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IATA Annual Safety Report 2025 - Executive Summary and Safety Overview
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IATA Annual Safety Report - 202 5
Executive Summary and Safety
Overview
2 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
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Contents
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Summary of 2025 Safety Performance: ...................................................................................................................................... 8
1. IATA Safety Strategy ....................................................................................................................................................... 12
1.1. Safety Leadership and Safety Culture ...............................................................................................................................12
2025: Key highlights .........................................................................................................................................................................12
Expanding Engagement and Commitment ..............................................................................................................................12
1.2. Safety Risk (SIH) .........................................................................................................................................................................13
Safety Risk Assessments (SRA) .............................................................................................................................................13
IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) – Risk- Based Audits .........................................................................................14
IATA Safety Issue Review Meeting (SIRM) ..........................................................................................................................14
1.3. IATA Connect .............................................................................................................................................................................14
1.4. IATA Safety Management System (SMS) .........................................................................................................................15
SMS Strategy Outcomes .........................................................................................................................................................15
2. IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) ........................................................................................................................ 16
Auditor Management and Training .......................................................................................................................................16
2.1. IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) Program .....................................................................................................16
3. IATA World Safety and Operations Conference (WSOC) .................................................................................... 17
4. Accident Investigation .................................................................................................................................................... 17
4.1. Accident Investigation Final Reports ................................................................................................................................. 18
4.2. Accident Investigation Roadmap ........................................................................................................................................18
4.3. Accident Investigation at the 2025 WSOC, Xiamen, China ........................................................................................19
4.4. Accident Investigation Training and Advocacy ..............................................................................................................19
5. Reduce Operational Risk ................................................................................................................................................ 20
Global High -Risk Categories of Occurrence .....................................................................................................................20
IATA Priorities ..............................................................................................................................................................................20
5.1 2025 Occurrences ............................................................................................................................................................21
5.1.1 Occurrences from a third -party source ............................................................................................................21
System/Component Failures ..................................................................................................................................................22
Wildlife Strikes/ Birds ................................................................................................................................................................. 23
5.1.2 Serious incidents ......................................................................................................................................................24
5.2 Loss of Control In -flight (LOC -I) ....................................................................................................................................24
5.3 Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) ............................................................................................................................25
5.4 Mid -Air Collision (MAC) / Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory Measurement
Enhancement ......................................................................................................................................................................................26
MAC Overview .............................................................................................................................................................................26
Enhancing TCAS Effectiveness .............................................................................................................................................26
Emerging Risks ............................................................................................................................................................................26
5.5 Runway Safety ....................................................................................................................................................................27
5.5.1 Tail Strike Initiatives .................................................................................................................................................27
Tail Strike Overview ....................................................................................................................................................................27
Tail Strike Survey ........................................................................................................................................................................27
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Tail Strike Action Plan ................................................................................................................................................................27
Industry Engagement ................................................................................................................................................................28
5.5.2 Runway Excursions (REs) Initiatives ...................................................................................................................28
5.5.3 Runway Incursions (RIs) ..........................................................................................................................................28
5.5.4 Unstable Approaches (UAs) ..................................................................................................................................29
6. Training and Licensing .................................................................................................................................................... 29
6.1 Competency -Based Training and Assessment (CBTA) Programs – Implementation Support ..............29
6.2 IATA CBTA Library .............................................................................................................................................................29
6.3 IATA Global CBTA Center of Excellence (CoE) ........................................................................................................29
7. Cabin Safety ....................................................................................................................................................................... 30
7.1 Cabin End State ..................................................................................................................................................................30
7.2 Cabin Safety Incidents .....................................................................................................................................................30
7.3 Cabin Safety Activities .....................................................................................................................................................31
8. Cargo Safety ...................................................................................................................................................................... 32
8.1 Safety of the Supply Chain .............................................................................................................................................32
8.2 Dangerous Goods .............................................................................................................................................................32
Lithium Batteries .........................................................................................................................................................................33
Global Outreach ..........................................................................................................................................................................33
8.3 Unit Load Devices (ULD) Safety ....................................................................................................................................33
Wireless Tracking Devices Attached to ULDs ..................................................................................................................33
ULD Safety Awareness .............................................................................................................................................................33
8.4 Mail Safety ............................................................................................................................................................................34
Air Mail Safety Guidelines ........................................................................................................................................................34
Non -Compliant Hybrid Scenarios .........................................................................................................................................34
Air Mail Webinars ........................................................................................................................................................................34
9. IATA Turbulence Aware (ITA) ........................................................................................................................................ 34
10. Emergency Response Planning (ERP) ........................................................................................................................ 34
2025: Key Highlights ........................................................................................................................................................................35
Key Ongoing Activities ....................................................................................................................................................................36
11. Ground Operations Safety ............................................................................................................................................. 37
11.1 IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) ................................................................................................37
11.2 Top ISAGO findings and variations under the new ISAGO audit model 2025 ..............................................38
11.3 Root causes ISAGO findings and conclusion ..........................................................................................................41
11.4 Ground Damage Reduction Initiatives ........................................................................................................................42
11.5 Ground Operations Accidents, Incidents and Injuries Prevention ...................................................................44
11.6 ADX – Aircraft damage and fatality/injuries ..............................................................................................................44
11.7 IDX – Aircraft damage ......................................................................................................................................................44
11.8 IDX – Aircraft loading and unloading errors (IDX events related to IGOM) ....................................................45
11.9 IDX – GSE operations incidents (GHSPs) ...................................................................................................................45
11.10 Safety Issue Hub – Ground Operations Risks ......................................................................................................47
11.11 Safety Incident Taxonomy and IGOM Mapping ..................................................................................................47
11.12 Safety Increase through Standardization and Adoption of Industry Standards .....................................48
11.13 DAQCP Program Output – winter season 2024 -2025 .....................................................................................49
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11.14 DAQCP Audits ................................................................................................................................................................49
11.15 DAQCP Findings ............................................................................................................................................................50
11.16 Significant Safety Hazards and Levels of Risk ....................................................................................................51
11.17 Regional Performance .................................................................................................................................................52
11.18 Hazards Coexistence ...................................................................................................................................................53
11.19 Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................................54
12. IATA Fuel Quality Pool (IFQP) ........................................................................................................................................ 54
12.1 IFQP Inspections and Findings .....................................................................................................................................55
12.2 Intoplane Fueling Filtration .............................................................................................................................................56
12.3 Summary ...............................................................................................................................................................................57
13. Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) ............................................................................................................. 58
Tail Strike Study ...........................................................................................................................................................................58
Human Factors Study ................................................................................................................................................................59
13.1 SafetyIS .................................................................................................................................................................................59
13.2 MCX ........................................................................................................................................................................................60
13.3 Artificial intelligence .........................................................................................................................................................60
13.4 Excellence Award ..............................................................................................................................................................61
14. Advocacy for Approved Aviation Infrastructure ................................................................................................... 61
14.1 Rocket Launches and Space Transport Operations .............................................................................................61
14.2 Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) ......................................62
14.3 Protection of Aircraft Radar Altimeters from Interference .................................................................................62
15. Regional Insight ................................................................................................................................................................. 65
15.1 Asia -Pacific Region (ASPAC) .........................................................................................................................................65
15.2 The Americas Region (Latin America & the Caribbean [LATAM/CAR] and North America [NAM]) .......66
15.3 Europe Region (EUR) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) ........................................................68
15.4 Africa & The Middle East (Middle East and North Africa [MENA] and Africa [AFI]) ......................................69
15.5 North Asia Region (NASIA) ..............................................................................................................................................71
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Executive Summary
In 2025, the global aviation industry transported under 5 billion passengers across 38.7 million flights.
Commercial aviation continues to be one of the safest modes of public transportation. This is demonstrated by
a sustained long‑term reduction in accident rates, declining from 3.72 accidents per million sectors in 2005 to
1.32 accidents per million sectors in 2025. This improvement reflects the industry’s enduring commitment to
safety, supported by safety management systems, technology, training, and the promotion of a strong safety
culture aimed at mitigating future risk.
Although the industry recorded a slight improvement in the overall accident rate in 2025, the year was
overshadowed by several high -profile events that had a disproportionate impact on public perception and
global fatality figures. A total of 51 accidents met the IATA classification criteria as assessed by the ACTF,
resulting in an accident rate of 1.32 per million sectors, a reduction from 2024 , when the accident rate was 1.42.
The five -year rolling average accident rate per million sectors continued its gradual improvement, declining
from 1. 31 (2020 -2024) to 1. 27 (2021 -2025) . However, despite this progress, the severity of outcomes
increased significantly. Eight of the reported accidents were fatal, resulting in 394 onboard fatalities and 35
additional fatalities, classified as other fatalities, marking the highest annual fatality total since 2018. T wo
catastrophic events accounted for more than half of all onboard losses: a mid -air collision near Washington –
Ronald Reagan National Airport on January 29th, and the crash in Ahmedabad, India on June 12th. This 12th of
June event, with 24 1 onboard fatalities plus 19 other fatalities , was th e deadliest commercial aviation accident
in nearly 11 years, surpassing all recorded fatality totals since the 2014 loss of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370,
which resulted in 239 fatalities .
Another notable 2025 accident , though with fewer fatalities due to being a freighter, occurred during takeoff in
Louisville, Kentucky. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB ), the structural failure
originated from fatigue - and overstress -related cracking in the aft attachment lugs connecting the engine
pylon to the wing. This event also illustrates how outcomes can differ significantly within the airport
environment, where critical infrastructure, surface‑movement layouts, and limited buffer zones can heighten
operational risk and reduce the margin for recovery when structural or mechanical failures occur.
While these events remain statistically rare relative to the vast number of flights operated annually, they
highlight the ongoing need for robust investigation, transparent safety oversight , and a continual focus on
identifying system gaps . In some cases, insufficient investigative information has limited the ability to classify
accidents , resulting in temporary placement under “Other End States” pending official findings. Moreover, a
number of these accidents have remained in this accident category for extended periods due to long‑pending
final reports, further highlighting the importance of timely and comprehensive investigation processes.
Comprehensive final accident investigation reports are a cornerstone of global aviation safety. As defined
under ICAO Annex 13, these reports are intended to provide transparency and actionable safety lessons to the
international aviation community. Delays or failures in publishing final reports have far‑reaching consequences,
including the persistence of unmitigated risks, missed opportunities for safety improvement, and erosion o f
public confidence in aviation oversight. Conversely, the timely and transparent publication of final
comprehensive reports reinforces the primacy of safety over political, legal, or reputational considerations,
honours victims by enabling meaningful chan ge, and strengthens the resilience of the global aviation system. In
this context, the publication of final accident reports is not discretionary; it is a professional and systemic
obligation essential to preventing future tragedies.
For the second consecutive year, tail strikes, runway excursions, and landing gear events remained the most
frequent accident categories. These trends reinforce the importance of vigilance, data -driven interventions,
and targeted training to further reduce operational risk and sustain safety improvements.
8 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
While these occurrences were non -fatal, their continued prevalence highlights persistent challenges related to
abnormal runway contact, crew response to unusual situations, manual handling , runway condition awareness,
adherence to standard operating procedures, inadequate safety management system (SMS), adverse weather
conditions and other factors.
The IATA Accident Classification Task Force (ACTF) classified accidents according to IATA Accident Criteria,
as presented within the appendix to this report.
Summary of 202 5 Safety Performance:
In total, 51 accidents were recorded , with a corresponding accident rate of 1. 32 per million sectors. This
represent s a reduction from 2024, when the accident rate was at 1.42 per million sectors . The five-year rolling
accident average also continue d its downward trend, declining from 1. 31 (2020 -2024) to 1. 27 (2021- 2025)
accidents per million sectors, reinforcing the industry’s long -term trend of improved safety performance.
Of the 51 accidents, 8 were fatal, resulting in 394 onboard fatalities and an additional 3 5 other fatalities. This
reflects a significant increase compared with 2024, which recorded 244 onboard fatalities and 7 other fatalities.
The fatality total for 2025 is the highest recorded since 2018, underscoring the disproportionate severity of a
small number of catastrophic events despite overall improvements in accident rates.
The fatality risk rate per million sectors increased from 0 .06 in 2024 to 0. 17 in 2025 . However, the long -term
trend continues to show a significant decline, dropping from 0.69 in 2005 to 0. 17 in 2025 .
Accident categories in 202 5, listed in order of the number of fatalities, with the number of accidents in
brackets, were:
▪ Other End State1 (4) with 279 onboard fatalities , plus 19 other fatalities
▪ Mid -Air Collision (1) with 64 onboard fatalities , plus 3 other fatalities
▪ Controlled Flight into Terrain (1) with 48 onboard fatalities
▪ In-flight Damage (1) with 3 onboard fatalities , plus 11 other fatalities
▪ Runway Excursion (1) with 2 other fatalities
The accident categories in 2025 , listed by the frequency of non -fatal accidents , were:
▪ Tail Strike ( 9)
▪ Landing Gear ( 7)
▪ Runway Excursion ( 6)
▪ Ground Damage ( 6)
▪ Hard Landing ( 4)
▪ Runway Damage ( 3)
▪ In-flight Damage ( 3)
▪ Off Runway Touchdown (Off or Partial) ( 3)
▪ Mid -Air Collision (1 )
▪ Other End State ( 1)
1 The Other End State is used where:
▪ Information available at the ACTF meeting was not enough to determine the accident end state. For example:
‒ Aircraft is missing,
‒ The investigation is still ongoing or report not available and the ACTF is unable to assign an end state classification
▪ The End State does not fit into other categories
9 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Jet and turboprop accidents in 202 5
▪ The jet accident rate per million sectors went from 1.23 in 2024 down to 1.03 in 202 5. In contrast,
turboprop operations did not follow this trend, with the accident rate increasing from 3. 22 to 4 .08 per
million sectors.
When considering accident rate s per region of operator :
▪ 5 regions saw an improvement in accident rate s per million sectors compared with 2024 . These regions
were:
‒ Middle East and North Africa (MENA) operators’ accident rate per million sectors decreased from 1 .09
to 0.53 per million sectors. The f atality risk rate has remained at zero since 2019.
‒ Africa (AFI) operators’ accident rate per million sectors fell sharply from 1 2.13 to 7 .86 per million
sectors. In contrast, the fatality risk did not follow the same pattern, it went from zero up to 2.1 9.
Despite overall improvements in the global accident rate, the AFI region has the highest accident rate
compared with all other regions.
‒ Europe (EUR) operators’ accident rate per million sectors declined from 1. 48 to 1. 30. A similar trend
was observed with the fatality risk , which improved from 0.03 to zero.
‒ Asia Pacific (ASPAC) operators’ accident rate decreased from 1.0 8 in 2024 to 0.91 per million sectors
in 2025. The fatality risk was reported at 0.15
‒ Latin America and Caribbean (LATAM/CAR) operators’ accident rate improved from 1.84 to 1. 77. A
similar trend was observed with the fatality risk, which improved from 0.3 7 in 2024 to 0.26 in 2025.
▪ 3 regions recorded increases in the accident rate per million sectors.
‒ Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): It is observed that the accident rate rose f rom 1. 44 to
2.74 per million sectors. The fatality risk also had a significant jump from zero in 2024 to 0. 69 in 2025.
‒ North America (NAM) operators’ accident rate per million sectors increased from 1.4 9 to 1. 68. The
fatality risk rose from zero in 2024 to 0.21 in 2025
‒ North Asia ( NASIA ) operators’ accident rate per million sectors reported at 0.16 . The fatality risk rate
remained at zero since 2023
Additionally, ACTF members analyzed the underlying contributors to the accidents using the Threat and Error
Management (TEM) framework. The review identified several predominant factors in 2025 accidents,
including undesired aircraft states, latent conditions, flight crew errors, environment and airline- related threats
as well as the effectiveness of countermeasures, were:
▪ Abnormal Runway Contact was a contributing factor in 2 5% of the 202 5 accidents.
▪ Bounced Landing was cited in 14% of the accidents.
▪ Vertical/Lateral/Speed Deviation was cited in 12% of the accidents
▪ Crew Response and Situational Awareness w as a contributing factor in 25 % of the accidents.
▪ Manual Handling and Primary Flight Control Errors was a contributing factor in 2 4% of accidents
▪ Non -compliance with Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) was cited in 20% of accidents.
▪ Adverse weather was a contributing factor in 2 9% of the accidents with conditions relating to wind/ wind
shear/ gusty wind and thunderstorms most cited.
▪ Airport facilities were cited in 16% of the accidents
▪ Aeroplane Flight Path Management, Manual Control was cited in 29% of the accidents
▪ Situation Awareness (SA) and Management of Information (MoI) were contributing factors in 29 % of
accidents
▪ Inadequate Safety Management System was cited in 16% of all accidents
▪ Inadequate regulatory oversight was a contributing factor in 12% of the accidents
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Note: The percentages (%) shown for contributing factors are based on the number of accidents in each
category. Since a single accident may involve multiple contributing factors, the total percentage may exceed
100%.
While State obligations under the Chicago Convention and ICAO Annex 13 are clearly defined, a significant
portion of investigations remain unresolved. Between 2019 - 2023, 63% of the 2 03 aircraft accident
investigations were completed .
This gap in investigative completion and timeliness undermines the global safety learning cycle and delays the
implementation of risk- mitigating actions. IATA is intensifying collaboration with ICAO, States, and industry
stakeholders to drive consistent adherence to Annex 13, issuance of comprehensive reports as per ICAO
Annex 13 timelines, and ensure that safety lessons are captured, shared, and acted upon, closing the loop that
protects passengers, crews, and the resilience of the global aviation system.
For more details and interactive content, please visit
the IATA Annual Safety Report dashboard
11 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
s
12 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
1. IATA Safety Strategy
IATA remains committed to improving global aviation safety performance through the reduction of accidents.
