
The wide variety of complex glass cockpit equipment designs, and their proprietary technology,
demands that any discussion of these displays be system -specific. Consequently, as electronic
systems replace analog gauges, the expectation that average general aviation pilots will understand the inner workings of their cockpit instruments is no longer realistic. This problem is compounded by the fact that, unlike analog gauges, the functionality and capability of electronic display systems can continue t o evolve after they are installed because of subsequent software
revisions. The resulting increase in system complexity burdens pilots with the need to keep up with changes so that they can understand their avionics systems well enough to identify and troubleshoot any abnormal system operations or malfunctions that they might encounter in flight.
An additional difficulty is that, in comparison to the detailed information included in FAA training handbooks about conventional flight instruments, the informati on about glass cockpits is
currently limited to very general descriptions of system components and displays.
In addition, as the pilot of the Luna, New Mexico, accident aircraft found, glass cockpit
displays may function differently than conventional displ ays under certain conditions. In that
case, a blocked pitot tube intake that would have affected only the airspeed indicator of a conventiona l cockpit display resulted in loss of airspeed, altitude, and rate -of-climb information
in a glass cockpit display. The information provided to the pilot indicated only that the air data
computer had failed, with no indication of why it had failed or whether the situation could be safely corrected in flight. The NTSB concludes that pilots are not always provided all of the
information necessary to adequately understand the unique operational and functional details of the primary flight display s in their airplanes . Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA
require all manufacturers of certified electronic PFDs to include information in their approved AFM and pilot’s operating handbook supplements regarding abnormal equipment operation or
malfunction due to subsyste m and input malfunctions , including but not limited to pitot and/or
static system blockages, magnetic sensor malfunctions, and attitude -heading reference system
alignment failures.
Equipment -Specific Training Requirements
Integrated electronic displays hav e the potential to increase the safety of general aviation
aircraft operations by providing pilots with more operational and safety -related information and
functionality. For that potential to be realized, however, the burden of responsibility falls on pilots to operate the equipment safely and efficiently. Any deficiencies or inefficiencies in
equipment functionality and interface design must be addressed through superior pilot training and skill.
As aircraft equipment becomes more complex , the demands pl aced on pilots to manage
and monitor equipment operation will continue to increase. FAA Part 23 - Certification Process
Study Report
117 FAA , July 2009. findings and comments included in pertinent draft FAA ACs suggest that the
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
68 human- equipment interaction issues previously i dentified for Part 25 transport -category aircraft
will become increasingly critical for Part 23 aircraft. In contrast to the generalized training
traditionally required to operate the relatively simple systems in Part 23 aircraft, the complexity and variat ion of Part 25 aircraft systems have been addressed by requiring pilots to hold a type
rating to act as pilot- in-command.
Equipment Malfunction Training However, now that light aircraft are incorporating
integrated glass cockpit avionics that rival in complexity those in Part 25 aircraft, generalized
systems training may not be sufficient for pilots of these aircraft . Different system architectures
require different operating techniques , and responses to failure and knowledge of one type of
glass cockpit display are not likely to transfer to other systems . The NTSB concludes that
generalized guidance and training are no longer sufficient to prepare pilots to safely operate glass
cockpit avionics; effective pilot instruction and evaluation must be tailored to specific
equipment. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA incorporate training elements
regarding electronic PFDs into its training materials and aeronautical knowledge requirements
for all pilots. The NTSB also recommends that the FAA incorporate training e lements regarding
electronic primary flight displays into its initial and recurrent flight proficiency requirements for pilots of 14 CFR Part 23 certified aircraft equipped with those systems that address variations in
equipment design and operation of suc h displays.
