NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR-25-01 - Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic at Reagan National Airport

Aviation Investigation Report

AIR-25-01

Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in

the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington

National Airport

Introduction

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is providing the following

information to urge the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take immediate

action on the safety recommendation s in this report concerning the potential for

midair collision s between traffic on helicopter Route 4 and airplanes landing on

runway 33 or departing runway 15 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

(DCA) . We identified th is issue during our ongoing investigation of the midair

collision involving a US Army Sikorsky UH -60L and PSA Airlines flight 5342, a

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI ) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL -600-2C10

(CRJ700) that occurred over the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC, on

January 29, 2025.

Background and Analysis

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST), a Sikorsky

UH-60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and PSA Airlines

flight 5342, a n MHI RJ Aviation CL -600-2C10 , N709PS, collided in flight about

0.5 nautical miles (nm) southeast of runway 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington

National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in

southwest Washington, DC.1

The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the airplane and all

3 crewmembers aboard the helicopter were fatally injured. Both aircraft were

destroyed as a result of the accident . Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions

of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic

passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT), Wichita,

Kansas, to DCA , departing ICT at 1839 EST . PAT25 originated from Davison Army

Airfield (DAA) , Fort Belvoi r, Virginia, at 1845 EST on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight

1 Visit the investigation page for this accident at ntsb.gov for additional information . March 7, 202 5 Aviation Investigation Report AIR-25-01

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2 plan for the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation with the use of night vision

goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the

time of the accident.

Preliminary air traffic control (ATC) information provided by the FAA revealed

that at 2033:41, PAT25 was about 1 5 nm northwest of DCA and requested helicopter

Route 1 to Route 4 to DAA . The DCA local controller approved this request .2

At 2043 :06, when the airplane was about 10.5 nm south of the airport,

flight 5342 contacted DCA tower and checked in on the Mount Vernon visual

approach to runway 1. The controller asked the crew of flight 5342 if they could

accept runway 33 for landing, and the flight crew accepted . At this time , PAT25 was

traveling south along the Potomac River and flight 5342 was traveling north .

At 2046:01, the controller advised PAT25 that traffic just south of the Wilson

Bridge was a CRJ (flight 5342) at 1,200 ft circling to runway 33. PAT25 confirmed

7 seconds later that they had the traffic in sight and requested visual separation ,

which the controller approved. About this time, PAT25 was crossing the Tidal Basin

and continuing southbound . The controller cleared other jet traffic on runway 1 for

departure with no delay at 2046:47 .

At 2047:3 9, with the helicopter south of Hains Point (located at the confluence

of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers and a “noncompulsory ” reporting point , as

indicated on the FAA’s Baltimore -Washington Helicopter Route Chart ), the controller

asked the crew of PAT25 to confirm that the y had the CRJ in sight . An aural conflict

alert in the tower can be heard in the background of the ATC recording at this time .

About 4 seconds later , the controller instructed PAT25 to pass behind the CRJ ;

PAT25 immediately confirmed that the traffic was in sight and again requested visual

separation, which the controller approved. The collision occurred at 2047 :59, at an

altitude about 300 ft, while flight 5342 was on final approach to land on runway 33

(see figure 1) .

2 Route 1 and Route 4 are standard helicopter routes established by the FAA and were part of

PAT25’s VFR flight plan. The contours of this route and established compulsory and noncompulsory

reporting points are described later in this report.

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Figure 1. Google Earth image with preliminary ADS -B flight track for flight 5342 (blue line)

and preliminary radar data for PAT25 ( orange line) .

DCA is equipped with three runways : runway 1/19 , runway 15/33, and

runway 4/22 .3 In general, when DCA is conducting n orth operation s (as was the case

when the collision occurred ), traffic lands and departs on runway 1 with intermittent

arrivals to runway 33 based on traffic demands and separation requirements .

Conducting northbound operations with simultaneous operations to runways 1 and

33 is a routine ATC procedure in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65B B. Use of

3 Information gathered from FAA data indicated that , between 2018 and 2024, runway 1

accounted for about 57% of arrivals, runway 19 accounted for about 38% of arrivals, runway 33

accounted for about 4% of arrivals, and runway 15 accounted for less than 1% of arrivals at DCA.

Runway 15 accounted for about 5 % of departures from DCA.