The three core pillars of its Safety Strategy are Safety Leadership, Safety Risk and Safety Connect.
1.1. Safety Leadership and Safety Culture
Aviation continues to evolve rapidly amid technological advances, growing environmental pressures, and
shifting geopolitical realities. This dynamic operating environment demands both adaptability and
accountability. Strong safety leadership - and a contin uously improving safety culture - remain essential for
organizations to navigate complexity while maintaining safe operations.
2025: Key highlights
In 2025, the Safety Leadership Charter surpassed 200 airline CEO signatories , demonstrating strong
executive -level awareness and growing commitment to advancing safety culture within their organizations.
Grounded in 8 guiding principles, the IATA Safety Leadership Charter, launched in October 2023, promotes
learning, safety -mindedness, and continuous improvement of organizational safety practices and behaviors.
Putting these principles into practice is essential. To support this, IATA Safety Leadership initiative includes:
▪ Safety Leadership in Practice e-Library – showcasing real examples and initiatives from signatory
organizations, expanded each year.
▪ Integration into the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA ) – strengthening safety leadership and culture
practices and behaviors through IOSA Maturity Assessment and risk -based auditing. The first results of
the IOSA Maturity Assessment have been analyzed and will help drive targeted safety improvement
initiatives.
▪ IATA Aviation Safety Culture survey ( I-ASC ) – developed in 2016 by IATA in collaboration with Cranfield
University and Ipsos, I -ASC helps aviation organizations assess their safety culture, identifying gaps,
implement changes, and track progress.
Using a standardized methodology and performance indicators, I -ASC delivers measurable, actionable, and
comparable results, based on both quantitative and qualitative data, enabling internal and industry benchmarking.
In 2025, I -ASC continued supporting the industry’s safety culture improvements across airlines and aviation
organizations in Asia Pacific, the Americas, and Africa, with an increasing number of stakeholders now
preparing for the 2026 launch of the assessment.
▪ Safety Training Programs – Aligned with IATA’s Safety Leadership priorities, we continue to enhance
our training portfolio with programs , such as the IATA Just Culture in Civil Aviation training .
▪ Safety Talks – a series of videos from airline CEOs sharing leadership insights and experiences and real -
world experiences. IATA continued to grow the materials available.
Expanding Engagement and Commitment
Reflecting the increasing interdependence of the aviation ecosystem , at the IATA World Safety and Operations
Conference (WSOC) hosted a cross -industry Safety Leadership panel . These discussions reinforced that
lasting improvements require collaboration across all operational partners.
This foundation sets the stage for 2026, when IATA will expand engagement with non -airline stakeholders and
deepen collaboration with academic partners to more effectively translate safety -leadership research into
13 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
practice. These efforts will further strengthen a unified, cross -industry approach to safety leadership grounded
in trust, learning, and fair accountability.
With broad industry awareness firmly established, IATA will be advancing the Charter toward a deeper level of
commitment from signatory organizations to further drive measurable safety improvements in aviation.
In the coming year, IATA will maintain a focused emphasis on the two Safety Leadership Guiding Principles
selected by Charter signatories the year before:
▪ Guiding Principle #3 , which calls for the integration of safety into business strategies, processes, and
performance measures, and
▪ Guiding Principle #5 , which emphasizes creating an atmosphere of trust where employees feel
encouraged and confident to report safety -related information.
Both principles target key elements of a strong safety culture: organizational alignment and psychological
safety .
Progress in these areas requires sustained leadership attention, consistent reinforcement, and time to embed meaningfully within day -to-day operations : how decisions are made, how performance is assessed, how safety
risks are perceived and how openly employees can communicate about safety risks and concerns.
Recognizing the depth and long -term nature of this work, in addition to focusing on all Charter principles, IATA
will continue to prioritize these two Guiding Principles in the years ahead, supporting signatories as they
translate them into practical actions, leadership behaviors, and fair accountability practices that balance
organizational learning, individual responsibility, and system improvement.
We encourage all members of the aviation community to share the initiatives their organizations are
implementing to strengthen safety culture. By exchanging lessons learned , innovative practices, and
successful approaches, we collectively accelerate progress and reinforce a n industry -wide commitment to
safer operations.
1.2. Safety Risk (SIH)
The Safety Issue Hub (SIH) , hosted within the IATA Connect platform, continued to evolve in 2025 to meet the
needs of both our member airline s and the wider aviation industry. Serving as a one -stop shop to support
airline safety management system s, the SIH expanded its capabilities significantly during the year.
Beyond serving only a s a repository of safety issues that are used to supplement and validate the airline risk
registry, the SIH has expanded to include a set of blogs and content on regional safety issues and other safety
topics. Occurrence data has been added to the Safety Issue Hub, providing additional intelligence that supports data -driven decision- making.
Safety Risk Assessments (SRA)
In addition to the various safety risk assessments (SRAs) already available to support our member airlines, new
SRAs were published for the following safety issues:
▪ Runway Excursion
▪ Space Debris
Furthermore, t he Tail Strike and GNSS Interference SRAs were also updated to reflect the latest operational
insights and emerging trends.
14 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) – Risk -Based Audits
The SIH provides a key input into the risk -based approach utilized by IOSA. Prioritiz ed safety issues identified
through the SIH are consolidated into regional risk pictures , which are shared with auditors to ensur e audits
remain targeted and effective.
In 2025, an enhanced set of risk pictures was introduced. These enhancements incorporate d not only the
insights emerging from the audit program but also additional sources of safety intelligence:
▪ Regional and Worldwide Safety Issues
▪ Safety Management System – Area for Improvement
▪ Insights from Av iation Herald Data
▪ Operator Specific Incidents ( Aviation Herald)
▪ Insights from Audit Data
▪ States with Significant Safety Concerns
IATA Safety Issue Review Meeting (SIRM)
The Global Safety Issue Review Meeting ( SIRM ) is an event taking place annually for our members to share
lessons learned in a safety environment to support the continuous improvement of aviation safety.
In April , many of our members and the wider industry attended SIRM 35 in Montreal and shared best practices
in mitigating several key safety issues, including:
▪ Runway Safety
▪ SMS and Safety II
▪ GPS Spoofing
▪ Ground / Winter Operations
▪ Cabin Safety
Blogs from the meeti ngs with a summary of insights, risk mitigations , and actions are available on our SIRM
page . They were also shared on IATA Connect .
1.3. IATA Connect
Through IATA Connect , our Aviation Safety Gateway, we aim to provide airlines and other aviation related
stakeholders with resources, information and guidance to support their safety management and auditing
activities. IATA Connect strives to become the ultimate source of information for the aviation community, fostering not only access to relevant content but also active knowledge exchange and collaboration among
users.
During 2025 , we welcomed more than 2 ,100 new users from airlines around the world, who are now able to
engage with each other on important safety topics and issues.
IATA Connect comprises of the following main elements:
▪ Safety Issue Hub – a space which allows users to report safety issues and concerns which they feel the
industry should be aware of and to seek IATA’s input. Each published issue contains links to resources, guidance and discussions to help mitigate potential safety risks.
▪ Safety Connect – a safe space for discussions among airlines and other related organizations,
facilitating questions and remaining appraised of IATA’s global activities and offering a collaborative tool
that enables airlines and all users to share best practices and insights across the community.
▪ IOSA Registry – The registry contains all details of current IOSA -registered airlines for public viewing
and provides IOSA auditors with all necessary tools and documentation, serving as the central repository
and primary source for audit -related resources
15 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
▪ ISAGO registry – In the final months of 2025, the ISAGO registry containing details of ISAGO -registered
Ground Handling Service Providers (GHSPs) was added, further enhancing the safety collaboration
opportunities between airlines, their GHSP partners and ISAGO Auditors.
▪ Directories – a public view of all IOSA Airlines and ISAGO GHSPs .
IATA encourages all aviation stakeholders with an interest in Safety Management and Operations to join IATA
Connect by following the instructions on the IATA Connect homepage and actively participating by sharing
expertise and joining discussions.
1.4. IATA Safety Management System (SMS)
SMS Strategy Outcomes
As part of the Safety Risk pillar, IATA has developed an SMS Strategy to ensure the benefits of an effective
Safety Management System (SMS) are maximized for our members. Consisting of three strategic pillars, we
have defined the following outcomes that are being supported by action plans:
IATA Capability IATA Member Capability Global Influence
IOSA auditors are fully competent in
SMS practices to conduct effective
Maturity Assessments.
Continually improving the findings
management process to ensure it
effectively supports our members’
improvement. Air operators have the tools they
need to build and enhance their
SMS , incorporating data
management that encourages
ongoing improvement.
We influence SMS practices and
standards setting globally .
We promote safety by offering our
customers an extensive portfolio of
training courses .
When building a management system, there are several important aspects to consider, such as setting goals, developing implementation plans, documenting processes, and evaluating performance. To make the most out
of SMS, it's crucial to grasp the key basic concepts to promote safer and smoother operations across the
industry. An effective SMS will not only support the delivery of safety objectives but also increase operational
resilience.
To assist airlines in maintaining and evolving their SMS and in support of our SMS Strategy, IATA has collated
useful tools, guidance material and practical examples.
IATA invites you to continuously explore the material available on
▪ IATA - Safety Management System website. The material can be found conveniently divided into the
four pillars of the SMS framework.
▪ the Safety Group Channel within the IATA Connect Safety | IATA Connect . Through this site, safety and
operational- related peer -to-peer discussions, members’ questions, resources, and guidance material
are provided periodically. Users will be able to find posts such as: Closing the Gaps: Evolving Safety
Management Through Smart Performance Monitoring or Key Criteria for Selecting Service Providers for
outsourced operational functions.
▪ Our aviation Safety Courses portfolio IATA - Safety courses . These include safety courses dedicated to
airlines as well as diploma programs focused on safety management, workplace safety, and best
practices for civil aviation.
The continuous improvement of aviation safety relies fundamentally on the collective engagement of all
stakeholders. Active participation and collaboration are essential to strengthening and advancing SMS.
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2. IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)
In 2025, the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) Program reached a key milestone with the full transition of
IOSA registration renewal audits to a risk -based audit methodology, performed exclusively by IATA -trained and
qualified auditors. This evolution m arked a significant step forward for the program, with IOSA -registered
operators experiencing more comprehensive audits that assess not only compliance with standards, but also
the maturity of their SMS and the robustness of safety -critical operational are as. As a result, the IOSA Program
has further strengthened its ability to evaluate safety barriers and to identify meaningful opportunities for improvement within operators’ management systems.
With an initial focus on IOSA, IATA Connect provides a secure platform for information exchange and collaboration to support continuous improvements in aviation safety.
Throughout 2025, IATA Connect continued to support the IOSA community through enhanced functionalities, including expanded access to IOSA Standards Manual (ISM) content for IOSA -registered airlines, improved
capabilities to download and analyze IOSA audit reports, and enhanced tracking of airline profile information. By the end of the year, the IATA Connect community included approximately 5,700 aviation safety professionals,
with 1,023 designated IOSA airline administrators. During the year, more than 4,00 0 requests for airline profile
access were processed, along with approximately 6,000 access requests for IOSA audit reports,
demonstrating the platform’s growing adoption and its increasing role in supporting effective, risk -based
oversight and collaboration across the IOSA community.
To increase efficiency in regulatory oversight and reduce duplication of oversight activities for regulators and
airlines, IATA continued to collaborate with civil aviation authorities (CAAs) worldwide in 2025. During the year,
two new Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed, bringing the total number of civil aviation
authorities using IOSA to complement their regulatory oversight to 40. These collaborations further reinforced
IOSA as t he global operational safety standard and supported the shared ob jective of effective, risk -based
oversight.
The IOSA Registry continued to grow in 2025, reflecting sustained industry confidence in the IOSA Program and its fully embedded risk -based approach. During the year, 18 airlines were added to the IOSA Registry,
bringing the total number of airlines on the Registry to 449 by year- end. Airlines across all regions continued to
complete initial and renewal IOSA audits, contributing to the robustness and global relevance of the IOSA
Registry.
Auditor Management and Training
In 2025, IATA continued to strengthen auditor management and capability development to support the full implementation of the Risk -Based IOSA (RBI) model. The IOSA auditor recruitment process was streamlined to
improve efficiency while maintaining rigorous qualification standards. During the year, three Initial IOSA Auditor
Training courses were conducted, resulting in the recruitment of 39 new IOSA auditors, mainly in the Flight Operations discipline , where there was the greatest need. These efforts reinfo rced auditor capacity and
ensured the availability of suitably qualified auditors to support the effective and consistent delivery of IOSA audits worldwide.
2.1. IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) Program
The IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA) is a voluntary evaluation program developed to extend the safety, standardization, and efficiency benefits of the IOSA Program to operators of smaller aircraft that are not eligible for IOSA.
17 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
2025 marked the first full year of implementation of the new ISSA audit model. Throughout the year, a ll ISSA
assessments were conducted exclusively by IATA -trained and contracted auditors, ensuring a consistent,
independent, and fully standardized audit approach across the program.
During 2025, 12 ISSA assessments were completed, representing the highest annual number in the history of
the ISSA Program. This strong level of activity reflects growing industry confidence in the enhanced ISSA
framework and its alignment with ICAO requirements. By the e nd of the year, 16 operators were listed in the
ISSA Registry, further strengthening the program’s global footprint.
A major milestone in 2025 was the launch of the Joint IOSA –ISSA Assessment concept, designed to provide an
integrated and efficient oversight solution for operators with mixed fleets or evolving operational profiles. The
first Joint IOSA –ISSA audit was suc cessfully conducted, demonstrating the operational feasibility and value of
this combined approach.
With the new ISSA structure fully embedded, including enhanced standards, mandatory observations,
extended audit duration, and centralized IATA auditor management, the ISSA Program delivered greater
assessment depth, consistency, and regulatory credibility throughout the year . These developments further
position ISSA as a key safety benchmark for smaller operators worldwide and a strong complement to the IOSA Program.
3. IATA World Safety and Operations Conference
(WSOC)
IATA continues to facilitate industry -wide collaboration through conferences, webinars, and events designed to
support airlines in addressing critical safety risks, operational challenges, and emerging concerns. Among
these, the IATA WSOC provide a comprehensive event that addresses safety, operations, and infrastructure
topics with in the aviation industry. The event brings together professionals from diverse disciplines to discuss
and share valuable insights.
Last year’s event, t he IATA WSOC 202 5, hosted by Xiamen Airlines , was held in Xiamen , China , on 14-16
October 2025, and brought together experts from around the globe to discuss strategies for ensuring aviation
safety, operational efficiency, and sustainable development amid an ever -changing risk landscape.
With more than 850 participants from 62 countries, the conference was held under the t heme “Futureproofing
Aviation: Strategies for Success” , focus ed on four key areas: safety, cabin operations, flight operations, and
crisis management.
Looking ahead, the next IATA WSOC will be held in Istanbul, Türkiye, on 6 - 8 October 2026.
4. Accident Investigation
Accident investigations are a fundamental component of aviation's overall risk management process, guiding the implementation of safety strategies across the industry. Regardless of the statistical trends in aviation accident data, one central fact remains : investigating aviation accidents is crucial. These investigations gather
and analyze information, identify root causes and contributing factors , as well as formulate safety
recommendations — all with a focus on prevention rather than assigning blame or l iability.
Aligned with international standards, the provisions outlined in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13 underscore the importance of timely and thorough investigations to enhance safety and prevent future occurrences. ICAO Annex 13 also outlines the process leading to the issuance of an accident
investigation.
18 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
▪ Preliminary Report - within 30 days of the of the date of the accident or incident - containing established
factual information and indicating the progress of the investigation.
▪ Final Report – as soon as possible (ASAP) and within 12 months of the date of the accident or incident –
in the interest of accident prevention.
▪ If the report cannot be made publicly available within 12 months, the State conducting the investigation
shall make an Interim Statement publicly available on each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing the
progress of the investigation and any safety issues raised.
4.1. Accident Investigation Final Reports
Between 2019 and 2023, only 63% of the 203 accidents documented in IATA’s Annual Safety Reports had
completed investigations. Although the industry is seeing a gradual rise in the number of finalized investigation
reports , and interim statements are being issued more frequently when delays occur , the overall pace and
consistency of reporting remain inadequate.
A major concern is the significant variation in reporting performance across regions. While some regions
consistently meet or come close to ICAO’s recommended investigation timelines, others lag substantially
behind. This unevenness creates gaps in global safety data, restricts the industry’s ability to conduct
comprehensive analysis, and ultimately weakens collective efforts to drive safety improvements.
To support transparency, accountability, and continuous learning, greater regional harmonization and stronger investigative capabilities are essential. Without meaningful progress, the industry risks prolonged information
gaps that impede proactive safety management and delay the implementation of critical preventive actions.
IATA’s continued advocacy for the timely publication of complete investigation reports reinforces the industry’s commitment to continuous improvement and the proactive prevention of aviation accidents. To
support this effort, IATA has developed a comprehensive roadmap that outlines targeted actions to strengthen global investigation practices, enhance reporting timeliness, and enhance industry -wide learning .
4.2. Accident Investigation Roadmap
The Accident Investigation Roadmap, endorsed by the Safety Group (SG), was developed to address industry -
wide challenges related to the timeliness and completeness of accident investigations. This strategic
framework sets out targeted actions extending beyond 2025, with the aim of improving the publication rate of
final reports and ensuring that lessons learned a re effectively leveraged to prevent future occurrences.
To further advance industry -wide learning and enhance preventive safety measures, a centralized repository of
Accident Investigation -Based Safety Recommendations has been established . This resource consolidates
safety recommendations from past events, enabling more efficient analysis and application of lessons learned.