Although PFD screen failure is easy to simulate in a training environment, the accident
case studies cited in this safety study suggest that screen failure may not be the most likely type
of glass cockpit failure or abnormal operation that a pilot will encounter. That is, training pilots
to fly by backup instruments when faced with a blank primary display may not adequately prepare them to respond to a partial failure in which they are likely to see a compelling display that is presenting erroneous or incomplete data. To be adequately prepared to respond to flight
instrument system malfunctions and failures, pilots should be trained to identify and respond to all anticipated failure modes. However, in many cases , it is neither appropriate nor practical to
train for all anticipated types of glass cockpit avionics failures and malfunctions in the aircraft. The NTSB concludes that simulators or procedural trainers are the most practical alternative
means of training pi lots to identify and respond to glass cockpit avionics failures and
malfunctions that cannot be easily or safely replicated in light aircraft. Pilots who do not have
ready access to approved flight simulators or training devices could benefit from equipment -specific training using software applications or procedural trainers that replicate glass
cockpit displays. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA develop and publish guidance
for the use of equipment -specific electronic avionics display sim ulators and procedural trainers
that do not meet the definition of flight simulation training devices prescribed in 14 CFR Part 60 to support equipment -specific pilot training requirements.
118 Title 14 CFR 61.31.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
69 Tracking Service Difficulties and Equipment Malfunctions
NTSB investigations have revealed multiple instances of glass cockpit avionic s
malfunctions that were not required to be reported to the FAA and that did not result in an SDR
system report. Findings of the FAA Part 23 - Small Airplane Certification Process Study suggest
a general difficulty with tracking Part 23 equipment performance due to SDR system underreporting for light aircraft. The NTSB concludes that identification and tracking of service
difficulties, equipment malfunctions or failures, abnormal operat ions, and other safety issues will
be increasingly important as light aircraft avionics systems and equipment continue to increase in complexity and variation of design, and
current reporting to the FAA’s SDR system does not
adequately capture this informa tion for 14 CFR Part 23 certified aircraft used in general aviation
operations. The NTSB also concludes that the FAA’s current review of the 14 CFR Part 23
certification process provides an opportunity to improve upon deficiencies in the reporting of equipment malfunctions and defects identified by the FAA and a viation industry representatives
in the July 2009 Part 23 - Small Airplane Certification Process Study .
However, the review of 14 CFR Part 23 and resulting regulatory actions will likely
require con siderable time. Therefore, to improve the voluntary submissions to the FAA SDR
system in the interim, the NTSB recommends that the FAA inform aircraft and avionics
maintenance technicians about the critical role of voluntary SDR system reports involving
malfunctions or defects associated with electronic primary flight, navigation, and control systems
in 14 CFR Part 23 certified aircraft used in general aviation operations.
Despite the identified problems associated with tracking the function and reliability of
glass cockpit displays in Part 23 aircraft, the technology has provided a new potential source of
safety information . The NTSB concludes that some glass cockpit displa ys include recording
capabilities that have significantly benefited accident investigations and provide the general aviation community with the ability to improve equipment reliability and the safety and
efficiency of aircraft operations through data analy ses.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
70 Summary
This study used manufacturer records, aircraft investigation information, and a tailored
subset of general aviation activity survey data to assess how the transition to electronic PFD
avionics has affected the safety of light aircraft . The study also evaluated the resources and
requirements supporting the transition to this new technology. The results of this study suggest that, for the aircraft and time period studied, the introduction of glass cockpit PFDs has not yet
resulted in the anticipa ted improvement in safety when compared to similar aircraft with
conventional instruments. Advanced avionics and electronic displays can increase the safety potential of general aviation aircraft operations by providing pilots with more operational and
safety-related information and functionality, but more effort is needed to ensure that pilots are
prepared to realize that potential. The FAA, manufacturers, aviation industry groups, and
academia have an established history of collaboration through the FITS program initiative for
supporting aircraft model -specific and scenario -based training techniques that would teach pilots
“higher -order thinking skills.” However, the FAA has changed the focus of the FITS initiative
and has to date relied on manufacturers a nd commercial vendors to deliver the
equipment -specific training originally envisioned for FITS. Adoption of uniform
equipment -specific training elements by the FAA to ensure pilots have adequate knowledge of
aircraft equipment operation and malfunctions, as well as improved reporting of equipment
malfunctions and service difficulties, is likely to improve the safety of general aviation
operations beyond those involving aircraft with glass cockpit displays. However, such actions are
particularly important in order to achieve the potential safety benefits associated with advanced
cockpit technologies in light aircraft.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
71 Conclusions
Findings
1. Study analyses of aircraft accident and activity data showed a decrease in total accident rates
but an increase in fatal accident rates for the selected group of glass cockpit aircraft when
compared to similar conventionally equipped aircraft during the study period. Overall, study analyses did not show a significant improvement in safety for the glass cockpit study group.