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4 runway 33 is typically limited to smaller aircraft , which are able to land on its relatively

shorter surface .4 Runway 33 is equipped with a four -light precision approach path

indicator (PAPI) that uses light cues to provide a 3° glidepath indication to pilots of

approach ing aircraft . The PAPI was operational at the time of the accident.

PAT25’s VFR flight plan entailed transiting Washington, DC, airspace following

standard helicopter routes established by the FAA: Route 1 to Route 4 . Beginning at

the American Legion Bridge near Cabin John, Maryland, Route 1 follows the western

shore of the Potomac River before crossing Key Bridge in Washington, DC . Route 1

then follows the eastern shore of the Potomac with the Kennedy Center and Lincoln

Memorial to the east and Rosslyn to the west, avoiding prohibited airspace , and

cross es Memorial Bridge , a comp ulsory reporting point (see figure 2).5 At this point,

the maximum allowable altitude on Route 1 is 200 ft a bove mean sea level (msl) .

Route 1 then continues south of the Washington Monument, crossing the Tidal

Basin before following the Washington Channel along East Potomac Park. Hains

Point, the southernmost tip of East Potomac Park , is identified as a noncompulsory

reporting point and the area where Route 4 intercepts Route 1 ; the maximum altitude

on Route 4 remains 200 ft msl .6 Route 4 continues south to ward the Woodrow Wilson

Bridge along the Potomac River’s eastern shore, with DCA to the west. South of the

Wilson Bridge, the maximum allowable altitude along Route 4 increases from

200 ft msl to 300 ft msl.

According to information obtained from FAA aeronautical information

specialists, helicopter routes have no defined lateral boundaries and are drawn to

depict linear paths along defined surface features in a manner legible to flight crews.

Any applicable al titude and lateral distance restrictions are documented in the chart

specifications or in warning boxes displayed on the chart. The lateral guidance

provided to pilots flying Helicopter Route 4 included, “via east bank of Potomac

River”; a specific distanc e from the river bank was not defined.

4 The NTSB also learned that some flight crews will specifically request to land on runway 33 ,

which is 5,204 ft long, when wind conditions favor that runway, particularly since its turn -off points are

conveniently located nearer to the terminals.

5 Compulsory reporting points, designated on Helicopter Route Charts by a solid triangle

symbol , are geographical locations where pilots must report their position to ATC.

6 Noncompulsory reporting points are designated by an open triangle symbol on the

Helicopter Route Chart. Pilots are not required, but may be requested, to report to ATC upon reaching

a noncompulsory reporting point.

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Figure 2. An excerpt of the FAA’s Helicopter Route Chart for the area surrounding DCA.

Source: FAA.

Figure 3 presents a cross -section of the airspace that e xtends from runway 33’s

centerline , spanning from the runway 33 threshold markings to the east bank of the

Potomac River . The figure shows the separation distance that would exist , according

to FAA charts, with a helicopter on Route 4 and an airplane descending on a 3° visual

glideslope (as provided by the PAPI’s glidepath indication) to runway 33 .

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Figure 3. Cross section showing the notional separation between Route 4 and a

PAPI -guided visual approach to runway 33 , according to FAA charts and aerial

photogrammetry analysis .

Because helicopter routes established by the FAA have no lateral boundar ies

and the Baltimore -Washington Helicopter Route Chart includes no warning for

helicopters to operate a defined distance from the shoreline, the shaded region

represents an approximation of the area in which helicopters could be flown. At an

altitude of 2 00 ft, a helicopter operating over the eastern shoreline of the Potomac

River would have about 75 ft of vertical separation from an airplane approaching

runway 33 , and this distance de creases if the helicopter is operated farther from the

shoreline. This vertical separation also decreases if an airplane is operating below the

3° visual glidepath provided by the runway 33 PAPI.

Review of information gathered from voluntary safety reporting programs

along with FAA data regarding encounters between helicopters and commercial

aircraft near DCA from 2011 through 2024 indicated that a vast majority of the

reported events occurred on approach to landing. Initial analysis found that at least

one traffic collision avoidance system ( TCAS ) resolution advisory was triggered per

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7 month due to proximity to a helicopter.7 In over half of these instances, the helicopter

may have been above the route altitude restriction. Two -thirds of the events occurred

at night.