The roadmap , which is i llustrated in the figure below , continues to make steady progress and has already
delivered several notable outcomes, strengthening the foundation for more transparent, timely, and impactful accident investigation practices worldwide.
19 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
4.3. Accident Investigation at the 2025 WSOC, Xiamen, China
As part of our continuous commitment to strengthening safety performance, a dedicated panel on A ccident
Investigation — Learning from Past Events to Prevent Recurrence was held during the 2025 IATA WSOC in
Xiamen , China . The session brought together panellists from regulatory authorities, safety investigation bodies,
and operators, providing a platform for in -depth dialogue on leveraging lessons learned and identifying actions
needed to strengthen future safety practices in this area.
The session emphasized the importance of the timely publication of accident investigation final reports, as
outlined in ICAO Annex 13, and highlighted how such transparency contributes to global learning and improved safety outcomes. The panellists explored how insights drawn from past investigations can be transformed into
meaningful learning opportunities that help prevent reoccurrences.
Discussions focused on what needs to change to ensure these lessons are effectively applied. The panel also examined how learnings from historical events can inspire and equip the next generation of aviation professionals to champion a proactive and resilient safety culture.
Valuable exchanges such as these reinforce the industry’s collective ability to turn lessons learned into
actionable insights and ultimately contribute to safer skies.
4.4. Accident Investigation Training and Advocacy
As part of the accident investigation roadmap mentioned above, the IATA Accident/Incident Prevention and
Investigation Training Course was formally presented by IATA at the annual meeting of the Accident Analysis
and Prevention (AAP) Committee of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) that
took place in Amsterdam at the end of August. The AAP Committee rev iewed the content of the course and the
positive feedback provided by several of its members who had already completed it, and recommended to IFALPA's Executive Board that this course be endorsed by IFALPA for the purpose of accreditation as IFALPA Acciden t Investigator. Final decision is pending. In partnership with IFALPA and five other industry
stakeholders, IATA co -authored a Joint Position Paper advocating for the timely publication of final accident
20 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
investigation reports and actively contributed to regional safety forums through the presentation of related
working papers.
Additionally, IATA presented a working paper (WP) titled “ Driving Safety: Enhancing Accident Investigation
Report Publication and Mechanisms” at the ICAO General Assembly. Co -authored with the International
Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA) and IFALPA, this paper led the Commission to acknowledge concerns regarding delays in publishing final reports and agree to urge St ates to
ensure timely publication. Action items from WP/330 have been referred to relevant ICAO expert groups for
further consideration.
5. Reduce Operational Risk
Throughout 202 5, IATA demonstrated a dedicated commitment to fostering aviation safety through a
comprehensive and collaborative approach. With a strategic focus on addressing key safety priorities, IATA
has undertaken safety measures to mitigate operational risks and enhanc e overall safety within the aviation
industry.
The collaborative engagement with industry stakeholders, including the IATA Operations Advisory Council (OAC), Safety Group (SG), Accident Classification Task Force (ACTF), Human Factors Task Force (HPTF), Cabin
Operations Safety Task Force (COSTF), Flight Operations Group (FOG), member airlines, regulators, and
technology providers, highlights the collective efforts to enhanc e safety measures throughout the industry.
Global High -Risk Categories of Occurrence
ICAO identifie d a series of global high -risk categories of occurrence (G -HRCs) that should be addressed to
mitigate the risk of
▪ controlled flight into terrain (CFIT);
▪ loss of control in -flight (LOC -I);
▪ mid -air collision (MAC);
▪ runway excursion (RE); and
▪ runway incursion (RI)
Selected based on fatality rates and accident frequency, they drive Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) initiatives.
IATA Priorities
IATA is strengthening the global approach to incident and accident analysis and prevention by prioritizing a set of initiatives designed to reduce operational risks, enhance predictive capabilities, and support data -driven
safety management across the industry. Key strategic focus areas include:
▪ Advancing safety data analytics to detect emerging risks and systemic trends early, enabling proactive interventions before they lead to operational disruptions.
▪ Enhancing terrain -related risk mitigation, including the development and continuous improvement of
CFIT/GPWS databases and the wider adoption of GNSS -based solutions.
▪ Reducing the risk of Loss of Control In -Flight (LOC -I) through the application of advanced analytics,
operational insights, and targeted prevention strategies.
▪ Strengthening mid -air collision (MAC) prevention by improving Traffic Collision Avoidance capabilities
and other initiatives
▪ Improving runway safety performance, with focused action on preventing runway excursions, incursions,
and tail- strike events.
▪ Enhancing ground safety, leveraging data -driven insights
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▪ Improving dangerous goods handling, promoting globally harmonized standards, enhanced oversight,
and increased operator awareness.
▪ Use of AI for safety data and related predictive technology risks and issues
5.1 2025 Occurrences
5.1.1 Occurrences from a third -party source
Aviation accidents seldom occur without prior signals. They are usually preceded by safety -related incidents
and operational weaknesses that reveal underlying hazards. For this reason, incident data is an essential tool for detecting emerging risks before they escalate into a catastrophe . Although learning from accidents remains
important, relying solely on reactive measures is not enough to achieve sustained safety improvement. Elevating safety performance requires complementing reactive responses with pro active systems that assess
a wider spectrum of safety information, especially incident reports, to identify trends, anticipate hazards, and
enable early intervention.
In addition to IATA Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) Programs, IATA has integrated into the SIH, a
unified occurrence platform that consolidates all occurrences sourced from a third‑party provider (Aviation
Herald) . Expanding the scope of safety information, particularly incident and serious incident reports , enhances
the ability to identify emerging trends, anticipate hazards, and enable early safety intervention. The platform
provides structured insights derived from the full spectrum of reported occurrences. This section highlights
the most frequently report ed safety occurrences in 2025, with System Component Failures and Bird Strikes
emerging as the top two categories, as illustrated in the chart below.
Note: Some entries are also classified as accidents under the ACTF and IATA accident definition.
This section presents the two most frequently reported occurrences in 2025: System Component Failures and
Birdstrikes :
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System/Component Failures
Safety Issue Hub SI79: -Aircraft System Component Failure Non -Powerplant SI-
115: - In Flight Shut Downs (IFSD)
A review of the IATA centralized repository for global aviation accident and incident reporting, accessed
through the IATA SIH platform, indicates that for the 2025 reporting period (see Chart 2), System/Component
Failures – Non‑Powerplant (SCF‑NP) and System/Component Failures – Powerplant (SCF‑PP) are the most
prominent risk occurrence categories worldwide, based on absolute occurrence numbers, followed by Bird events.
Key Insights
The SCF‑NP refers to failures or malfunctions of an aircraft system or component other than the powerplant.
Conversely, the SCF‑PP refers to failures or malfunctions of an aircraft system or component related to the
powerplant . Within SCF‑NP occurrences, cabin pressurization issues and smoke or fume events are the most
common.
When combined, these two categories are the most significant contributors to aviation safety occurrences in
2025, representing a major portion of the total incidents and accidents recorded globally. Their continued
prevalence highlights the persistent operational and technical vulnerabilities.
Contributing Factors
▪ Deficiencies in aircraft maintenance programs, including inspection practices.
▪ Manufacturing issues, such as latent defects or design shortcomings and/or Manufacturing defects.
▪ Inadequate regulatory oversight
▪ Inconsistencies in Minimum Equipment List (MEL) approval and use, particularly decisions allowing
aircraft to operate with degraded capability.
▪ Inadequate Safety Management System (SMS)
These systemic issues suggest that both operators and regulatory authorities must strengthen oversight mechanisms and enhance technical governance frameworks.
Challenges in Accident Investigation Final Reports
A persistent concern is the continued lack of comprehensive accident investigation reports. These include all end states, including landing gear accidents. Investigations into these events remain unfinished, and among those published, the level of detail r egarding contributing factors is often insufficient. This lack of complete,
in‑depth reporting constrains the industry’s ability to fully understand the contributing factors of these occurrences and, consequently, limits the development and implementation of effective, sustainable safety improvements.
This trend highlights the need for:
▪ More publication of comprehensive accident/incident investigation final reports
▪ Systematic identification of organizational, regulatory, and human factors contributors.
▪ Enhanced Regulatory oversight and SSP (State Safety Programme) implementation
▪ Strengthened maintenance oversight
▪ Enhanced effective SMS
▪ Collaboration between all stakeholders, including States, operators, and manufacturers, is essential to reduce these failures and ensure sustainable improvements in global aviation safety performance.
23 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Wildlife Strikes/ Birds
Safety Issue Hub S59- Bird/Wildlife Strikes
Aircraft and wildlife, especially birds, pose d safety challenges since the earliest days of aviation. Encounters
can occur both on the ground and at various altitudes, ranging from near ground level to several thousand feet,
and occasionally even higher. However , the majority of wildlife strikes tend to happen while the aircraft are at
lower altitudes. Birds, unlike many other hazards, are not confined by fences or walls; they fly freely, cross paths with aircraft, and often follow migration routes that int ersect with flight paths. This makes them a unique risk to
aviation safety.
As seen in Chart 2 above, Birds are the second -highest occurrence category. Bird strikes can damage critical
aircraft components , including engines, wings, windshields, and fuselage. Although many incidents result in
minor or no damage, some have led to catastrophic accidents. These events also impose operational and
financial burdens on airlines, including repair costs, delays, and flight disruptions. Beyond safety and cost
implications, bird strikes are almost always fatal to the animals involved, raising concerns about animal welfare
and, in rare cases, conservation.
Bird presence on or near runways is rarely accidental. Airports frequently create unintentionally attractive environments, such as open grass areas, standing water from drainage systems, food waste, or proximity to
landfills that support bird activity. Many airports are also situated in regions where local geography and climate
naturally sustain diverse wildlife populations.
Effective risk reduction depends on making the airport and its surroundings less appealing by controlling
attractants and modifying habitats to deter wildlife near operational areas and flight paths. This complexity
underscores the need for airports to imp lement comprehensive Wildlife Hazard Management Plans (WHMPs)
that address all relevant hazards.
While airport operators are responsible for executing WHMP measures, the State, through its CAA, holds the
overarching responsibility for establishing and enforcing the regulatory framework. Effective wildlife hazard
management (WHM) relies on coordinated involvement from all stakeholders, including airport operators,
aircraft operators, air traffic control (ATC) , and air navigation service providers (ANSPs) .
Accident investigation and wildlife
Wildlife s trikes, where aircraft collide with wildlife, can lead to serious incidents or accidents , and require
investigation under Annex 13. C onducting thorough investigations is essential to determine contributing
factors, evaluate associated hazards, and develop effective safety recommendations and mitigation measures.
Without investigative reports, lessons cannot be learned , and corrective actions cannot be implemented,
leaving risks unaddressed.
Data and Reporting
Wildlife reporting and accurate data collection are also critical, as they enable the identification of trends, seasonal patterns, and high‑risk areas. Reliable data supports evidence‑based decision‑making, helps prioritize
mitigation measures, and allows airports and authorities to evaluate the effectiveness of their WHMP over time.
Consistent reporting enables trend identification, supports hazard analysis, and ensures lessons learned are
applied to prevent recurrence. Robust data collection is essential for understanding wildlife activity patterns,
24 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
assessing risk, and informing evidence‑based mitigation. Sharing information strengthens the collective safety
knowledge base and supports global best practices in WHM.
It is also recommended that operators actively participate in the GADM Incident Data eXchange (IDX) program
and routinely share wildlife hazard data through the platform.
Participation enhances industry‑wide situational awareness, facilitates comparative analysis across airports and regions, and strengthens collaborative efforts to reduce wildlife strike risks.
5.1.2 Serious incidents
Building on the occurrence reporting platform, IATA expanded its safety performance monitoring in 2025 by
formally capturing serious incidents and their corresponding final investigation reports. As demonstrated above, incidents or occurrences, including serious incidents, serve as leading indicators and often provide
early warning signals prior to the occurrence of accidents. Although the number of recorded serious incidents is limited at this stage, the observed trends, as seen in the chart below, are con sistent with patterns identified in
other internal databases. This alignment reinforces the validity of the insights derived from this dataset. The serious incident database together with the occurrence database will continue to evolve and mature in 2026, enabling more robust analysis and stronger predictive capability to support proactive risk management and
incident prevention efforts.
The following section provides data from the accident data:
5.2 Loss of Control In -flight (LOC -I)
Safety Issue Hub SI-136 Aircraft upset / unusual attitude due to pilot handling (manual flying skills)
and/or turbulence
Loss of C ontrol In-flight (LOC -I) refers to the loss of aircraft control while inflight. Over the past decade, this
category has accounted for more th an 37 percent of fatal accidents in commercial aviation , highlighting its
significance as a persistent global safety challenge . The likelihood of this event can be reduced through
improved skills in prevention, recognition, and recovery, making this a targeted issue for safety improvement
by IATA. 0123456Serious Incidents
25 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
LOC- I continues to be identified by both IATA and the wider aviation industry as one of the highest -
risk accident categories . In response to this persistent safety concern, IATA, with the support of the Safety
Group (SG), developed the Loss of Control – Environmental Conditions Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) , which
was issued at the end of 2024.
This comprehensive assessment provides a structured analysis of environmental factors contributing to LOC -I
events and includes a series of targeted recommendations addressed to multiple stakeholders across the
aviation industry. These recommendations aim to enhance operational resilience, improve training, and
strengthen preventive measures to reduce the risk of LOC- I accidents.
To ensure effective implementation of the recommendations, IATA will organize follow -up activities to monitor
the adoption of the SRA recommendations and support stakeholders in addressing identified gaps.
5.3 Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
Safety Issue Hub SI-45 EGPWS Software & Terrain Database out of date
Controlled Flight into T errain (CFIT) refers to the In -flight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without
indication of loss of control. Between 201 6 and 2025, CFIT accounted for 16 percent of commercial aviation
fatal accidents and continues to represent one of IATA’s key area of safety focus.
CFIT remains classified as one of the Global High- Risk Categories of Occurrence. To help mitigate CFIT -related
risks, IATA monitors the validity of the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) terrain database
and associated software through the IATA IOSA Standard FLT 4.2.7, which was elevated to a standard following
a dedicated SRA , reinforcing its importance in preventing CFIT events and supporting continuous improvement
in operational safety.
Moreover, IATA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) jointly hosted the Positioning,
Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Resilience Workshop, building on the insights and outcomes of previous sessions
and addressing the growing challenges posed by Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference and
its impact on aviation operations. As GNSS disruptions grow in both frequency and complexity, the industry must move beyond reactive mitigation measures and adopt more proactive, forward -looking st rategies.
The workshop brought together experts from across the aviation sector to explore ways to strengthen resilience and ensure operational continuity in the face of evolving threats. Discussions focused on developing
comprehensive solutions that safeguard navig ation integrity and maintain safety under conditions of GNSS
interference or spoofing.
Looking ahead, IATA will review the GPWS Database SRA and conduct a study on IOSA Registry compliance
with the IOSA Standard FLT 4.2.7 to ensure adherence to terrain awareness requirements. In addition, IATA will
evaluate the level of implementation of the GNSS SRA and its associated recommendations across the
industry. These efforts aim to ensure effective risk mitigation across the industry.
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5.4 Mid-Air Collision (MAC) / Traffic Collision Avoidance System
Resolution Advisory Measurement Enhancement
Safety Issue Hub SI-53: Incorrect response from Crew to TCAS Alerts
SI-123: Airspace Infringement
SI-107 -: Large Height Deviations
MAC Overview
MAC accidents refer to collisions between aircraft while both aircraft are airborne. Between 201 6 and
2025, three MAC accidents were reported, resulting in a total of 69 fatalities, including onboard and
other fatalities.
Enhancing TCAS Effectiveness
To improve MAC prevention, Eurocontrol developed the Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution
Advisory (TCAS RA) Method B, a methodology designed to evaluate TCAS effectiveness as a safety barrier and
enhance situational awareness. Compared to Method A, Method B applies less stringent compliance criteria,
particularly when pilots must make significant vertical rate adjustments to comply with an RA. Both
methodologies utilize flight data to assess pilot compliance with TCAS RAs.
In collaboration with Eurocontrol, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, and Japan Airlines, TCAS RA Method B has
been integrated into the GADM Flight Data Exchange (FDX) platform. This enhancement enables participating
airlines to benchmark TCAS RA events more effectively and provide an assessment of pilot response,
especially in cases where there is a significant change in vertical rate. This enhanced platform/dashboard
provides capabilities to:
▪ Analyze TCAS RA rates by Flight Information Region (FIR) or altitude.
▪ Investigate precursors and responses using Method B compliance criteria.
▪ Correlate TCAS RA contextual measurements such as duration, acceleration, and autopilot/autothrottle status.
Emerging Risks
IATA is currently developing two risk bow -tie models to differentiate between new entrants that fall under
ICAO’s aircraft definition (e.g., supersonic passenger aircraft and RPAS) and those that do not (e.g.,
spaceplanes and High- Altitude Platform Station s [HAPS]). These models aim to address evolving risks
associated with emerging technologies and operations, in particular , focusing on the MAC .
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5.5 Runway Safety
Safety Issue Hub SI-66: Aircraft Tailstrike
SI-122 Runway Incursion
SI-160 Runway Excursion
SI-55 Unstable Approaches
5.5.1 Tail Strike Initiatives
Tail Strike Overview
Over the last decade, 48% of all accidents have been related to runway safety. Tail strikes are a type of
accident that has been trending up over the last 5 years. According to the IATA Safety Report, tail strike was
the most frequent type of accident in 2024 and in 2025 . Although the fatality risk remains low, tail strike is
identified as one of the IATA Safety Group's priorities.