2. Pilots must be able to demonstrate a minimum knowledge of primary aircraft flight instruments and displays in order to be prepared to safely operate aircraft equipped with
those systems , which is necessary for all aircraft but is not currently addressed by Federal
Aviation Administration knowledge tests for glass cockpit displays .
3. Pilots are not always provided all of the information necessary to adequately understand the
unique operational and functional details of the primary flight instruments in their airplanes.
4. Generalized guidance and training are no longer sufficient to prepare pilots to safely operate
glass cockpit avionics; effective pilot instruction and evaluation must be tail ored to specific
equipment .
5. Simulators or procedural trainers are the most practical alternative means of training pilots to identify and respond to glass cockpit avionics failures and malfunctions that cannot be easily or safely replicated in light aircra ft.
6. Identification and tracking of service difficulties, equipment malfunctions or failures, abnormal operations, and other safety issues will be increasingly important as light aircraft avionics systems and equipment continue to increase in complexity and variation of design, and current reporting to the Federal Aviation Administration’s service difficulty reporting
system does not adequately capture this information for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part
23 certified aircraft used in general aviation operations .
7. The Federal Aviation Administration’s current review of the 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 23 certification process provides an opportunity to improve upon deficiencies in the reporting of equipment malfunctions and defects identified by the Federal Aviation
Administration and aviation industry representatives in the July 2009 Part 23 - Small
Airplane Certification Process Study .
8. Some glass cockpit displays include recording capabilities that have significantly benefited accident investigations and provide the general aviation community with the ability to
improve equipment reliability and the safety and efficiency of aircraft operations through data analyses.
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
72 Recommendations
As a result of this safety study, the National Transpor tation Safety Board makes the
following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:
Revise airman knowledge tests to include questions regarding electronic flight
and navigation displays, including normal operations, limitations, and the interpretation of malfunctions and aircraft attitudes. (A -10-36)
Require all manufacturers of certified electronic primary flight displays to include
information in their approved aircraft flight manual and pilot’s operating
handbook supplements regarding abn ormal equipment operation or malfunction
due to subsystem and input malfunctions, including but not limited to pitot and/or static system blockages, magnetic sensor malfunctions, and attitude -heading
reference system alignment failures. (A -10-37)
Incorpor ate training elements regarding electronic primary flight displays in to
your training materials and aeronautical knowledge requirements for all pilots .
(A-10-38)
Incorporate training elements regarding electronic primary flight displays into your initial and recurrent flight proficiency requirements for pilots of 14 Code of
Regulations Part 23 certified aircraft equipped with those systems that address
variations in equipment design and operation of such displays. (A-10-39)
Develop and publish guidance for the use of equipment -specific electronic
avionics display simulators and procedural trainers that do not meet the definition
of flight simulation training devices prescribed in 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 60 to support equipment -specific pilot training requirements. (A -10-40)
Inform aircraft and avionics maintenance technicians about the critical role of
voluntary service difficulty reporting system reports involving malfunctions or
defects associated with electroni c primary flight, navigation, and control systems
in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 certified aircraft used in general
aviation operations . (A-10-41)
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN ROBERT L. SUMWALT
Chairman Member
CHRISTOPHER A. HART
Vice Chairman
Adopted : March 9, 2010
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
74 Appendix: Study Accidents
ntsb_no ev_date Registration Make Model Glass Severity
ANC06CA036 24-Mar-06 N514ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ANC06CA114 12-Aug-06 N2469U Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL03LA022 3-Dec- 02 N289HG Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-161 Conventional NonFatal
ATL03LA034 11-Jan-03 N5199H Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL04FA096 19-Apr-04 N8157J Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit Fatal
ATL04LA060 27-Dec- 03 N742CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
ATL04LA140 24-Jun-04 N2116P Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL04LA143 20-Jul-04 N2069S Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL04WA042 12-Oct-03 N100BR Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional Fatal