A review of commercial operations at DCA (instrument flight rules departures

or arrivals) between October 202 1 and December 2024 indicated a total of 944,179

operations. During that time, there were 15,21 4 occurrences between commercial

airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than

1 nm and vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events that

involved a lateral separation less than 1,500 ft and vertical separation less than 200 ft.

As a result of the January 2025 accident , the FAA issued Notice to Air men

(NOTAM) FDC 5/4379 on February 19, 2025, which restricted helicopter traffic from

operating over the Potomac River near DCA from the surface to 17,999 ft msl until

March 31, 2025 .8 The NOTAM states that if a lifesaving medical, active law

enforcement, active air defense, or presidential transport helicopter mission must

operate in this restricted area, civilian aircraft will not be allowed in the area to

prevent potential conflicts.

The NTSB’s investigation of this accident is ongoing ; however, preliminary

findings suggest that the existing separation distances between helicopter traffic

operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on ru nway 33 are insufficient .9 Therefore,

the NTSB concludes that existing separation distances between helicopter traffic

operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on runway 33 are insufficient and pose an

intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision .

Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA prohibit operations on

helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runway s 15 and

33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at DCA . As noted

7 According to FAA publication “Introduction to TCAS II Version 7.1,” TCAS is a family of

airborne devices that functions independently of the ground -based ATC system and provides collision

avoidance protection for a broad spectrum of aircraft types. All TCA S systems provide some degree of

collision threat alerting and a traffic display. TCAS II is mandated in the United States by the FAA for

commercial aircraft, including regional airline aircraft with more than 30 seats or a maximum takeoff

weight of more t han 33,000 lbs. TCAS II provides traffic advisories (TAs) to assist the pilot in the visual

acquisition of intruder aircraft and resolution advisories ( RAs), or recommended escape maneuvers, to

either increase or maintain the existing vertical separation between aircraft. On descent below 900 ft

above ground level (agl), TCAS inhibits RAs. Below 900 ft agl on descent, TCAS issues a TA when the

intruding aircraft is about 20 s econds from the closest point of approach, or 0.3 nm, whichever occurs

first. As the aircraft descends below 400 ft agl on arrival, the aural annunciation associated with the TA

is inhibited.

8 This NOTAM replaced 5/9909 , which was issued February 4, 2025, and was similar in effect.

9 That is, the separation distances between Route 4 and runway 33 traffic given the procedures

in effect at the time of the accident.

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8 previously, runway 15/33 only accounts for 5% of departures and 4% of arrivals,

respectively, so the prohibition of using Route 4 would likely be infrequent, although

it could still negatively impact public safety helicopter operations .

The NTSB recognizes that a total closure of helicopter Route 4 between Hains

Point and the Wilson Bridge during times when runway 15/33 is in use for departures

and arrivals, respectively , would restrict a vital aviation corridor used for law

enforcement activity, Coast Guard patrols, and continuity of government

operations .10 Continued access to the most direct course possible is critical for these

operations. Additionally, mandating that controllers hold helicopters in place north or

south of DCA while airplanes are operating on runway 15/33 has the potential to

increase risk by adding to controller workload .

The NTSB concludes that when Route 4 operations are prohibited as

recommended in Safety Recommendation A-25-1, it is critical for public safety

helicopter operations to have an alternate route for operating in and around

Washington , DC, without increasing controller workload . Therefore, the NTSB

recommends that the FAA designate an alternative helicopter route that can be u sed

to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of

Route 4 is closed .

Conclusions

Findings

Existing separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and

aircraft landing on runway 33 are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to

aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision .

When Route 4 operations are prohibited as recommended in Safety

Recommendation A-25-1, it is critical for public safety helicopter operations to

have an alternate route for operating in and around Washington , DC, without

increasing controller workload .

10 Medical evacuation flights would not be impacted because they receive priority handling

under all circumstances.

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9 Recommendations

To the Federal Aviation Administration :

Prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the

Wilson Bridge when runway s 15 and 33 are being used for departures

and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National

Airport . (A-25-1) (Urgent)

Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate

travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of

Route 4 is closed . (A-25-2) (Urgent)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JENNIFER HOMENDY MICHAEL GRAHAM

Chair man Member

ALVIN BROWN

Vice Chairman THOMAS CHAPMAN

Member

J. TODD INMAN

Member

Report Date: March 7, 2025

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