Tail strike refers to a tail strike either on take- off or landing , resulting in substantial damage . In 2025, tail strike
accounts for 18% of all accidents.
While tail strikes have a low fatality risk, they often result in significant aircraft damage. Given their prevalence
during take -off and landing, they pose a considerable safety risk and have become a focal point for aviation
safety initiatives. In response, IAT A has implemented proactive measures to mitigate this hazard.
▪ Development of an SRA : IATA conducted a comprehensive SRA to identify contributing factors and
potential mitigation strategies for tail strike events.
▪ Collaboration with the ACTF: IATA engaged with ACTF to develop a set of targeted recommendations
aimed at reducing the occurrence of tail strikes through operational improvements and enhanced
awareness.
▪ Launched a survey to assess the level of adoption of the rec ommendations
▪ Developed an action plan to address tail strike events .
Tail Strike Survey
To evaluate industry awareness and the extent of implementation of these recommendations, IATA conducted a three -part survey, reformulating the recommendations into question format to gather actionable feedback:
▪ Part I – which focused on Aircraft Policies and Operations, received the highest number of responses (53
responses)
▪ Part II - which addressed Training, received 57 responses
▪ Part III - covering Safety Management Systems (SMS), received 28 responses
Survey results indicate strong industry awareness and generally positive adoption of tail strike mitigation
measures. However, barriers to full implementation remain. IATA remains committed to supporting the industry in overcoming these barriers and advancing safety initiatives that reduce the risk of tail strike events.
Tail Strike Action Plan
To further strengthen safety measures, IATA developed and implemented an Action Plan for Tail Strike Events ,
endorsed by Safety Group (SG) members. Key initiatives include the following:
▪ Review recent accident investigation reports to identify commonalities beyond the flight deck.
▪ Conduct deep -dive analyses of accidents and incidents reported through IATA safety programs. The
goal is to determine common contributing factors/precursors of tail strikes. In the most critical phases of
flight
28 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
▪ Update the Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) and revise the associated risk model to reflect current
operational realities – An updated SRA can be found here .
Although the 2025 action plan has been completed, IATA will continue to monitor tai l strike risk through key
safety performance indicators and will develop additional measures to further strengthen mitigation efforts.
Industry Engagement
Industry engagement activities included a dedicated session at WSOC 2025, held in collaboration with an
air operator, to introduce the Tail Strike Action Plan and share airline mitigation strategies.
Additionally, as part of the 2025 action plan, a webinar titled “Avoiding Tail Strike Accidents – From
Awareness to Action” attracted over 200 participants, featuring presenters from operators and
manufacturers who addressed key challenges in mitigating tail strikes. The k ey takeaway messages from
the webinar can be found here.
5.5.2 Runway Excursions (REs) Initiatives
From 2016 to 2025, there were 98 runway excursion (RE) accidents, representing 20% of all accidents , of which
8 were fatal, resulting in 82 onboard and other fatalities. REs were the most frequent accident category
throughout the reporting period, and in 2025 , they ranked the second highest‑occurring accident type.
In 2025, IATA released a n SRA on Runway Excursions, providing a structured framework to help air operators
analyze and mitigate associated risks. The assessment includes a standardized description of potential threats,
preventive controls, escalation factors, and recovery measures designed to prevent runway excursions from
escalating into accidents that cause aircraft damage. IOSA Standards and Recommended Practices that
impact the effectiveness of risk controls are highlighted in the risk model .
An additional webinar will be hosted on Runway safety/Runway excursions to elaborate on how to build a comprehensive risk assessment (Bowtie) as a dynamic tool to evaluate risk, trigger mitigation actions, and monitor safety performance.
5.5.3 Runway Incursions (RIs)
IATA developed the Runway Incursions SRA to assist IATA member airlines in evaluating the effectiveness of
their safety controls and identifying the need for additional mitigation actions.
Despite industry efforts, IATA continue s to monitor high -severity runway incursions that, in several cases, have
resulted in serious near -miss events between aircraft. This trend reinforces the need for operators,
Manufacturers, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), and Airport Operators to assess and strengthen their
mitigations to prevent a runway incursion from escalating into a collision.
The Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (GAPPRI) provides a comprehensive set of
recommendations to reduce the likelihood and potential consequences of such events. Operators, Manufacturers, ANSPs, and Airport Operators are encouraged to review the extent to which these recommendations have been implemented within their organization.
To facilitate this, IATA developed an easy‑to‑use GAPPRI gap analysis tool that enables operators to quickly
identify which recommendations are already in place and where gaps remain. This resource supports the
development of targeted and effective implementation plans.
Continued reporting of near -miss events by flight crew is essential for ongoing safety improvement and for
monitoring safety performance. Achieving this relies on strong Safety Leadership , fostering a culture in which
timely, honest, and non- punitive reporting is actively encouraged and supported.
29 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Additionally, the Runway Safety session at the WSOC provided valuable insights into global runway safety
challenges and examined how emerging technologies can support risk reduction for airlines and passengers.
5.5.4 Unstable Approaches (UAs )
In 2024, IATA established a group, comprising member airlines and industry partners, to define and categorize high -risk unstable approaches, with the aim of implementing the classification in the GADM FDX program for its
users. Various Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) were considered, including the High Risk Unstable
Approaches SPI option.
In 2025, IATA developed a draft concept outlining how high‑risk UAs could be measured and presented the proposal at the GADM User Forum in September. The intent of this concept is to provide FDX users with the flexibility to apply different thresholds when analyzing Unstable Approach events, enabling a more tailored and
operationally meaningful assessment of risk.
6. Training and Licensing
6.1 Competency -Based Training and Assessment (CBTA)
Programs – Implementation Support
IATA advocates for the implementation of Competency -Based Training and Assessment (CBTA) programs as a
more effective and efficient way to develop a competent workforce than the traditional task - or hours -based
training and checking. As such, IATA delivers CBTA awareness sessions and workshops for States and
industry, to illustrate the value of CBTA in regard to safety enhancement and training efficiency.
IATA also supports global CBTA implementation by actively participating in the ICAO Personnel Training and
Licensing Panel to update, standardize , and create new ICAO CBTA provisions (e.g., CBTA route into Annex 1).
6.2 IATA CBTA Library
Since October 2023, the IATA CBTA Library for flight crew training contains, among other guides, the first
CBTA implementation guide for pilot and instructor training available in the industry, supporting the consistent
application of CBTA across all modules and roles in a pilot’s entire career.
In 2025 the 2nd edition of the Guidance Material and Best Practices for Improving Flight Crew Monitoring was
published in the CBTA Library. This 2nd edition provides the methodology, and practical examples, to
implement a CBTA -based monitoring program for licensing and op erator training .
6.3 IATA Global CBTA Center of Excellence (CoE)
To support a harmonized CBTA implementation, in 2025 IATA launched two standardization programs under the Global CBTA CoE. The first one, the CBTA Standardization for the Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors (CASIs) in charge of the approval and the surveillance of training organizations conducting CBTA programs, the second
one, the Standardization for CBTA course developers for pilot training. In 2026 IATA will develop two additional
standardizations, one for CBTA course developers for maintenance training and the other for CBTA course
developers for cabin crew training. These standardizations are delivered through the IATA Consulting Services and IATA Training .
Additionally, in 2026, IATA will be evaluating an accreditation program for training organizations delivering CBTA programs. The objective of this accreditation program is to assess the quality and the compliance to international standards, as well as indu stry best practices, of the pilot and instructor training programs
delivered by training organizations engaged in CBTA. The program will help enhance safety through global harmonization and standardization.
30 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
7. Cabin Safety
7.1 Cabin End State
The Cabin Safety section of the interactive IATA Annual Safety Report contains the End State classifications
for aircraft accidents. When reviewing the dashboards, it should be noted that not all accidents will have a
cabin classification for a Cabin End State, for example, cargo flights without cabin crew, or flights without
passengers. Additionally, while some accidents within the database might be rejected as they do not meet the
IATA criteria of an accident, they may have had an impact in the cabin for cabin crew and have been classified
with a Cabin End State.
These classifications focus on three main categories:
▪ How much time the cabin crew had to prepare for the emergency;
▪ The corresponding level of preparation they were able to perform within the cabin;
▪ The type of evacuation carried out – land, water, abnormal disembarkation or normal operations.
The Accident database includes aviation safety incidents which do not always meet the criteria to be classified
as an accident, but may still have some relevance or importance to Cabin Operations and Safety. Typically,
these are classified in the following categories for reference:
▪ Turbulence - Cabin Crew Injury
▪ Turbulence - Passenger Injury
In common with all previous years, almost all accidents which resulted in evacuation occurred with minimal
warning and cabin crew had no additional time available to carry out any more preparation than they would
during a normal landing.
This highlights the utmost importance of SOPs for cabin secure checks prior to take- off and landing being
thoroughly and consistently applied by cabin crew members, as this is usually the only opportunity to prepare
passengers for a potential evacuation.
The accident which occurred at Gimhae international Airport in Busan during January, was an onboard fire,
which resulted in evacuation of the aircraft and subsequent loss of the aircraft. The fire started while
the aircraft was on the ground. The cabin cr ew initially commenced firefighting procedures, and the flight
crew subsequently ordered evacuation immediately afterwards. It is not possible for cabin crew to continue
firefighting activities while simultaneously conducting an evacuation, and the aircraft was subsequently
destroyed after the safe evacuation of 176 occupants.
Practical training for Cabin Crew members focuses on evacuation of passengers in many different
scenarios. This training is repeated annually, contributing to consistently successful evacuation outcomes
where cabin crew have drawn on their experience to enhance situational awareness and to adapt to
rapidly changing situations. One of the most notable accidents in 2025 occurred in Toronto where
the aircraft was evacuated successfully despite the disorientation of all passengers and crew as
the aircraft was completely upside down. Social media footage shows the cabin crew continuing to respond
calmly and professionally despite the extremely challenging circumstances.
7.2 Cabin Safety Incidents
Safety Issue Hub SI-233: Passenger noncompliance with safety regulations, policies and instructions
Cabin Crew safety duties encompass all activities within the cabin and extend much further than managing a
successful evacuation. IATA’s Safety Issue Hub resource contains multiple cabin issues
and associated guidance to help airlines mitigate any potential risks.
31 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Passengers are also responsible for complying with safety regulations and procedures. It is evident through
social media and safety reports that passengers continue to take carry -on baggage with them during
evacuation, which increases the risk of personal injury, increases evacuation time for others and can obstruct
evacuation routes.
Passengers should always wear their seatbelt when occupying their seat to mitigate the risk of injury whenever
turbulence is encountered. While it may not be possible to remain seated for the entire duration of a
flight, numerous reports continue to indic ate that many passengers do not comply with this recommendation
or choose not to comply with the illuminated fasten seatbelt signs instructing them to return to their seat.
The Unruly Passenger data within IATA’s Incident Data Exchange (IDX) Program indicates that while passenger
non -compliance may not be intentional, many passengers do not consider any safety risk when flying and do
not always act safely.
This behavi or is not unique to air travel, but the aviation industry has a responsibility to influence and educate
travelers to adopt more appropriate behaviors.
During 2025, multiple and rapid regional changes to regulations regarding the carriage of electronic devices
added to already complex rules and there was a need to improve passenger awareness on the risks posed by lithium battery -powered devices, spare batteries and power banks. To help airlines and to increase general
public awareness, IATA produced an awareness campaign, comprising of 7 short videos covering the following
key points:
1. Pack light – only bring the devices that you need.
2. Stay alert – call the crew if devices become hot, smoke or damaged
3. Check battery size – larger batteries may not be allowed
4. Keep devices with you - in carry on baggage.
5. Gate check reminder - remove all devices if your bag is checked in at the gate.
6. Protect loose batteries – cover the terminals with tape or keep inside packaging.
7. Check with your airline – rules vary
The videos can be downloaded with or without the IATA Logo and shared through all available channels, to travelers and the wider general public. The intent of this campaign is to raise awareness that batteries and
devices can be a hazard in air travel.
7.3 Cabin Safety Activities
IATA’s activities to support airlines include risk assessment, training, publication of guidance materials, and setting global standards for cabin safety.
The Cabin Operations Safety Best Practices Guide is a comprehensive guidance document covering all
aspects of Cabin Safety Management. Edition 11 published in December 2025, includes new guidance material
for firefighting and turbulence management. As well as providing information and guidance to addre ss existing
risks, it is also published to help airlines determine best practices to assist them in complying with the IOSA
standards which are a prerequisite for their continued IATA membership.
The IOSA Standards Manual section 5 includes the global cabin safety standards required for IATA
membership and is updated annually by IATA’s Cabin Operations Safety Task Force, a team of cabin safety specialists from airlines who work closely with IATA to guide our activities eac h year.
As the IATA Connect resource continues to evolve, the Cabin Group has established itself as the most direct
communication channel between airlines, IATA, and selected Strategic Partners to discuss issues and
challenges and to support the effective implementation of safety management systems within the
32 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
cabin. IATA encourages all airlines to ensure that their Cabin Safety Management team are registered to
join this valuable resource and therefore participate in the global discussions on Cabin Safety issues.
IATA facilitates regular conferences, webinars, and events to ensure airlines come together to discuss
important safety risks, issues, and concerns. During the IATA WSOC , safety experts discussed issues within
the following four content tracks:
▪ Cabin Safety;
▪ Flight Operations;
▪ Safety and Risk Management;
▪ Emergency Response and Aircraft Recovery.
Bringing together delegates from four related, yet different disciplines was a great opportunity to raise
awareness of the similarities, the differences, and the cross -disciplinary issues faced by all. Cabin Safety is an
integral part of Flight Operations, Safety and Risk Management and Emergency Response, and while it is
necessary to maintain a separate platform to discuss cabin safety issues, the impact on others must also be
con sidered and discussed openly.
8. Cargo Safety
Safety Issue Hub SI-41 Carriage of Miss or undeclared High Energy Storage Devices (Lithium Li
Batteries) as cargo
Cargo safety remains a critical pillar of aviation safety and forms part of IATA’s broader safety governance and risk management framework. It encompasses the safe transport of dangerous goods; the integrity and airworthiness of Unit Load Devices (ULDs); t he mitigation of emerging fire risks, particularly those associated
with lithium batteries; the safe carriage of mail amid the exponential growth of cross‑border e‑commerce; and the secure restraint of special loads to ensure compliance with aircraft opera ting limitations.
The activities in 2025 included engagement in the Safety Issue Hub, review of GADM/IDX incident taxonomy
relating to cargo safety, and refinement of cargo safety requirements across the suite of publications and
guidance material notably in areas such as dangerous goods, ULDs, and special loads, supporting the
prevention of aircraft fires, structural damage, and loss‑of‑control events resulting from load shifting. There was a focus in 2025 on expanding and promoting the adoption of training and assessment based on competency criteria with a CBTA methodology across the cargo environment .
8.1 Safety of the Supply Chain
IATA continued its advocacy of proposed amendments to ICAO Annex 18 and the concept of expanding
accountability to all parties in managing the safety of the cargo supply chain. These proposed amendments should be put to State consultation in 2026. A program of outreach and education will be undertaken in order to
support the widespread adoption and implementation of this important safety -based initiative.
8.2 Dangerous Goods
The carriage of dangerous goods, in particular lithium batteries and other energy storage devices, continues to represent a significant safety risk for the air transport industry. Throughout 2025, IATA advanced a comprehensive dangerous goods safety agenda that spans regulatory engagement, standards development,
supply chain oversight, and global outreach to strengthen compliance and mitigate the risks posed by mis-declared and undeclared dangerous goods. Involvement also included technical support with the development
and improvement of tools and products that facilitate the safe and efficient transport of declared dangerous goods through increased digitalization.
33 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Lithium Batteries
Following the loss of an airframe in Korea in January 2025, addressing threats from power banks formed a
significant work. The program included:
▪ encouraging States to not act unilaterally, but in concert with ICAO,
▪ the development of white label passenger information video clips on batteries in baggage,
▪ the separation of power banks from spare batteries in the provisions for dangerous goods carried by
passengers (expected to take effect in Q1 2026),
Mobility aids powered by lithium batteries, and the apparent lack of a limit to the watt hour rating of those
batteries, was identified in 2024 as being a matter of concern and was largely addressed in 2025. IATA and a
number of key airlines members were a ctive participants in examining the safety issues and making a series of
recommendations and proposed changes to ICAO. The recommended changes will be reviewed in 2026 for implementation in 2027.
Global Outreach
To support compliance with evolving dangerous goods requirements, IATA expanded its regional outreach and
technical engagement with global virtual seminars and in person events in Manila, Kuala Lumpur , Guangzhou,
Brussels and Chicago.
8.3 Unit Load Devices (ULD) Safety
ULD safety remains fundamental to aircraft structural integrity, fire risk mitigation, and the safe restraint of
cargo to prevent load shift. In 2025, the ULD Board (ULDB) focused on the enhancements to the fire testing
requirements for Fire Resistant Cont ainers (FRC) and Fire Containment Covers (FCC). This work addresses the
air transport industry’s growing need for standardized minimum performance requirements for FRC/FCC
against fires involving lithium -ion cells .
Wireless Tracking Devices Attached to ULDs
The FAA has identified wireless tracking devices attached to ULDs as a safety concern and common hazards to be considered by operators in the Safety Risk Management, as operators must ensure such devices will not cause interference with the navigation or communication system of the aircraft. This requirement, combined
with complex interlining, ULD leasing, and alliance operations, makes it difficult to verify whether a tracking
device on a transferred ULD is approved by the operating airlines . ULDB therefore recommended that:
▪ The transferring airline ensures any tracking devices attached to ULDs have been approved by the
operating airline, and
▪ The operating airline accepts only ULDs equipped with its approved devices.