ATL05CA153 24-Aug-05 N21670 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL05CA160 10-Sep-05 N1251C Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL05FA034 9-Dec- 04 N42SE Diamond Aircraft DA40 Conventional Fatal
ATL05LA105 20-Jun-05 N53538 Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional Fatal
ATL05LA156 31-Aug-05 N5213M Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL06CA068 16-Apr-06 N21527 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL06CA089 6-Jun-06 N1046P Mooney M20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL06CA117 3-Aug-06 N124CK Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL06FA029 29-Dec- 05 N799TM Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
ATL06LA035 13-Jan-06 N87HK Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
ATL06LA058 31-Mar-06 N2157V Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional NonFatal
ATL06LA134 21-Aug-06 N518SR Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL07CA035 28-Jan-07 N221GW Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
ATL07CA047 5-Mar-07 N2145T Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ATL07CA049 11-Mar-07 N313L Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL07CA093 15-Jun-07 N2228L Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL07CA105 15-Jul-07 N13151 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ATL07FA010 22-Oct-06 N2135L Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit Fatal
ATL07LA041 9-Feb-07 N315P Hawker Beechcraft 36 Conventional NonFatal
ATL07LA115 17-Aug-07 N869CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CEN09CA002 3-Oct-08 N5172J Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CEN09CA020 11-Oct-08 N764C Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional NonFatal
CEN09CA049 3-Nov-08 N558SR Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CEN09FA083 6-Dec- 08 N6053B Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit Fatal
CEN09WA033 22-Oct-08 N467BD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
CHI02FA231 4-Aug-02 N316PM Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-46-350 Conventional Fatal
CHI02LA258 17-Aug-02 N336CB Hawker Beechcraft 36 Conventional NonFatal
CHI03FA057 18-Jan-03 N9523P Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional Fatal
CHI03FA284A 22-Aug-03 N53033 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional Fatal
CHI03LA061 31-Jan-03 N670CS Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI04CA251 9-Sep-04 N379BF Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI04FA257 12-Sep-04 N843MC Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional Fatal
CHI05CA007 16-Oct-04 N555MN Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI05CA027 31-Oct-04 N814FA Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional NonFatal
CHI05CA035 21-Nov-04 N967SA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI05CA085 2-Apr-05 N8150F Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
75 ntsb_no ev_date Registration Make Model Glass Severity
CHI05FA042 9-Dec- 04 N587C Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Conventional Fatal
CHI05LA223 10-Aug-05 N795WW Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI05LA227 11-Aug-05 N632FA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI06CA122 28-Apr-06 N1129P Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI06CA133 20-May -06 N814SN Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
CHI06CA135 23-May -06 N409TA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI06CA183 8-Jul-06 N335SP Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI06CA189 13-Jul-06 N918TA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI06CA197 22-Jul-06 N52728 Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Conventional NonFatal
CHI06CA267 15-Sep-06 N6500V Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 350 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI06CA276 6-Sep-06 N2430A Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI06FA043 11-Dec- 05 N621PH Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
CHI06FA186 11-Jul-06 N8163Q Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
CHI06FA218 5-Aug-06 N658CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI06FA245 28-Aug-06 N91MB Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
CHI07CA308 29-Sep-07 N2327J Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI07LA164 7-May -07 N51827 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI08CA002 3-Oct-07 N437ND Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-161 Conventional NonFatal
CHI08CA029 29-Oct-07 N77LU Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI08CA091 17-Mar-08 N53417 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
CHI08CA138 21-May -08 N1387C Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit NonFatal
CHI08CA263 25-Aug-08 N1281 Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DCA07MA003 11-Oct-06 N929CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Conventional Fatal
DCA07WA024 2-Feb-07 N901SR Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit Fatal
DEN03LA017 20-Nov-02 N850FS Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-201 Conventional NonFatal
DEN04CA137 29-Aug-04 N2099J Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DEN04FA087 7-Jun-04 N6162E Hawker Beechcraft 36 Conventional Fatal
DEN04LA053A 26-Mar-04 N5345G Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DEN05LA022 29-Oct-04 N203RF Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN06CA022 10-Dec- 05 N1053X Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DEN06FA023 13-Dec- 05 N1257Z Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional Fatal
