NASA ASRS CALLBACK - Issue 549 (October 2025)

Issue 549 October 2025

This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance

to “interact” with the information given in a selection of

ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event or situation up to a point where a specific decision must be made, an immediate action must be taken, or a non-normal condition must be actively managed. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision, determine a possible course of action, or devise a plan that might best resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not provide all the

information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation judgment and decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action, and there may not be a “right” answer. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to these reported incidents.

The First Half of the Story

Part 91 – On the Beach

A Small Single Engine Aircraft Pilot’s Report

nI departed my home base…for a short pleasure flight.

Clear skies prevailed with visibility unlimited and winds outof the north at approximately 10 knots. I planned to fly overthe lake. As I approached the north end of the lake, I sawa beach along the lake that was aligned with the wind andmade the decision to -

What Would You Have Done?

Part 121 – Taking Action

A Commercial Fixed Wing Aircraft FO’s Report

nImmediately after the “clear to pull chocks” from the

ground crew, the Captain released the parking brakes, andwe started rolling backward. I believe the ground crew said,“Wait I’m here connected.” As we continued to roll, theCaptain and ground crew continued to communicate, and Iheard the ground crew saying, “Wait, the headset’ s hooked up to the plane.” I made direct eye contact with the Captain and told him we needed to stop several times. I could hear the ground crew saying something like, “Stop, I’m under here connected to the plane; you’re moving too fast.” I told the Captain it’ s an emergency; we need to stop now. After no response…and hearing the ground personnel struggle,

What Would You Have Done?

Part 121 – An Unexplained Shutdown

An A321 Check Airman’s Report

nDuring a single-engine taxi for departure, Engine One

experienced an uncommanded rollback and shutdown,accompanied by an EGT rise. I was conducting OE(Operating Experience) with a new Captain on his secondflight. As the Number Two Engine was stabilizing, the FlightAttendant contacted the flight deck regarding a possiblemedical situation in the cabin. While I was addressingthe medical issue, the Captain in training observed anabnormal EGT rise on Engine One. He brought this to myattention, and I -

What Would You Have Done?

Part 135 – A Mountain Approach

A Fractional Transport Aircraft FO’s Report

nIt was my first trip into Aspen, working for Company. The

weather was CAVOK (Ceiling And Visibility OK). I had

loaded the RNAV-F . The two remaining approaches

in the FMC database were the localizer to 15 and another

RNAV approach, which we did not have a plate for. Th e PM

noticed the RNAV-F did not have a runway associated with

it. It was decided that a RNWY EXT would be used in lieu of

the localizer approach because it would provide vertical

guidance using VNAV

. Due to time pressure, being vectored

for the approach, the PM neglected to change the glideslope

angle from 3° to 3.5°. Though high on the…VNAV path, a

soft terrain warning was followed by a hard terrain warning.

What Would You Have Done?

The Rest of the Story...

Part 91 – On the Beach

nland there. I circled the area at about 500’ AGL to make

sure there were no people, vessels or structures anywhere

near the area I planned to land. I set up for a half-mile

final…dropped my flaps, and slowed to approach speed. I

verified again the beach looked clear with no obstacles or

people. I touched down on my main gear as slow as practical

and immediately decelerated in soft mud. The aircraft slowly

went over on its nose, but not all the way over - the tail did

not strike.… I unbuckled and lowered myself against the

windshield

and roof. I turned off the mags and master switch.

I waited for authorities to arrive. I had no injuries, and there was no damage to any property. In hindsight, it was a completely stupid decision…to land there.… I should know better than to do…this. There were no aircraft anomalies and no reason for me to land there. It took a brief moment of “aviation fun” to re-learn an important lesson.… I’m never too old to learn. I deeply regret this lapse in judgement.

Part 121 – Taking Action

nI quickly applied the brakes to stop the aircraft. The stop

was abrupt in order to prevent potential injury to groundcrew and to prevent us from entering an active taxiway. TwoFlight Attendants had fallen from the quick stop. We returnedto the gate to get them cleared by Medical and to have theaircraft checked out for any maintenance irregularitiesto ensure safety. Both Flight Attendants were cleared byEMS, and the airplane was inspected by the Captain withno irregularities detected. No passenger injuries werereported.… Review and have detailed briefings on airport power-out notes. Follow ground communication procedures and ensure we understand instructions before taking actions.

Part 121 – An Unexplained Shutdown

nre-engaged fully with the flight deck. We observed that

Engine One had shut down by itself, with no visible signsof distress or damage. The ECAM displayed an “ENGINE1 F AIL” message and suggested an engine restart if nodamage was suspected. Given the simultaneous cabin andengine concerns, I coordinated with…Ground to taxi usingonly Engine Two to a safe area to address both issues. TheFlight Attendant later confirmed that the cabin issue hadresolved favorably, as the passenger was simply a nervousflyer. I then contacted Maintenance Control for guidanceand diagnosis regarding the engine issue. Maintenancereviewed their data and indicated that the fault appeared tobe related to the F ADEC (Full Authority Digital Electronic Control). They advised that a reset would likely resolve the issue. I informed Maintenance Control that the Captain in training had observed a redline EGT rise during the event, however, Maintenance stated that no EGT exceedance was recorded in their data, and we did not have any exceedance indication in the flight deck.… Additionally, subsequent to our flight, Maintenance confirmed that our flight history showed no EGT exceedance. Following Maintenance’ s direction, we performed a F ADEC reset. Before attempting an engine restart, I recommended conducting a dry motor to clear any residual fuel, which Maintenance agreed with. The subsequent engine start was normal with all engine parameters within limits. During takeoff, engine indications, including EGT and fuel flow, were normal and within 10 degrees of each other. Cruise checks also indicated normal operation. After departure, I noticed a red marking on the EGT gauge that had not been previously observed during ground operations, possibly due to expectation bias. Out of an abundance of caution, I notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control to meet the flight upon arrival. While further reviewing the situation, I retrieved a data printout left onboard from the previous flight.… Upon review, I noticed evidence suggesting similar engine issues had occurred twice on the inbound flight. Based on this information and the symptoms experienced, I elected to request a more thorough inspection by Maintenance before the aircraft was returned to service.

Part 135 – A Mountain Approach

nIn good VMC conditions, the descent rate was shallow,

and the terrain was visually cleared. The approach wascontinued to a landing. The GPWS provided appropriateterrain warnings. Terrain avoidance was done visually.During the course of the flight, I inquired as to whatapproach we may get into Aspen. It was my understandingthat Company had a tailored approach to Runway 15. Thedatabase only had two approaches that the crew had platesfor. The database was checked to be current prior to the1st flight of the day. The crew was late doing the approachchecklist due to a late start getting landing data. The descentrate was shallowed, but not enough to prevent the terrainwarning. The approach was continued with the terrain insight to a landing.… I should’ve gone around.

The reports featured in CALLBACK are offered in the spirit of stimulating

thought and discussion. While NASA ASRS does not verify or validate reports, we encourage you, our readers, to explore them and draw your own conclusions.

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Learn More About ASRS UAS/Drone Safety Reporting

ASRS Alerts Issued in August 2025

Subject of Alert No. of Alerts

Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2

Airport Facility or Procedure 22

ATC Equipment or Procedure 16

Other 2

TOTAL 42August 2025 Report Intake

Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,494

General Aviation Pilots 1,600

Flight Attendants 1,571

Military/Other 614

Controllers 338

Mechanics 237

Dispatchers 225

TOTAL 10,079549

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