In addition, to facilitate airline compliance, the requirements and guidance for control and approval of PED use
in aircraft cargo compartment, including PED as part of cargo or attached to ULDs, have been incorporated into
the ISM 18 (Portable Electronic Devices in Aircraft Cargo Compartment).
ULD Safety Awareness
A concern with fraudulent practices with aircraft pallet net airworthiness was addressed in 2025 with the
publication of a safety awareness article. An increase in report on personnel injuries due to broken aircraft
container pull- straps led to an update to inspection notification requirements.
34 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
8.4 Mail Safety
Air Mail Safety Guidelines
Mail safety remains a high‑priority cargo safety area due to the continued risk of prohibited dangerous goods,
particularly lithium batteries, entering the air transport system through international mail streams. In 2012 IATA
and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) produced a joint document “Mail Safety Guidelines” following a tasking
from the IATA Board of Governors . In 2025 IATA initiated a review of this key document and commenced
consultation with the UPU. The intent is to produce a finali zed and updated document in 2026.
Non -Compliant Hybrid Scenarios
Work is continuing with hybrid scenarios where both the UPU and ICAO conventions are being used by some
industry participants to obscure the distinctions between “mail” and “cargo” when transporting on aircraft. A
position paper has been developed by the aviation industry regarding these non- complying hybrid scenarios
and will form the basis of engagement with the UPU in 2026.
Air Mail Webinars
IATA continued its close cooperation with the UPU and ICAO with regular engagement with each other as well as with the development and delivery of a series of webinars. The webinars focused on Air Mail Safety and Security, including regulatory provisions a nd applicable standards, guidance materials related to Improvised
Incendiary Devices (IID), and initiatives to strengthen global partnerships in the air mail industry.
9. IATA Turbulence Aware (ITA)
Safety Issue Hub SI-98: Turbulence Encounters
Turbulence Aware is a real -time platform that provides flight crews, dispatchers and operations center
personnel to access to near real -time turbulence data collected from multiple airlines globally. Turbulence
Aware data improves airline safety performanc e by decreasing turbulence -related injuries. The data helps
crews make more informed decisions to avoid turbulence or delay meal service and switch on the seat belt sign where turbulence cannot be avoided. This data can also help reduce fuel burn and opera tion efficiencies
through better, safer route planning.
IATA has seen a 26% increase in data within its Turbulence Aware program in 2025 having received more than
65 million reports from over 3,300 participating aircraft. Given the increasing interest in this risk management safety initiative, further growth is forecast for 202 6. Since 2020, Turbulence Aware has enhanced the safe
travel experience of over 1.2 billion passengers.
10. Emergency Response Planning (ERP)
IATA continues to drive efforts to improve Emergency Response Planning (ERP) across the global aviation
community , ensuring that airlines are equipped with the structures, competencies, and coordination
mechanisms required to manage crises effectively. Central to this work is the IATA Emergency Response
Planning Task Force (ERPTF ).
The ERPTF mission is to serve as a center of excellence for strategic and tactical guidance, expertise, and
consultation in emergency response, providing advisory support to the Safety Group, IATA Management, and relevant stakeholders across the aviation industry .
35 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
The ERPTF aims to establish and align best practices to meet evolving Industry needs. It encourages
standardization across the global aviation industry, and promotes a culture of empathy, care, and collaboration
to enhance safety, coordination, and resilience.
2025: Key Highlights
ERP Best Practices Handbook : Launch of the revised Emergency Response Best Practices Handbook . For the
first time, the handbook includes detailed guidance on family assistance.
Family assistance has long been an IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) requirement. Since 2022, the
requirements for family assistance are included as a standard in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s
(ICAO’s) Annex 9 (Facilitation) while ICAO ’s Document 9973 provides clear responsibilities for airlines, airports
and ground handlers, turning international standards into care for affected families.
The family assistance chapter in the revised manual provides guidance and practical tools to help operators meet both the IOSA and ICAO requirements.
Family Assistance training courses. IATA has also integrated simulation exercises into its Emergency
Response Planning (ERP) courses for airlines, airports and ground handling service providers, giving ERP and
Assistance Management teams hands -on experience in providing comfort and guidance to families during
emergencies. IATA - Family Assistance for Airline ERP and Crisis Management Teams.
IOSA Emergency Response Planning Standards and Recommended Practices (ISARPs) updates. The
proposed updates will be included in the 19th edition of the IOSA Standards Manual (ISM). Following is the
summary of proposed changes and related key benefits:
ERP Forum 2025. On 13 October , over 55 delegates from around the world gathered for a one- day Forum in
Xiamen, China . The Forum was held alongside the IATA World Safety and Operations Conference ( WSOC )
2025, where broader topics related to Emergency Response Planning (ERP) were featured as part of a three-
day Crisis Management Track on October 14 -16.
The agenda of the Forum included updates from the IATA ERPTF, a review of the data gathered during the brainstorming sessions in the 2024 ERP Forum, and featured in- depth case studies from recent airline
activations, offering valuable insights and lessons learned. Participants also took part in interactive
brainstorming sessions on the following topics:
• Effective contact centre design in crisis response Fewer number of ISARPs
The revised framework
consolidates the existing requirements from twelve to seven, thereby reducing the overall auditor preparation time. In addition, the updated structure removes duplicative elements, eliminating the need for operators to submit the sam e evidence multiple
times.
Clarity
The proposal introduces more comprehensive guidance material to support consistent implementation, enabling both operators and auditors to more clearly interpret and apply the revised requirements. The enhanced guidelines reflect recognized industry best practices and are particularly valuable for personnel newly assuming Emergency Response Planning (ERP)
responsibilities.
Flexibility
Emergency response planning must remain adaptable to differing organizational cultures, operational contexts, and emerging technologies. The revised provisions are designed to accommodate this diversity by offering greater operational flexibility, includi ng support
for virtual crisis centres, varied training approaches, and the use of innovative
exercise formats.
36 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
• Staff wellbeing and management of fatigue in emergencies
• Formalizing external support and partnerships in crisis plans
Further details are included in the ERP Forum 2025 Final Report .
Key Ongoing Activities
ERPTF Workstream on Partnership Activation Standardization and Alignment
This workstream focuses on enhancing the consistency and alignment of airline partnership activations across
a broad range of operational scenarios. These include full‑scale activations such as wet‑lease operations,
alliances, and codeshare arrangements, as well as cooperation during significant incidents that do not require
full activation, such as severe turbulence events. The workstream also addresses the complexities associated with interoperability among multiple marketing carriers. The primary output is planned to be an IATA guidance document designed to support operators in managing
partnership activation more effectively. A call for participation in this workstream was issued during the 2025
ERP Forum.
ERPTF Workstream on Mentorship Program
The ERP Mentorship Program was initiated in response to feedback from the 2024 ERP Forum breakout sessions and is being designed to promote knowledge sharing and professional development within the airline
community. This peer‑to‑peer model is intended to strengthen organizational expertise and support the
consistent application of ERP best practices across the industry. A call for participation in this workstream was
issued during the 2025 ERP Forum.
Industry Collaborations
ICAO Work
IATA ERPTF member contributes airline expertise to the following ICAO group s, offering an airline perspective
to inform the development of globally harmonized guidance and to ensure that airline needs are clearly and
effectively represented.
• Emergency Response Planning Expert Group (ERPEG): The ICAO Emergency Response Planning Expert Group (ERPEG) is responsible for reviewing and updating ICAO Annex 14 provisions along with the associated guidance material.
• ICAO AAAVF Working Group: Through the IATA ERPTF members, the airline views are also represented at the ICAO Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and their Families Working Group
(AAAVFWG). This WG is dedicated to strengthening international standards and best practices for the The ERP Forum 2026 will take place on October 5 in Istanbul. Please register your interest to
attend here. As in 2025, the ERP Forum will be co -located with the IATA World Operations and
Safety Conference ( WSOC ), taking place on October 6 - 8.
WSOC 2026 will once again feature a dedicated three -day Crisis Management track, widening the
scope of ERP -specific themes to cover a broader set of crisis -driven topics and practical
resilience -building strategies .
37 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
assistance of aircraft accident victims and their families. Its work focuses on ICAO Doc 9998, which
defines ICAO’s policy framework, and ICAO Doc 9973, the corresponding manual offering practical implementation guidance. The primary output of this init iative is a gap analysis of existing ICAO
documents, aiming to inform future improvements and ensure alignment with industry needs.
Existing resources for ERP Professionals
11. Ground Operations Safety
11.1 IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO)
The IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) is the industry’s leading program for global oversight of
Ground Handling Service Providers (GHSPs). In June 2025, a new audit methodology was introduced to address industry demands for stronger implement ation assessments, alignment of audit standards with
industry standards as published in IGOM, AHM and ICHM, with focus on reduction of operational variations and improvement of safety performance.
The new approach has contributed to a rise in accredited stations and increased engagement from nearly 200 ISAGO airline members. Currently, there are 231 GHSPs listed in the ISAGO Registry, delivering services at 433
accredited stations across 239 airport s worldwide.
The ISAGO reports have enabled the ISAGO member airlines to be more efficient by complementing or, where
appropriate, replacing their monitoring activities over their GHSPs. ISAGO definitely benefits both airlines and GHSPs as it is efficiently delivering an estimated USD 9 million in savings to both ISAGO member airlines and
GHSPs through: reducing duplicate audits, narrowing audit scope, and eliminating unnecessary overlapping
monitoring activities.
Throughout 2025, 388 audits have been conducted - 120 more than in 2024. Of these, 299 audits were
performed under the new methodology, providing valuable operational data on procedural variations and Crisis Communications and Reputation management - guidance material:
• IATA Crisis Communications and reputation management post -COVID. Evolving best practices
for the aviation industry (2024)
IATA ERP training portfolio:
• IATA - Family Assistance for Airline ERP and Crisis Management Teams (new)
• IATA - Emergency Planning and Response for Airports and GSPs with ERP Simulation
• IATA - Emergency Planning and Response for Airlines with ERP Simulation
• IATA - Airport Emergency Response Awareness
IATA ERP Managers contact list *: A voluntary list designed to help ERP professionals connect with
peers. We encourage airlines and other aviation stakeholders to sign up and make use of this
complimentary service.
IATA Connect *: IATA’s digital space for safety collaboration and direct interactions among aviation
professionals. Includes best practices, guidance material, safety risk assessments and the IATA Safety
Issue Hub .
* Require an IATA Customer portal profile.
38 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
findings. This data will be used to further enhance the Airport Handling Manual (AHM) and IATA Ground
Operations Manual (IGOM), reinforcing seamless operations and industry -wide standardization.
The enhanced ISAGO audit model responds to industry requests for greater ground operations
standardisation, stronger adoption of industry requirements, safety risk reduction, and improved benchmarking
of audit results.
11.2 Top ISAGO findings and variations under the new ISAGO
audit model 2025
The following audit results analysis is based only on the 270 ISAGO audits were conducted under the new
ISAGO model audit methodology between June and October 2025, resulting in 3,596 findings. These included
89 Headquarters (MHQ) audits and 181 Station (STN) audits. The average number of findings per report is 13. Top Findings and variations are fully detailed in the following infographics.
Data range Jun -Oct 2025 89
181270 Audits in total
MHQ STN111
52503819Audit distribution by region
Europe Asia Pacific
Africa & Middle East Americas
China & North Asia
143Regional breakdown of findings
270 Audits, 3,596 findings
Europe Asia Pacific
Africa & Middle East Americas
China & North Asia1445
112 56 40 37Findings per discipline
270 Audits with 3,596 findings
ORM RMP TRN PAX BAG CGM LOD
39 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
A total of 270 audits were conducted, resulting in 1,445 findings under ORM (Organi zation & Management)
across both MHQ and STN levels. A total of 270 documentation -related findings were identified, meaning that
every audit conducted within the five months period (89 MHQ and 181Station level) contained documentation
issues related to the gap analysis as published by the GHSP in the OPS portal .
Organization and Management (ORM ) overview
Documentation finding analysis – Findings data indicates that GHSPs may not fully understand how to correctly
perform gap analysis and self -assess against the audit standards. This trend also highlights the need for
GHSPs to implement strong internal quality assurance systems to review gap analyses before submission,
ensuring accuracy and completeness. It is expected that GHSPs will learn how to properly correct their gap analysis, and the ability to clone these analyses for subsequent station audits should lead to greater accuracy and efficiency in the future.
Organization and Management (ORM ) AHM Ch6 Sub -sections breakdown
ORM (AHM Ch.6), covers areas including AHM601 -Management, AHM610 -Safety Management System,
AHM615 -Monitoring, AHM620 -Emergency Response, AHM616 -Occupational Health, and AHM617 -Human
Factors. The accompanying graph provides a detailed breakdown of implementation findings (except ORM
which includes also documentation finding as reflected above) within each subsection, highlighting key areas
of improvement and illustrating the distribution of the ORM findings between MHQ and STN.
ORM top findings – organization faces significant challenges in safety culture and operational governance,
poor promotion of safety culture, ineffective communication and lack of change management. There is no
proper delegation of duties, coupled with deficiencies in GSE maintenance and oversight of outsourced providers. Training, documentation, and performance monitoring for third parties are inadequate, and record retenti on is weak. Within the Safety Management System, critical gaps exist such as missing SPIs, ineffective
hazard identification, absent risk registers, and inadequate safety reporting and data analysis. Monitoring 253
601 Org &
Mngmnt610 SMS 615
Monitoring620 ERP 616 OHS 617 HFORM -AHM Ch.6 Breakdown for MHQ
639 findings
601 - Org &
Mngmnt610 - SMS 620 - ERP 615 -
Monitoring617 - HFORM -AHM Ch.6 Breakdown for STN
806 findings639
806ORM findings (MHQ & STN)
1,445 Findings
MHQ STN253339
MHQ STNDocumentation findings - AHM601
for 270 Audits
Total Findings Docmentation Findings
40 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
processes are inconsistent, with failures in corrective action implementation, audit quality, and oversight of
external providers, further compounded by poor record keeping.
Training (TRN )
A total of 874 implementation findings were identified during the audit of the training program across both
MHQ and STN levels. The assessment covered key elements under TRN (AHM 1110), including the
management of training records —particularly at the station level—as well as the structure, content, and
currency of training modules. The accompanying graphs highlights the distribution of these findings between
MHQ and Stations, providing a clear view of areas requiring improvement
Training (TRN) top findings – lack of evidence for trainer competence and unsupervised OJT. The train- the-
trainer program is non -standardized, and practical training for load control, ramp, and passenger handling is
not implemented. RMP and GSE modules are incomplete, with missing content in syllabi and training materials.
Records reveal expired or overdue training for SMS, Security, ERP, and GEN modules, while OJT modules for
ramp and passenger handling are absent. There is no mechanism to t rack recurrent training, materials are not
fully aligned with AHM1110, and station -level records lack staff information.
Operational Disciplines – Implementation findings
2546 findings were identified during 181 STN audits, all highlighting implementation challenges
Ramp (RMP) top findings - Ramp handling operations show safety lapses, including incomplete or missing
walkaround checks before GSE positioning and failure to raise safety rails. Speeding, non -use of seat belts,
and leaving GSE unattended with engines running were observed. Equipment safety practices are poor, with conveyor belts left elevated, GSE unchocked near aircraft, and damaged or missing cones and chocks. PPE compliance is inconsistent, especially for lavatory services, and GSE marked “out of service” is still in use. Additi onally, potable water servicing lacks proper port cleaning, record accuracy, and fill point inspections.
Baggage (BAG) top findings -
Baggage handling operations reveal safety and quality gaps. Staff frequently
failed to use required PPE such as gloves, hearing protection, and safety shoes, despite availability, indicating 408
466TRN Findings (MHQ & STN)
874 Findings
MHQ STN
181Total Audits -270
MHQ STN1032
11256 39 37STN -Findings breakdown
181 Audits, 2,546 Findings
RMP ORM TRN PAX BAG CGM LOD
41 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
weak enforcement. Improper baggage handling was observed, including throwing bags and stacking heavy
items on lighter ones, creating risks of damage and injury. Safety procedures for carts and dollies were
inconsistently followed, with unsecured rails, ope n curtains, and unrestrained ULDs contrary to IGOM
standards. Many baggage carts were unserviceable —broken poles, missing curtains, and defective
bumpers —yet remained in use. The recurrence of these issues across baggage and flight areas highlights
systemi c failures in supervision, training, operational discipline, and equipment maintenance.
Cargo and Mail handling ( CGM ) top findings - Outdated DG notices remain displayed, and segregation in DG
areas is inadequate with missing markings, CAO shipments were stored alongside general cargo, and DG
items like batteries were not visibly displayed during acceptance. There is no dedicated secured storage for radioactive materials, and documentation is missing. Additional issues include expired cargo nets and straps
in use, ULDs stored directly on the ground, and unsecured cargo facility access. Screened cargo segregation
was inconsistent, customs truck seals and driver verification were not performed, and potable water servicing
lacked proper clea ning, record accuracy, and inspections.
Passenger Handling (PAX ) top findings - Documents such as boarding passes, tags, and PILs were left
unattended at counters, and DG/prohibited items notices were missing at check -in and boarding gates.
dang erous goods question not asked at the check -in, and weighing scales were not calibrated, and some are
with expired certificates. Check -in agents inconsistently assessed cabin baggage weight, allowing overweight
carry -on items, and lacked awareness of special baggage handling procedures, including lithium b atteries.
Load Control (LOD) top findings - Multiple final LIRs lacked required signatures, and NOTOCs were missing
for special loads or dangerous goods. Mandatory documents were not consistently retained for the required three -month period and checks of aircraft basic weight/index were often skipped. Continuous load sheet
accuracy checks were incomplete, with frequent errors such as missing flight numbers, registration details, unconfirmed underload, incorrect DOW/DOI, unchecked final fuel figures, missing ULD tare weights, and other
critical data omissions.