DEN06FA114 15-Aug-06 N8127J Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN06FA131 15-Sep-06 N787SL Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit Fatal
DEN07CA128 26-Jul-07 N1049V Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN07CA154 13-Aug-07 N249FS Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN07LA082 9-Apr-07 N953CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN07LA119 11-Jul-07 N97PP Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN07LA137 14-Aug-07 N395MR Mooney M20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN07WA005 8-Oct-06 N147SR Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN08CA051 17-Jan-08 N819C Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DEN08FA141 15-Aug-08 N487TC Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit Fatal
DEN08LA111 21-Jun-08 N5178Y Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DFW05CA077 21-Jan-05 N832TC Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional NonFatal
DFW05CA253 29-Sep-05 N5343U Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DFW06CA098 9-Apr-06 N358TW Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DFW06LA038 9-Dec- 05 N302BY Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DFW06LA101 7-Apr-06 N142SF Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DFW07CA012 15-Oct-06 N1013Y Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
76 ntsb_no ev_date Registration Make Model Glass Severity
DFW07CA210 28-Sep-07 N364GW Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DFW07FA019 5-Nov-06 N53443 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional Fatal
DFW07LA021 31-Oct-06 N506C Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DFW07LA207 25-Sep-07 N22237 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
DFW08CA021 26-Oct-07 N5181A Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
DFW08FA060 2-Feb-08 N824BJ Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
DFW08FA111 22-Apr-08 N729SR Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
DFW08FA204 10-Aug-08 N214MT Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional Fatal
ERA09CA007 7-Oct-08 N889LD Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ERA09CA016 6-Oct-08 N22AS Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ERA09CA017 7-Oct-08 N771CP Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ERA09CA035 1-Nov-08 N2055R Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ERA09CA041 6-Nov-08 N1242C Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
ERA09CA110 27-Dec- 08 N178AF Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
ERA09FA053 13-Nov-08 N827GM Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional Fatal
FTW02CA249 4-Sep-02 N9855S Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-161 Conventional NonFatal
FTW04CA163 16-Jun-04 N2101M Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
FTW04LA072 7-Feb-04 N2124Z Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
FTW04LA123A 9-May -04 N89SE Diamond Aircraft DA40 Conventional NonFatal
FTW04LA178 24-Jun-04 N810SA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
IAD03FA039 20-Mar-03 N1005P Mooney M20 Conventional Fatal
IAD04CA009 5-Feb-04 N5165M Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
IAD05CA014 19-Nov-04 N2120M Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
IAD05CA056 16-Apr-05 N127X Diamond Aircraft DA40 Glass cockpit NonFatal
IAD05CA131 5-Sep-05 N209SL Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
IAD05FA032 15-Jan-05 N889JB Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
IAD05LA043B 9-Mar-05 N3513F Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
IAD05LA111 20-Jul-05 N1328N Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX02LA192 8-Jun-02 N480DW Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX03LA170 29-May -03 N5329L Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX03LA186 8-Jun-03 N519ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX03LA228 7-Jul-03 N288PA Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional NonFatal
LAX03LA231 12-Jul-03 N5327G Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX03LA273 31-Aug-03 N280KT Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-46-350 Conventional NonFatal
LAX04CA130 14-Feb-04 N262TA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX04CA288 8-Aug-04 N5327G Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX04LA060 6-Dec- 03 N396TA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX04LA211 14-May -04 N5341G Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional NonFatal
LAX04LA324 19-Sep-04 N931CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
LAX05CA028 5-Nov-04 N20519 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX05CA299 4-Sep-05 N53056 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX05FA032 10-Nov-04 N803ZG Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX05FA088 6-Feb-05 N286CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX05LA073 18-Jan-05 N2157H Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional Fatal
LAX05LA109 7-Mar-05 N517SW Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX05LA118 22-Mar-05 N562AB Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX05LA210 18-Jun-05 N626Z Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX06CA039 30-Oct-05 N51732 Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional NonFatal