11.3 Root causes ISAGO findings and conclusion
The root causes of all the ISAGO findings are grouped into three categories:
Documentation: Wrong references, incorrect self -assessment while gap analysis – wrongly marked variations,
procedures not defined and not clear, and missing evidence on risk assessment for safety critical procedures
Training (implementation issues) : Training content missing against AHM1110 requirements, training modules
not delivered as per job specific and other mandatory training missing, training content elements missing.
Oversight (implementation issues) : External providers oversight deficiencies, corrective action
implementation failure, inadequate communication.
The new ISAGO audit model represents a significant step in the right direction, the initial overview of results
from 270 audits clearly highlights the current challenges faced by the industry in the ground handling sector. This Finding analysis highlights the standards and specific operational procedures where most repetitive
issues are happening and indicating areas in which GHSPs need to strengthen their monitoring and oversight
processes. Enhancing these controls to ensure continued compliance with appl icable industry standards and
to improve readiness for ISAGO audits. From this analysis it becomes obvious that an additional effort needs to be done by the GHSPs in the preparation and quality of their gap analysis particularly with ORM, TRN and RMP
disciplines to ensure adherence to IGOM and AHM.
42 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
11.4 Ground Damage Reduction Initiatives
The IATA Enhanced GSE Recognition Program , launched in May 2024 and now integrated into ISAGO, is
designed to reduce ground damage risk by incentivizing the implementation of advanced anti -collision systems
in ground support equipment (GSE). These systems help prevent collisions between equipment, aircraft, and
infrastructure, addressing one of the most significant contributors to ground damage incidents.
According to IATA’s Ground Damage Report, ground damage costs currently exceed $4.5 billion annually and
are projected to double to $9.7 billion over the next 15 years if no corrective measures are taken. Anti -collision
technology offers a proven mitigation strategy: modelling indicates that widespread adoption of enhanced GSE could reduce damage rates by up to 50% for high -risk equipment types and deliver cost avoidance of
approximately $1.7 billion per year at a 75% adoption level.
Since its launch, the program has demonstrated strong momentum. In less than 18 months, it received 304
applications from 145 Ground Handling Service Providers (GHSPs) , underscoring the industry’s commitment to
improving safety through technology adoption.
Regional analysis reveals notable disparities. North
Asia leads with the youngest fleets, averaging 10
years, and the highest recognition ratios. Europe shows strong performance with 27 successful
recognitions. Africa and the Middle East operate the oldest fleets, averaging 29 years, yet achieve higher recognition rates through retrofitting strategies. The Americas, despite relatively young fleets, show the
lowest recognition numbers—a trend expected to
shift as older equipment is phased out.
Adoption of active anti -collision systems varies widely, from 55 percent in belt loaders to 25 percent in de-
icers, leaving significant room for improvement. Program performance data indicates that risk reduction rates
achieved by participating GHSPs vary considerably.
43 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
To evaluate applications, the program uses a standardized matrix that calculates the potential reduction in
ground damage risk based on the number and type of active anti -collision systems installed on ground support
equipment within entire GSE fleet . Each anticollision system contributes to lowering collision risk, and the
cumulative effect determines the applicant’s fleet overall risk reduction score. To qualify for recognition,
Ground Handling Service Providers (GHSPs) must achieve a minimum risk reduction rate of 20 %.
Out of 113 assessed applications, 53 achieved less than 10 percent risk reduction, and only 7 achieved between 80 and 90 percent, with none reaching 90 –100 percent. The average risk reduction across all
applications is 20.75 percent, while successful recog nitions average 44.88 percent, compared to just 4.19
percent for failed applications. This distribution highlights that while recognized GHSPs demonstrate
measurable improvements in reducing ground damage risk, overall implementation levels of enhanced GSE
remain low and uneven across the industry.
A comprehensive analysis planned for next year will provide deeper insights into program penetration, fleet
characteristics —including equipment types, age profiles, and safety systems—and the potential for ground
damage cost avoidance. These findings will guide further refinements to accelerate adoption and improve safety outcomes.
In parallel, a review of existing GSE specifications has commenced to identify ergonomic solutions that could
help engineer out ground damage risks arising from human factors. This work is essential, as autonomous GSE operations are likely to remain limite d to specific equipment types or locations in the short term.
At the same time, a growing number of airports and stakeholders are exploring the adoption of autonomous
operations. The benefits of autonomous GSE extend beyond efficiency gains to include enhanced safety, as
such systems inherently incorporate anti -collision capabilities. On the contrary, it can also introduce new risk if
introduction of autonomous GSE is not managed properly. In response, IATA has worked extensively with industry partners to develop first -of-its-kind guidance, including guidelines, recom mendations, risk
assessment methodologies and use cases. Building on this foundation, a standardized framework for testing
autonomous GSE use cases has now been delivered, enabling consistent comparison of safety and efficiency
performance across different original equipment manufacturers. Looking ahead, a scoring methodology and
further recommendations related to autonomous interactions with aircraft will be developed next year to support the scalable deployment of safe autonomous operations.
44 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
11.5 Ground Operations Accidents, Incidents and Injuries
Prevention
A regular review of ADX and IDX events data is conducted, with continuous updates to the Safety Issue Hub.
These trends are shared with working groups to analyze and identify potential hazards to enhanc e the AHM and
IGOM procedures . The ACTF taxonomy has been revised to include ground -related fatalities, categorized
under “others” for events involving aircraft . The following highlights are based on ADX and IDX data analysis,
covering top events related to aircraft damage , injuries and fatalities , and ground support equipment (GSE)
operations.
11.6 ADX – Aircraft damage and fatality/injuries
ADX – Analysis of aircraft damage data over the past 10 years (2015 – 2025) shows that there were in total 520
accidents out of which 53 were related aircraft -ground damage. Out of 53 ground damage related accidents,
16 were associated with ramp damage. The graph below presents the annual breakdown of aircraft damage accidents during ground handling.
Aircraft damaged during ramp handling
16 ramp accidents involving GSE during
ground handling resulted in aircraft damage,
with following breakdown:
• 11 accidents of GSE hit the aircraft
• 02 accidents caused by pushback failure
• 03 accidents caused by wrong parking of
GSEs
Cause s – non -adherence to procedure, wrong
parking, distraction, driving speed, GSE failure
ADX – Analysis of injuries and fatalities shows that since February 2025, no fatal ground handling accidents
have been reported. However, one major injury occurred when an airport staff member fell from a height of six metres from PBB at Sydney Airport. The WG reviewed the contributing factors, leading to enhancements of IGOM Ed14 procedures under 3.1.3.5 related to PBB operations and strengthen the requirement for serviceability checks and the reporting of malfunctions or defects. Safety issue hub was updated for the associated risks.
11.7 IDX – Aircraft damage
A total of 29,608 events were reported by 188 operators between 2024 to 2025 (Nov) related to aircraft
damages with the following top areas and source of damage:
Aircraft area of damage
• Cargo hold damage – panels and locks
• Fuselage damage
• Cargo door damage – frame and surrounding
• Cabin door damage
• Engine area damage Source of aircraft damage
• Passenger stairs
• Belt loader
• High loader
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
No. of damages2015- 2025
16 ramp damages
45 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
11.8 IDX – Aircraft loading and unloading errors (IDX events
related to IGOM )
A total of 37,953 loading error events were reported in 2025 by contributing members. The most common
events were:
1. Hold nets improperly deployed or not deployed
2. Improperly secured cargo/baggage
3. Cargo/baggage loaded in incorrect positions
These loading errors are related to the following IATA IGOM procedures:
• Supervision of aircraft loading and unloading
• Actions during loading and unloading
• Cargo hold inspection
• Securing of load
• Load spreading
Despite the well -documented benefits reported by members who have adopted digital solutions to support
safe loading reconciliation processes —such as a reduction of over 90% in loading errors and fewer loading
delays —industry -wide implementation of such sol utions remains low.
To support the industry, the working group has finalized a global digital standard, “Digital Load Verification
(DLV),” which can be implemented by any member through smart application. Furthermore, a new standard for
identifying and scanning loading positions within the aircraft cargo hold has been finalized in the AHM 47th
edition, designed to assist loading teams in mitigating incorrect loading position events.
In parallel, the working group is currently reviewing safety risks and procedural variations associated with these
areas to streamline processes and enhance operational safety. Procedures for supervision and cargo hold inspection have already been reviewed and updated in the current IGOM Edition 14, which is now in effect.
11.9 IDX – GSE operations incidents (GHSPs)
IDX is open to GHSP reporting, while the initial membership is still in its infancy, some data were analyzed to
show the value of data contribution and potential for industry improvements. 14 GHSPs reported ramp handling related events in IDX program between 2024 to 2025 (Jul) . A total of 1,621 distinct ramp handling incidents
(excluding baggage and ULD loading errors) were reported by 12 GHSPs.
Of these, 657 incidents (40.5%) were related to GSE o perations, with the following top five contributing factors
:
46 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Top five causes of GSE incidents
• 79 cases – Incorrectly positioned
GSE – 79 cases
• 53 cases – Gudeman/marshalling
failure
• 25 cases – GSE -to-aircraft
collisions (stationary aircraft)
• 23 cases – GSE -to-GSE collisions
• 20 cases – GSE -to-airport
infrastructure collisions
Many of the above incidents could have been prevented by use of the enhanced GSE, especially collisions with
aircraft and other equipment . The cases are being analysed for root causes and contributing factors.
Ground Ops stakeholders (airlines and GHSPs) have a held a detailed discussion on potential root causes and contributing factors behind ground operations incidents (damages, injuries). Their assessments and review
focused on identifying and addressing safety challenges in ground operations, with emphasis on people -
related, process -related and technology- related contributing factors and potential solutions. The output of
their review is highlighted below:
PEOPLE PROCESSES TECHNOLOGY
Root causes and contributing factors
• Staff understand safety only within their
own roles; limited awareness of broader hazards, however hazard messaging needs balance to avoid deterring recruitment.
• Safety training lacks cross -functional
content and real -life examples.
• Staff need to feel empowered to make safe decisions.
• Outstations feel less supported compared to home hubs, station management in outstations reports to commercial management which sometimes leads into unsafe decisions.
• Reporting lines misaligned; safety messages often conflict with commercial priorities.
• Supervisors must actively promote safety and avoid complacency.
• Ramp roles have short training cycles; high turnover impacts safety.
• SMS training should be practical and role -specific.
• CRM training should include time management and human limitations.
• No single point of contact for aircraft turnaround; coordination role needed.
• Mature processes exist but are not consistently followed.
• Excessive complexity and lack of alignment
with local conditions.
• Operational procedures often unrealistic
within turnaround timelines.
• Contracts lack clarity and specificity.
• Staff face barriers in accessing or understanding procedures.
• Existing systems lack safety controls and features.
• Aircraft and GSE technology adoption remains immature.
• Data usage is limited due to lack of skills and integration challenges.
• Infrastructure at many airports is outdated and unsafe.
• Fragmented systems and poor interoperability hinder efficiency.
• Data governance and sharing remain unresolved issues.
• Existing systems lack essential safety features and controls.
• Aircraft and GSE technology adoption remains immature.
• Poor data usage due to lack of skills and integration challenges.
• Outdated airport infrastructure negatively impacts safety.
• Fragmented systems and poor interoperability hinder efficiency.
• Data governance and sharing remain unresolved issues.
• Conflict between technology use and practical awareness on the ramp.
Solutions
• Improve compensation and benefits to make ground handling roles more attractive.
• Reduce labor intensity through automation
(e.g., autonomous pushback, PBB). • Focus on operational needs for turnaround rather than defining staff/time requirements.
• Standardize and reduce procedural variations
across stations. • Apply AEANA case globally and explore MAD example for gate and bridge automation.
• Implement automated Passenger Boarding Bridges (PBB). 12%
8%4%4%3%657 -GSE operations incidents
Top five causes
Incorrectly Positioned GSE
Gudeman/Marshalling Failure
GSE-to-Aircraft Collision
GSE-to-GSE Collision
GSE-to-Infrastructure Collision
47 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
• Strategically manage rising GSE and handling
costs.
• Tailor training to specific roles and modern
learning styles, use engaging, tech- enabled
formats for newer generations.
• Implement regular competency assessments
• Conduct human factors studies specific to ground operations.
• Expand CRM training to include leadership roles across airlines and GHSPs.
• Ensure consistent and repeated safety messaging from all representatives.
• Address staff shortages during turnaround to prevent shortcuts and pressure.
• Empower staff to make safe decisions despite
commercial/time pressures.
• Advocate for digital, visual, and interactive
documentation formats.
• Push for global standardization of supervisor roles in IOSA/ISAGO standards.
• Treat procurement as a safety -critical function
with proper training.
• Provide operational exposure to procurement teams.
• Benchmark against other industries to align safety and commercial goals.
• Ensure procurement processes reflect and document safety standards.
• Simplify procedures, formats, and
communication methods.
• Reduce the number of manuals and SOPs.
• Conduct risk assessments to ensure
processes are realistic and achievable.
• Design processes with the end -user in mind —
ask what would make them follow it.
• Streamline and reduce excessive GSE -related
procedures.
• Explore GSE pooling to optimize equipment use.
• Engage airports to address infrastructure limitations impacting process execution.
• Use remote -controlled pushback systems (e.g., Mototok
with LiBa).
• Establish centralized control rooms for PBB and pushback operations.
• Automate cargo delivery from warehouse to gate.
• Introduce robotic arms or vacuum tools for baggage handling.
• Deploy fleet management systems with speed control in defined areas.
• Equip GSE with mandatory safety features and disable manual shut -off options.
• Implement park assist systems for GSE docking and leveling.
• Use AI cameras for 360° compliance monitoring and
violation detection.
• Apply predictive analytics to improve turnaround efficiency
and safety.
• Install eLIR systems with automated load/offload signals in cargo holds.
• Require supervisors to scan QR codes to confirm empty cargo holds.
11.10 Safety Issue Hub – Ground Operations Risks
A number of safety issues have been added to the IATA Safety Issue Hub related to ground operations. For
each safety issue there is associated guidance documentation to support the understanding and mitigation of
these safety issues. The following ground operations risks were added or updated with additional guidance in safety hub in 2025:
Incorrect operation of passengers boarding bridge (PBB) leading to fall from height – lack of maintenance
program, no oversight, absence of safety signage and awareness of potential hazards. All such gaps resulted in personnel injuries, fatalities and operational disruption. Slipping of the propeller brake during ground handling on turboprop aircraft – To provide power without a GPU,
some turboprop crews run an engine with the propeller brake engaged. If the brake is worn, it may slip and the propeller can rotate, posing a serious risk to nearby ground personnel.
IATA continues to review the safety issues through IDX events and updates the Safety Issue hub. Several ground operations risks identified in 2024 continue to persist :
Aircraft damage caused by GSE
Reduced situational awareness from wearing earbuds/headphones underneath ear defenders
Aircraft De -Anti/Icing operation
Carriage of miss or undeclared high energy storage devices (Lithium Batteries) as cargo
Running engines (engine ingestion/blast)
11.11 Safety Incident Taxonomy and IGOM Mapping
Based on IDX data analysis in various ground operations categories, IATA has mapped the Safety Incident Taxonomy (ISIT) to relevant IGOM provisions. This mapping helps the industry and IDX users identify operational safety issues and drive data -based impro vements to standards and ensure risk -focus
procedures are shared with the industry . IDX -IGOM mapping is available through the industry overview
dashboard in the IATA Customer Portal under the GADM application. In 2025, the top IGOM procedural areas with th e highest incident reports remained consistent with 2024 and read as follows :
48 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Passenger Handling
• Passenger departure
• Special categories of passengers
• Passenger disruptions
• Passenger Arrival and Transfer Baggage Handling
• Departure baggage handling
• Disruption
• Safe baggage handling
• Transfer baggage
Aircraft Safety and Servicing
• Ramp safety in aircraft handling
• Aircraft cleaning and disinfection
• Adverse weather
• Safety during fueling and defueling Aircraft Turnaround
• Aircraft loading and unloading
• Aircraft towing
• Aircraft departure
• Aircraft access doors
Load Control
• Weight and balance calculation
• Last minute changes
• Information exchange
11.12 Safety Increase through Standardization and Adoption
of Industry Standards
The adoption of industry standards IGOM and AHM plays a pivotal role in standardizing ground handling
operations and reducing operational complexity across the aviation industry. These standards enable a irlines
and GHSPs to streamline processes, minimize variability, and strengthen both safety and efficiency . The
industry ground operations experts continue to develop and enhance these standards for ground operations to make them safer, simpler, and more efficient. All changes are reflected in AHM Ed4 6 (Airport Handling
Manual) and IGOM Ed14 (IATA Ground Operations Manual) effective as of January 2026 with applicability for the
ISAGO audits from March 2026 . Revitalized high -level ISAGO checklists (mirroring AHM , IGOM , and ICHM
requirements) can also be found in the AHM toolbox .
By the end of 202 5, 441 companies (264 airlines and 177 GHSPs) were onboarded to the OPS Portal , and 252
published their gap analysis. This represents an 83% increase compared to 2024 . This growth reflects an
increased industry -wide commitment to harmonization, variation reporting, and wider adoption of IGOM and
AHM 1110 (training) .
While industry drive to reduce ground operations variations remains strong, it is important to acknowledge that
full alignment is not always achievable. For IGOM Ed13, a total of 6,964 variations were reported by airlines
and GHSPs , with the highest concentration found in Chapters 3 and 4, cover ing Aircraft General
Safety and Aircraft Turnaround procedures.