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
77 ntsb_no ev_date Registration Make Model Glass Severity
LAX06CA128 9-Mar-06 N8141L Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX06CA173 28-Apr-06 N1488C Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Conventional NonFatal
LAX06CA218 27-Jun-06 N562H Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX06FA014 17-Oct-05 N285JB Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX06FA087 9-Jan-06 N526CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX06FA186 27-May -06 N451JE Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX06FA243 23-Jul-06 N241JL Hawker Beechcraft 36 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX07CA092 14-Feb-07 N289SP Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX07CA101 3-Mar-07 N526ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX07CA139 28-Apr-07 N1273E Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX07CA171 7-May -07 N533ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX07CA185 2-Jun-07 N65755 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX07CA193 24-Jun-07 N567DD Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX07CA199 1-Jul-07 N214GZ Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX07CA202 3-Jul-07 N619TH Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX07CA213 9-Jul-07 N747PZ Diamond Aircraft DA40 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX07FA021 25-Oct-06 N121LD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX07FA062 18-Dec- 06 N457S Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX07FA160 11-May -07 N512DS Diamond Aircraft DA40 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX08CA084 22-Mar-08 N3105Q Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX08CA102 13-Apr-08 N21705 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX08CA124 7-Apr-08 N65630 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX08CA158 28-May -08 N2252Z Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX08CA189 24-Jun-08 N877CM Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX08FA023 28-Oct-07 N21101 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional Fatal
LAX08FA261 7-Aug-08 N15963 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX08FA265B 10-Aug-08 N8341 Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX08LA179 12-Jun-08 N233GW Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
LAX08LA191 22-Jun-08 N2436F Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit Fatal
LAX08LA217 6-Jul-08 N2544W Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit NonFatal
LAX08LA283 30-Jul-08 N5329L Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA03CA125 18-Jun-03 N53352 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA03LA096 12-Apr-03 N52903 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA03LA144B 18-Jul-03 N431ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA04CA028 21-Nov-03 N378FA Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA04CA077 17-Apr-04 N5280D Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA04CA106 17-Jul-04 N315PA Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional NonFatal
MIA04CA109 12-Aug-04 N21063 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA04FA045 19-Jan-04 N298PA Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional Fatal
MIA05CA121 2-May -05 N66113 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA05CA156 13-Sep-05 N513JG Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA05FA140 30-Jul-05 N65982 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional Fatal
MIA05LA042A 6-Dec- 04 N294PA Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional NonFatal
MIA05LA043 17-Dec- 04 N375LP Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA05LA083 28-Mar-05 N53589 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA05LA129 2-Jul-05 N53269 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA05LA143 4-Aug-05 N513CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA06CA021 18-Nov-05 N5182Z Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
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MIA06CA072 26-Mar-06 N326XT Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Conventional NonFatal
MIA06CA079 5-Apr-06 N4654M Mooney M20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA06FA050 4-Feb-06 N667WP Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional Fatal
MIA06LA067 18-Mar-06 N777YM Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA07CA008 21-Oct-06 N401ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA07CA019 19-Nov-06 N53095 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA07CA045 27-Jan-07 N20956 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA07CA101 24-May -07 N904MM Mooney M20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA07CA115 1-Jul-07 N321MD Mooney M20 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA08CA056 15-Feb-08 N618VT Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA08CA068 26-Jan-08 N65329 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA08CA073 6-Mar-08 N213LP Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA08CA092 20-Apr-08 N375LP Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA08CA112 5-Jun-08 N300PB Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA08CA124 20-Jun-08 N65357 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA08CA165 9-Aug-08 N1600U Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
MIA08CA192 11-Sep-08 N710ND Hawker Beechcraft 36 Glass cockpit NonFatal
MIA08FA081 20-Mar-08 N615WM Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
MIA08FA115 7-Jun-08 N206GG Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit Fatal
MIA08LA132 14-Jun-08 N166DS Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 350 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC02FA089 24-Apr-02 N837CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional Fatal
NYC04CA085 10-Mar-04 N316MA Diamond Aircraft DA40 Conventional NonFatal
NYC04CA094 25-Mar-04 N340PA Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional NonFatal
NYC04CA164 30-Jun-04 N421RW Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NYC04LA061 22-Jan-04 N344CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
NYC04LA209 11-Sep-04 N579AL Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC05LA024 21-Nov-04 N5294W Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NYC05LA040 22-Dec- 04 N714KL Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-46-350 Conventional NonFatal
NYC05LA110 30-Jun-05 N3452L Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC05LA131 7-Aug-05 N915DJ Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Conventional NonFatal
NYC06CA058 22-Jan-06 N285MG Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC06CA116 14-May -06 N642KM Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC06CA232 30-Sep-06 N61WT Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC06FA072 22-Feb-06 N400WX Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit Fatal
NYC06WA203 12-Aug-06 N357MV Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
NYC07CA010 19-Oct-06 N246MT Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC07CA074 9-Mar-07 N323RW Mooney M20 Conventional NonFatal
NYC07CA112 4-May -07 N462ER Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC07CA116 9-May -07 N924LP Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NYC07CA131 2-Jun-07 N2298W Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC07FA037 30-Nov-06 N665CD Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
NYC07FA083 24-Mar-07 N324ST Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-32-301 Glass cockpit Fatal
NYC07FA126 26-May -07 N2537A Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 350 Glass cockpit Fatal
NYC07LA032 17-Nov-06 N1442E Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC07LA134 8-Jun-07 N729P Hawker Beechcraft 36 Conventional NonFatal
NYC08CA179 10-May -08 N65433 Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC08CA187 7-May -08 N513JG Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NYC08CA214 13-Jun-08 N65939 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NTSB Aviation Safety Study
79 ntsb_no ev_date Registration Make Model Glass Severity
NYC08CA233 29-Jun-08 N357TG Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit NonFatal
NYC08CA282 10-Aug-08 N5210A Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
NYC08FA041 21-Nov-07 N108GD Cirrus Design Corporation SR20 Conventional Fatal
NYC08FA138 14-Mar-08 N141SR Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
NYC08LA004 5-Oct-07 N5205X Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Conventional NonFatal
SEA04LA040 10-Feb-04 N6503C Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 350 Glass cockpit NonFatal
SEA05FA023 4-Dec- 04 N1159C Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
SEA05FA038 20-Jan-05 N6057M Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
SEA05FA075 12-Apr-05 N448T Hawker Beechcraft 36 Conventional Fatal
SEA06CA187 22-Sep-06 N320CP Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
SEA06TA118 30-May -06 N8210G Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Conventional NonFatal
SEA07CA003 5-Oct-06 N134GW Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Conventional NonFatal
SEA07CA064 24-Feb-07 N224MT Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit NonFatal
SEA07CA089 31-Mar-07 N65067 Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit NonFatal
SEA07CA207 18-Jul-07 N907JW Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
SEA07FA247 31-Aug-07 N2520P Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit Fatal
SEA07LA013 31-Oct-06 N2097G Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Conventional NonFatal
SEA08CA052 26-Dec- 07 N13974 Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
SEA08CA131 10-May -08 N196DC Diamond Aircraft DA40 Glass cockpit NonFatal
SEA08CA205 19-Sep-08 N420FP Diamond Aircraft DA40 Glass cockpit NonFatal
SEA08FA023 8-Nov-07 N881CP Cessna Aircraft Company 182 Glass cockpit Fatal
SEA08FA078 16-Feb-08 N621ER Lancair/Columbia Aircraft/Cessna Aircraft Company 400 Glass cockpit Fatal
SEA08FA108 8-Apr-08 N868PC Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 Glass cockpit Fatal
SEA08LA015A 30-Oct-07 N309PA Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Conventional NonFatal
SEA08LA095 25-Mar-08 N432RM Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-28-181 Glass cockpit NonFatal
WPR09CA007 9-Oct-08 N206TT Cessna Aircraft Company 206 Glass cockpit NonFatal
WPR09CA066 21-Dec- 08 N379P Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-46-350 Glass cockpit NonFatal
WPR09CA273 5-Oct-08 N6048Z Cessna Aircraft Company 172 Glass cockpit NonFatal
WPR09LA049 27-Nov-08 N936EW Hawker Beechcraft 36 Glass cockpit NonFatal
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