This distribution highlights the operational areas where alignment remains most challenging and
where standardization initiatives can deliver the greatest impact .
49 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
11.13 DAQCP Program Output – winter season 2024 -2025
The IATA De -Icing/Anti -Icing Quality Control Pool (DAQCP), established in 1997, supports safe winter
operations by enabling member airlines to share audits and safety intelligence through a common framework.
Membership exceeded 170 airlines in season 2024 –2025 (up from 160 in season 2023– 2024), supported by
190 qualified auditors and 16 Technical and Training Group members. Through this pooled approach, DAQCP
provides a stable, comparable view of winter operational hazards and supports targeted risk reducti on where
exposure is highest.
11.14 DAQCP Audits
In season 2024 –2025, DAQCP delivered 622 audits at airports with recurring exposure to conditions requiring
aircraft ground de -icing and anti- icing. This targeted deployment supports early identification of hazards and
strengthens risk visibility for DAQCP members and the wider winter operations community. The figures below 0102030405060708090100Top 20 Variations -GHSPs and Airlines
IGOM Ed1319%
8%
26%39%5%
3%IGOM Ed.13 Variations
Ch.1 PAX
Ch.2 BAG
Ch.3 RMP
Ch.4 RMP
Ch.5 LOD
Ch.6 SupervisionOut of 326 published gaps , 6964
variations were declared among
GHSP s and airline s
Chapter Airlines GHSPs
Ch.1 583 745
Ch.2 315 269
Ch.3 825 977
Ch.4 1212 1517
Ch.5 176 164
Ch.6 71 110
Total 6964
50 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
present the distribution of audits by type and geography. DAQCP operates within a defined seasonal window,
typically from October through March, with limited exceptions for select Northern European and Australasian locations.
Audits Breakdown – GHSP Types Audits Geography Monthly Breakdown
A – Aircraft Ground De -Icing / Anti -Icing
I – Post De -Icing / Anti -Icing Check * No DAQCP audits performed in
sanctioned territories * July audit – Southern Hemisphere
11.15 DAQCP Findings
During the season, DAQCP audits generated 1,394 findings across the network, an average of 2.24 findings per
audit . Findings are classified across three levels, enabling consistent differentiation between significant non -
conformities, other non -conformities, and observations that may contribute to future non -conformity.
The figures below provide the findings distribution by region and severity level. Together, they support a clear view of both the volume and the risk profile of issues identified during winter operations and help focus attention on the hazard groups that c ontribute most to overall exposure.
Findings Levels Breakdown Findings Ratios Findings Geography
DAQCP operates 3 levels of findings with
L1 being the most severe An average of 2.24 findings per audit
across the network
* No DAQCP audits performed in
sanctioned territories A, 12
(2%)
AI, 571
(92% )I, 39
(6%)
10223770 73410
MENA CIS* NAS ASPAC NAM EURSeason 2023-2024
Season 2024-2025
Jul Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Season 2023-
2024Season 2024-
2025354 346969914111134 Level
Level
Level17.1
01002003004005006007008009001000
Audits Findings Ratio135193156210871
MENAASPACNASCIS*NAMEUR622
Inspections
51 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
11.16 Significant Safety Hazards and Levels of Risk
To support consistent risk quantification, DAQCP applies the ARMS Operational Risk Assessment Methodology
to translate audit findings into a structured view of hazards and associated risk levels. This enables a
comparable assessment of both frequency and severity, supporting prioritization of mitigation focus areas across the network.
DAQCP classifies hazards into three tiers. The figures below summarize overall seasonal risk levels and show the distribution of hazards by frequency and severity. Fluid -related hazards remain the dominant driver of
overall exposure, accounting for around four -fifths of total risk while representing under one- third of total
findings, reinforcing the importance of disciplined controls across the full fluid management lifecycle.
Aggregated Risk Levels Significant Hazards Fluids related Hazards (Count)
Risk per audit rose by 7.05%, risk per
finding by 1.99% Percentages show each hazard group’s share of the seasonal total, by count and by
risk score.
Aggregated risk per audit and per finding increased overall. At the same time, several hazard groups showed
measurable reductions, including fluids related hazards, which remain the dominant contributor to total system
risk at approximately 80%.
The fluids- related hazards breakdown shows that the largest share of findings is identified at the vehicle stage.
This suggests that the primary exposure is concentrated in the last operational control points before application, rather than indicating wide spread issues with the fluid product itself, and may reflect cumulative
effects across storage, handling, and transfer processes leading up to use.
9641,032
020040060080010001200
60000160000260000360000460000560000660000760000
Season 2023-2024 Season 2024-2025
Total Risk Risk Per Audit
Risk Per Finding
13.957.76 -2.89 25.6
0100 000200 000300 000400 000500 000600 000
050100150200250300350400450500
Season 2024-
2025 Count
Season 2023-2024 Count
Risk % Change
39.3%
21.2%
12.2%
10.5%9.4%
7.4%
52 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Individual Hazards Dynamics (count)
11.17 Regional Performance
The regional breakdown highlights meaningful differences in hazard profiles across the network. While the mix
varies by region, fluids related hazards consistently represent the largest contributor to overall risk. This view supports region -specific focus without losing sight of the dominant system risk drivers observed across the
season.
Regional Breakdown of Hazards
Data presented at Tier 1 Level
The following charts show the change in average risk per audit and per finding by region between seasons.
Season 2023-2024 Season 2024-2025
Fluids Training Procedures
Equipment & Facilities Management Systems
17%19%15%32%22%
55%28%28%64%32%40%
4%9%9%9%3%4%
9%14%22%12%13%
15%30%26%27%21%21%
ASPACCIS*EURMENANASNAM
Equipment & Facilities Fluids Management Systems Procedures Training
53 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Regional risk per Audit Regional risk per Finding
Average risk per audit has increased by 7.05% Average risk per finding increased by 1.99%
11.18 Hazards Coexistence
Beyond individual hazards, winter operations risk is often shaped by multiple conditions occurring within the
same audit. The hazards coexistence matrix highlights which Tier 2 hazards most frequently appear together, pointing to combinations that tend to cluster around common control dependencies. Because DAQCP audits
assess conformance against requirements and supporting evidence, these patterns primarily reflect the
alignment and maturity of documented controls, training governance, and quality assurance / monitoring
programs .
The likelihood of hazard combination s occurring simultaneously
Darker cells indicate hazard pairs that co -occur more frequently within the same audit.
The coexistence results show that the most frequent Tier 2 pairings sit at the interface between documented
procedures, training governance, and quality assurance / monitoring system . These patterns reflect how 3738918931,493 1,6122,110
1,193
7948881,3881,879
1,061
05001000150020002500
NAS ASPAC EUR CIS* NAM MENASeason 2023-2024
4751,089
020040060080010001200
NAS ASPAC EUR CIS* NAM MENASeason 2023-2024 Season 2024-2025
Very likely Not likely
54 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
requirements are translated into procedures, embedded through training, and assured through the QMS /
Monitoring System:
Rank Hazard pairing Coexistence
frequency Note
1 Training Program +
Operational Procedures 82 Highlights the critical need for alignment between
training content and documented procedures.
2 Operational Procedures +
Equipment 46 Shows the dependency between procedural clarity
and equipment readiness requirements.
3 Training Program +
Monitoring System 45 Indicates that training governance and quality
assurance maturity are closely linked.
4 Training Program + Fluid
Acceptance 33 Reinforces the importance of embedding fluid
acceptance controls within training frameworks.
5 Operational Procedures +
Fluid Acceptance 31 Emphasises the role of clear documentation in
supporting consistent fluid acceptance processes.
11.19 Summary
The 2024 –2025 winter season confirmed DAQCP ’s continued value in providing a stable, comparable view of
winter operations risk across a large and diverse network. In total, 622 audits generated 1,394 findings,
supporting consistent visibility of both systemic and location- specific safety hazards.
Fluid -related hazards remained the dominant contributor to overall risk, with exposure distributed across
multiple control points including vehicle handling, acceptance, storage integrity, and testing. By count, fluid -
related hazards represent under one- third of findings, yet they account for around four -fifths of total risk,
confirming fluids control as the dominant risk driver. Coexistence analysis shows that the most frequent Tier 2
hazard combinations cluster around the alignment of training programs and documented procedures, reinforcing the importance of coherent, end -to-end control frameworks.
Looking ahead, DAQCP will continue to refine risk analytics and develop auditor capability, supporting
members with targeted priorities aligned to the highest -risk hazard groups observed during the season.
12. IATA Fuel Quality Pool (IFQP)
The IATA Fuel Quality Pool (IFQP) is a program that allows airlines to share fuel inspection reports from
locations worldwide. With a network of more than 2,000 airports, IFQP provides consistency in fuel quality and safety while also reducing costs for airlines and fuel suppliers. All IFQP activities fully comply with regulatory
requirements concerning airlines' provision of quality control and management oversight of airport fuelling
services.
The pool covers over 14, 000 aircraft which accounts for about 50% of the worldwide commercial active fleet ,
2,223 airports and 2,644 suppliers .
55 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
In the past year, IFQP welcomed 29 new member airlines, bringing the total membership to 224 in 2025. Of
these, 185 are active members, 15 are associated members, and 24 are passive members.
12.1 IFQP Inspections and Findings
With 204 qualified inspectors across various regions, IFQP conducted 1,147 inspections in 2025. These
inspections resulted in a total of 4,995 findings, averaging 5.1 findings per inspection. Africa 5%Asia Pacific 16%
Europe 57% Middle East 8%North
America 12%
Ce
ntr
al
&…MEMBERSHIP BY REGION050100150200250MEMBERSHIP GROWTH
56 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
The two graphs below illustrate the inspections performed per month as well as the r atio of f indings per
inspection by region .
12.2 Intoplane Fueling Filtration
The data from inspections conducted through 2025 demonstrate a continued and measurable decline in the
use of filter monitors across all vehicle types. This trend is accompanied by a steady increase in the adoption of alternative filtration technologies su ch a Filter Water Separator (FWS), Water Barrier Filtration (W BF) and Dirt
Defence Filtration (DDF) used in combination with Electronic Water Sensor.
The joint JIG/IATA/A4A filtration survey provided insight into the real world performance of these newer technologies. The survey outcomes covered by JIG Bulletin 160, indicated that EI qualified alternatives are performing reliably across a range of opera tional environments.
The graphs below illustrate the industry’s transition away from filter monitors and reinforce the readiness of
operators to adopt approved replacement technologies. 70839498111124
73MONTLHY INSPECTIONS
0500100015002000
Africa Asia Pacific Central & South
AmericaEurope Middle East North AmericaREGIONAL INSPECTIONS AND FINDINGS
Inspections Findings Ratio
57 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
12.3 Summary
The IFQP has proven to be a vital program for ensuring consistent fuel quality and safety across a global network
of over 2,000 airports. By allowing airlines to share fuel inspection reports, IFQP not only enhances safety but also reduces costs for both a irlines and fuel suppliers.
The IFQP's growth from 7 members to 2 24 highlights its expanding influence and importance, and continues to
strategically target growth in different regions of the globe.
. 5252,1253,145
28419784 140233
Hydrant carts Dispensers RefuellersVEHICLE FILTER OVERVIEW
FWS 1581/82 FM 1583 WBF 1588 DDF 1599
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500AfricaAsia PacificCentral & South AmericaEuropeMiddle EastNorth America
Africa Asia PacificCentral & South
AmericaEurope Middle East North America
FWS 1581/82 252 1464 406 1627 334 1712
FM 1583 8 2 31 7 0 1233
WBF 1588 29 157 42 41 0 188
DDF 1599 63 488 142 451 68 55VEHICLE FILTRATION BY REGION
58 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
13. Global Aviation Data Management (GADM)
GADM continues to be the most authoritative and comprehensive collection of global aviation operational data
in the world. GADM is uniquely positioned to provide accurate and actionable insights on industry safety,
security and operational issues due to its global coverage and membership footprint.
GADM boasts the highest number of processed flights, incident reports and maintenance cost data from a
global membership of over 340 participants. Membership across the different programs namely Incident Data
Exchange (IDX), Flight Data eXchange (FDX) and Maintenance Cost Data eXchange (MCX) stood
at 318, 223 and 50 respectively at the close of 2025.
In 2025, GADM produced several studies and analyses on different safety and operational topics ranging from
Human Factors, Tailstrike risks, Manual Flying, Inflight Engine Failures , Ground Service Equipment (GSE) related
incident etc These studies and ana lyses provide the industry with current insights on existing and emerging
areas of safety and operational concern enabling data -driven decision making and further strengthening of
industry measures.
Tail Strike Study
Safety Issue Hub SI-66: Aircraft Tailstrike
Over the past decade, runway safety has accounted for 52% of all aviation accidents, with tail strikes increasing
rapidly and becoming the most frequent accident type in 2024, according to the IATA Safety Report. Although the fatality risk is low, tail str ikes are a key priority for the IATA Safety Group.
To address this growing concern, IATA has proposed an action plan focused on data driven safety
improvements, best practice sharing, and proactive risk mitigation. A detailed analysis of GADM, IDX, and FDX
data (Jan 2022– Jun 2025) found tail strike occurre nces rising by about 26.5% annually and averaging 6 events
per million flights per month.
The ATR 72 and Boeing 737NG ( -800/ -900ER) were most frequently involved, accounting for 46% of events.
Most tail strikes occurred during landing (69% when including rejected landings). Asia Pacific recorded the highest number of events, with the U.S., Indi a, and Brazil among the most affected countries.
Contributing factors to tail strikes include bounced & firm landings, high pitch during landing, over -
rotation during takeoff, along with weather and operational conditions. Data from FDX revealed that 60% of
landing -related tail strike events involved acceleration above 1.6G, and 50% had fl are durations under 2
seconds. During take- off, 69% of events exceeded a pitch angle of 8°, and 31% showed pitch rates above
5°/s. with 25% of take -off events occurring below V2 speed.
These values are not strict operational limits or indicators of poor performance; they serve as reference points
that, often in combination with other contributing factors, can be monitored through flight data analysis to help
reduce the risk of tail strik es.
The study also highlighted monitoring gaps —especially around pitch and low -speed conditions during
landing —and emphasized the need to enhance FDM parameterization to better detect precursors and support
proactive mitigation of tail strike risks.
*Access to the complete study is available to current GADM participants via the IATA GADM Hub
59 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Human Factors Study
Safety Issue Hub SI-93 Fatigue
SI-87 Wellbeing
This study examined the prevalence and trends of human factors reporting within the IDX program between
2022 and 2024. It explained that the IDX framework depends on operators submitting safety reports tagged
with descriptors that describe the event, inclu ding who was involved, what occurred, when and why it
happened, and whether human factors elements were present.
According to the report, human factors reporting generally increased across the period, with the total number
of reports rising by 93% and the reporting rate growing by 58%. This trend was described as a positive
indicator of a maturing safety reporting culture globally and improved investigative depth among IDX
participants. However, it was noted that the rise was not uniform across categories: while areas such as fatigue,
norms, knowledge, and communication saw increases, categories including complacency, distraction,
pressure, and teamwork experienced declines.
The distribution of reports across human factors categories showed significant variation, partly due to some
categories being linked to multiple ISIT sub -descriptors. The highest volumes and rates of reporting
were observed in the fatigue, awareness, and c ommunications categories, which were influenced by
mandatory reporting requirements and the higher visibility of these types of events.
Communications, norms, and fatigue were the most commonly reported categories. Slightly over half of
participants reported at least one communication related event, while fewer than half reported in other
categories. Human factors reporting was dominated b y operators in Europe and North America, as well as by
legacy/network carriers —patterns attributed to the more mature safety reporting cultures and investigative
practices in these regions and sectors.
Additional descriptors submitted alongside human factors tags offered insight into the underlying causes and
operational contexts of these events. For example, complacency and knowledge related reports
were frequently associated with failures to follow pro cedures correctly, fatigue events were linked to
fitness for duty concerns, and distraction and pressure events were tied to task saturation
issues. Communication related events were often connected to judgment and decision- making errors.
IATA plans to explore enabling the ingestion of investigation findings and additional descriptors after an
event’s initial submission. Additionally, there are also plans to pursue development of a human factors AI model
to identify events with human factors elements that lacked corresponding descriptors.
Finally, although system improvements are underway, effective human factors reporting ultimately depends on
IDX participants. Operational staff, non- operational staff, and safety investigators must be trained, be
made aware, and empowered to report human factors issues and accurately tag them. Human factors are a
universal part of operations, applicable to all actors within complex systems, a key part of the hum an
experience, and can be a factor in the smallest near -miss to the most extreme accident outcom e.
*Access to the complete study is available to current GADM participants via the IATA GADM Hub
13.1 SafetyIS
In 2025, IATA successfully rolled out its flagship SafetyIS program to key industry partners, enabling them to
access and leverage critical safety and operational data.
60 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Recognizing the significant value that data collaboration brings to the aviation ecosystem, IATA remains
committed to extending these insights to additional stakeholders —such as Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs), Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), airports, and others —who seek to enhance safety and operational
performance at the organizational, state, or regional level.
More details on SafetyIS are available at www.iata.org/safetyis
13.2 MCX
The Maintenance Cost data eXchange (MCX) program is a unique global benchmarking platform that empowers
airlines to make smarter, data driven decisions on maintenance spending by securely comparing their costs
with industry peers.
In 2024, the average maintenance cost per flight hour was $1,522 with a 98.86% technical dispatch reliability.
The average fleet age was 10.6 years with average aircraft utilization of 9.06 hours per day.
To lear n more about how MCX supports the industry, visit www.iata.org/mcx and explore the excerpt from
the 2024 MCX Annual Report .
13.3 Artificial intelligence
Safety Issue Hub SI-85 Artificial Intelligence (including trustworthiness)
Over the past two years, the GADM team has built a comprehensive data platform designed to unify a wide
range of aviation data sources and enable more robust, evidence driven safety cases. A single data source
often reveals only part of the picture; however, by fusing multiple datasets, we can produce an unbiased,
trustworthy, and holistic view that tells a far more complete story.
To achieve this, we integrated data from FDX, IDX, MCX, Serious Incident Reports, airport configuration data, fleet and schedule information, weather sources, safety reports, turbulence and CO₂ datasets, as well as
partner data from organizations such as I CAO and EASA.
We have placed a strong emphasis on data quality enhancement and continuous monitoring. Data quality will
remain an ongoing priority, as higher -quality data enables clearer insights and more meaningful interpretation.
In parallel, we have implemented mechanisms to identify and quantify potential data bias, including bias scoring
at country, regional, contributor, and airport levels. This ensures that the aviation safety insights we deliver are balanced, transparent, and genuinely evidence led
Across both the FDX and IDX programs, we have implemented advanced analytics and AI capabilities to
enhance dashboards, enrich datasets, reduce errors, and classify information more effectively to generate
deeper insights. All AI and analytics capabilities have been designed and deployed with a strict focus on data
security and responsible, ethical use.
Within FDX, we introduced multiple layers of statistical controls and business rule -based quality checks to
further improve reliability and consistency. We also demonstrated the value of actionable insights through
multilevel outputs delivered to FDX users. These capabilities have been validated and are planned for broader
deployment in 2026.
IDX represented our most advanced use of AI in 2025. We implemented a layered AI architecture to enable
language detection and masking of sensitive information, automated tagging, mapping of reports based on the
IATA safety Incident taxonomy and report qua lity validation.
61 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
GADM applies advanced analytics and AI in a highly responsible, controlled manner. Our use of AI focuses on
generating insights, enhancing data enrichment, and improving the usability and impact of our dashboards. We have adopted a comprehensive Responsibl e AI framework covering both traditional and generative AI,
grounded in eight core principles and 32 subdomains, reviewed quarterly by GADM data experts.
The framework’s pillars include Fairness, Reliability and Safety, Privacy and Security, Inclusiveness, Transparency, Accountability, region -specific regulatory alignment, and a strong Human in the Loop model.
We strictly adhere to these principles to ensure human oversight across all AI-driven activities and outcomes.
13.4 Excellence Award
In 2025 GADM’s IDX (Incident Data Exchange) program was awarded both the Data and AI for Good – Hero
Organization Award and the Grand Prix Award for achieving the highest overall score at the DataiQ North
America summit.
The Data and AI for Good – Hero Organization Award recognizes programs and organizations that use data and
AI to deliver meaningful social impact and support non -profit or public -interest initiatives.
The Grand Prix Award represents the highest distinction, awarded to the best overall entry from more than 400
submissions across North America.
To learn more about the DataiQ Awards,
www.dataiq.global/articles/2025 -dataiq -awards -na-winners/
www.dataiq.global/award -winner/grand -prix -international -air-transport -association -iata/
14. Advocacy for Approved Aviation Infrastructure
IATA works with its member airlines and aviation industry stakeholders such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organis ation (CANSO), State regulators, and Air
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) to promote cost -effective Air Traffic Management (ATM) system which
simultaneously deliver required levels of safety, efficiency , and reduction of CO
2 emissions. This collaboration
supports the equitable and predictable use of airspace while ensuring that new airspace users are integrated in
a manner consistent with established aviation safety and performance objectives.
14.1 Rocket Launches and Space Transport Operations
Safety Issue Hub SI-84 Safe integration of spaceplanes into the aviation system
SI-188 Impact of space debris reentry in the atmosphere over civil aviation operations
The rapid growth of space transport operations has introduced new operational challenges to the globa ATM
system. The pace of rocket launches has markedly increased , resulting in significant disruptions of ATM in
some airspace segments. Unmanned High -altitude Platform Stations (HAPS) have also increased in number
and duration of flight , resulting in a need for civil aviation to account for their presence during flight planning
and day of operations tactical intervention.
As the launch and , in some cases, recovery of rockets and High Altitude Platform Systems ( HAPS) increases,
combined with the high uncertainty of debris trajectories during re -entry, the amount of airspace that needs to
be protected also increases, sometimes extending to thousands of square miles of oceanic and remote
airspace and, depending on the flight profile, hundreds of miles of continental or near -continental airways. The
62 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
creation of Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) and the issuance of NOTAMs are the instruments used by
ANSPs to establish and subsequently remove these airspace reservations, ensuring that stakeholders, including airlines, are informed and can plan accord ingly.
Global growth projections for air traffic and space transport operations are increasingly constrained by the lack
of effective information sharing, limited coordination and inefficient airspace allocation processes, all of which
must be addressed to ensure equitable access for all airspace users.
The lack of globally harmonized procedures results in ineffective measures against impacts on the ATM system
and calls for enhanced globally applicable guidance to facilitate the management of transport space and near-
space operations through controlled airspace. This involves defining global standards around the safety
performance requirements for space vehicles. IATA has led work in an ICAO panel to address this issue, and will
continue supporting the development of a global guidance material under the leadership of the ICAO
secretariat .
14.2 Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Radio
Frequency Interference (RFI)
Safety Issue Hub SI-43: GNSS Interference
GNSS provides primary position and timing information for most airline -operated aircraft. This information is a
key input to several on -board safety systems, such as Terrain Avoidance and Warning System (TAWS).
Additionally, GNSS information is a vital ref erence for other aircraft services such as Controller Pilot Data Link
Communications (CPDLC), Performance -based Navigation (PBN), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance -
Broadcast and Contract (ADS -B / ADS -C). Ensuring the effective protection of GNSS signals and timely
mitigation of harmful radio frequency interference (RFI) is necessary for maximizing flight safety.
IATA, in cooperation with other industry associations including the International Federation of Air Traffic
Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA), the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC), and the Airports Council International (ACI) continues to prioritize the mitigation of GNSS RFI at the highest level, including the presentation of working papers and meaningful contribution to the relevant resolution endorsed at the ICAO Assembly 42nd Session.
Additionally, the issue of harmful interference to GNSS has been reinforced by the United Nations (UN) Agencies, including the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) , which cosigned a joint statement to
protect GNSS from harmful interference.
IATA has developed and published a GNSS RFI Safety Risk Assessment (SRA), available here. Stakeholder
engagement and collaboration continue to be essential to ensure the effective implementation of the
referenced safety measures. IATA welcomes airline and industry feedback on the SRA.
14.3 Protection of Aircraft Radar Altimeters from Interference
Radar altimeters (RADALT), operating in the 4.2 -4.4 GHz band, are the only sensors on board civil aircraft that
provide a direct measurement of the clearance height of the aircraft above the surface beneath the aircraft keel. RADALT is also used by several other aircraft systems, particularly when aircraft are operating at and
below 2,500 feet above surface. The deployment of 5G telecommunications base stations has been identified as a safety- critical issue due to potential RFI with RADALT.
IATA, in collaboration with other industry associations, continues to prioritize the protection of the aeronautical frequency spectrum and ensure interference -free access, demonstrated through the presentation of working
papers and active contributions to the resolution endorsed at the ICAO Assembly 42nd Session.
63 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
Additional information about potential interference and IATA actions, as well as resources, can be found on the
IATA page: Aviation and 5G .
I-ASC provides:Is your safety culture improving? Do you have reliable KPIs to identify gaps and
measure progress? How does your safety culture compare with the rest of the industry?
With the IATA Aviation Safety Culture Survey (I-ASC), airlines can
accurately measure and benchmark safety culture, as recommended by ICAO Annex 19 and IOSA standards.
Whether you want to gain an initial understanding of your
safety culture or assess the impact of actions taken, I-ASC provides the data you need to drive continuous safety improvements across your organization.
Learn more at www.iata.org/i-ascActionable insights: Pinpoint areas for improvement using tailored performance
indicators.
Compliance support: Meet ICAO Annex 19 and SMS regulations effortlessly.
Improved safety awareness: Engage your team in strengthening safety practices.
Elevate your
airline's safety culture with I-ASC
Internal benchmarking: Measure safety culture across different departments to
identify strengths and gaps.
Global benchmarking: Compare your safety culture against industry peers andidentify where your organization stands.
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15. Regional Insight
15.1 Asia -Pacific Region (ASPAC)
In 2025, the ASPAC region safely managed a challenging operating environment through strong
collaboration and data- driven safety action s. Moving forward, the focus will remain on managing
emerging risks, strengthening safety culture, improving regional coordination, and leveraging safety
data with digital tools to support operational risk management and runway safety.
In 2025, the ASPAC region operated in a complex and evolving safety environment influenced by geopolitical developments
and operational disruptions. Increased conflict -zone activity in South Asia and the neighbouring Middle East led to periodic
and concentrated surges in air traffic demand within specific airspace volumes. Through sustained proactive safety
engagement, IATA worked closely with ICAO -ASPAC, State s, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), and airlines to
support effective demand –capacity balancing while maintaining/ enhancing safety levels. Applying performance- based
separation minima was key to keeping traffic flow safe, orderly, and efficient d uring these high- demand periods.
The region also experienced a notable increase in GNSS radio -frequency interference, elevating navigation risk. In
coordination with airlines and regulatory authorities, IATA supported the development of mitigation strategies, including the
promulgation of alternate routing options designed to minimise exposure to interference- affected areas, contributing to
reduced risk and continued operational resilience.
Throughout the year, ASPAC managed several major safety challenges, such as lithium -battery fire incidents, large height
deviation (LHD) occurrences, the AI- 171 accident, ATM flight -plan processing system failures in India and Australia,
volcanic activity with non -consistent VAAC (Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre) advisories, oceanic weather and turbulence
related non- coordinated deviations, and the management of danger areas associated with frequent rocket launches. These
diverse events reinforced the importance of coordina tion, preparedness, and alignment with global safety practices across
the region.
In response, IATA supported targeted safety enhancements. These included the development and dissemination of globally
harmonised Regional Safety Advisories (RSAs) through the ICAO Regional Aviation Safety Group (RASG) on lithium -battery
risks and large height deviation (LHD) prevention, including oversight of ATC; advoca ting for independent aircraft accident
investigation authorities; and drafting Emergency Response Plan (ERP) –SAR protocols to strengthen coordination with non-
aviation first responders. IAT A also supported airlines and ANSPs in enhancing contingency procedures during ATM
automation outages, advocated for improved consistency in VAAC advisories, facilitated ATC coordination for oceanic weather and turbulence management, and promoted more standardised approaches to managing rocket -launch danger
areas. Collectively, these actions enhanced situational awareness, operational consistency, and effective risk mitigation
across the region.
IATA ASPAC continued to work in partnership with member airlines, ICAO Regional Aviation Safety forums (RASG, RAST),
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), and ANSPs to ensure consistency, coordination, and timely follow -up on priority safety
issues. These col laborative efforts focused on harmonizing safety initiatives, sharing best practices, and addressing
emerging risks through data -driven approaches. By fostering strong engagement among stakeholders, IATA ASPAC
supported the implementation of global safety standards and the delivery of regional action plans, contributing to enhanced
operational resilience and improved safety performance across the Asia -Pacific region . IATA continued to work in
partnership with member airlines, ICAO Regional Aviation Safety forums (RASG, RAST), Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) , and
ANSPs to ensure consistency, coordination, and timely follow -up on priority safety issues.
Safety culture development remained at the core of regional safety efforts, supported by expanded engagement through the IATA Safety Leadership Program. Thirteen regional airlines signed the IATA Safety Leadership Charter during the year,
bringing the tota l number of signatories to 34 and reflecting a strong industry commitment to proactive safety management
and leadership principles .
66 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
In 2025, five new airlines from the region joined IATA Operational Safety Audit ( IOSA ) program, increasing the total to 71
IOSA -registered airlines. The IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) registry also expanded , with four new
station accreditations added, increasing the total number of ISAGO accreditations to 143 GHSP (Ground Handling Service
Providers) in the Asia Pacific region. The Global Aviation Data Management ( GADM ) program grew with eight new
participants, reinforcing the region’s consistent commitment to operational safety and data -driven risk management.
Engagement through the IATA Safety Connect platform and increased utilisation of the IATA Safety Issue Hub further
improved information sharing and coordinated safety action, supporting a resilient and collaborative safety ecosystem
across the region.
IATA closely worked with ICAO Asia Pacific and regional regulators to integrate IATA safety audit and data -sharing
programs (IOSA, ISAGO, and GADM -FDX/IDX) into the Asia Pacific Regional Safety Plan (2026 –2028), advocating alignment
within State National A viation Safety Plans (NASPs) and Safety Enhancement Programmes (SEPs). IATA contributed to ICAO
Regional Aviation Safety Team (RAST) meeting discussions through targeted papers on safety collaboration, safety culture
development, surveys, and management of turbulence -related risks in oceanic operations.
At the Asia Pacific DGCA Conference, IATA emphasised the importance of the timely publication of accident investigation
reports, highlighting ongoing delays and reinforcing the critical role of prompt safety learning in line with the ICAO Annex 13
timeline s. This advocacy was further strengthened at the ICAO Asia Pacific Accident Investigation Group (AIG) meeting,
which established a dedicated task force to address this issue and drive improvements in timely reporting .
15.2 The Americas Region (Latin America & the Caribbean
[LATAM/CAR] and North America [NAM])
The IATA Americas safety team continued its collaboration with the Regional Aviation
Safety Group -Pan America (RASG- PA) and its Pan American Regional Aviation Safety
Team (PA- RAST). Both FDX and ASIAS share aggregate, de- identified regional
information with PA -RAST to perform data -driven safety analysis at a regional level and
focus hemispheric safety initiatives on risk mitigation .
IATA actively participated in the 66th, 67th, 68th, and 69th meetings of the PA -RAST , contributing relevant data
that facilitated the identification of hot spots and potential risk. These insights informed the development and
implementation of an action plan aimed at mitigating high -risk categories , including Loss of Control In -Flight
(LOC -I), Mid -Air Collision (MAC), Runway Excursion (RE), Runway Incursion (RI), Large Height Deviation (LHD),
and Bird Strikes .
▪ TCAS -RA: Using FDX/IDX data , IATA conducted a safety risk analysis and presented findings to the
CAAs of Guatemala, Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia . The analysis identified TCAS RA hotspots within their
respective airspaces, along with the associated flight phases and contributing risk factors. These
insights support the implementation of risk -based operational mitigation strategies aimed at reducing
the likelihood of MAC within the State Safety Management framework .
▪ Bird Strikes: IATA shared an analysis with the CAAs of Panama, Chile, and Colombia on bird strike trends,
demonstrating that the frequency of events increases in correlation with seasonal bird migration periods. This analysis enables aeronautical authorities to implement targeted wildlife hazard mitigation measures at major airports, improving safety and operational efficiency.
▪ Large Height Deviation (LHD): IATA presented an analysis of LHD data identifying hotspot s within the
airspaces of Mexico and the United States. This analysis enables ANSPs, in coordination with
aeronautical authorities, to adopt collaborative, risk -based mitigation measures aimed at reducing the
occurrence of safety events .
▪ RI / RE: In the LATAM/CAR region, following the accident that occurred in Lima (Peru) in 2024, the trend of
RIs has decreased significantly. Nevertheless, IATA continues to monitor data recorded in the Global
Aviation Data Management (GADM) system to identify the potential occurrence of events at airports
within the region, enabling the timely implementation of risk mitigation barriers .
67 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
To reinforce IATA’s operational safety priorities and underscore the importance of proactive risk mitigation
through structured action plans that ensure the long -term sustainability of the aviation industry, IATA engaged
in the following forums:
▪ 1st Operational Safety Forum – Panama City (Panama): At this event, organized by the Panamanian CAA,
IATA highlighted the benefits to the State Safety Programme (SSP) resulting from the signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which recognizes IATA audits (IOSA, ISSA, and ISAGO) as
significant support and key contributors to the Authority’s safety oversight processes. Additionally, IATA
emphasized the importance of implementing effective action plans to mitigate bird strike risks at Tocumen Interna tional Airport .
▪ ALTA Aviation Safety, Flight Operations, and Training Summit – Mexico City (Mexico):
IATA presented a comprehensive regional safety analysis for LATAM/CAR based on GADM FDX/IDX
data . The session outlined key safety priorities, including promoting a strong reporting culture through
the IATA Safety Leadership Program, proactive risk identification and mitigation, the operational benefits
of IATA Connect, and insights from accident investigations—all aimed at supporting airlines, ANSPs, and
aviation authorities in enhancing safety performance and decision- making.
▪ 4th Operational Safety Seminar – AIRPLAN, Bogotá (Colombia):
IATA highlighted the industry’s role in fostering a strong operational safety culture, emphasizing the
strategic importance of implementing action plans and making informed, data- driven decisions based on
risk analysis and key stakeholder engagement. These initiatives enable authorities and operators in
enhancing safety outcomes and operational performance.
▪ GNSS loss signal MEX airport: As part of the Safety Management System (SMS) initiatives in the airlines ,
IATA, in coordination with SENEAM (the ANS provider), identified and mitigated the root cause of GNSS
signal loss in the approach areas to Benito Juárez Airport. This proactive action, facilitated through
Safety Management Reporting (SMR) processes, cont ributed to raising operational safety standards for
flight crews and air operators .
▪ RCG LATAM 58
th, 59th and NAT -NAM 38th: During the RCG meetings, at the request of its members, IATA
presented an analysis of TCAS- RA events at John F. Kennedy Airport in the United States. This analysis,
conducted through Safety Management Reporting (SMR) processes, addressed concerns following the
accident involving a military helicopter and a passenger aircraft during the descent and approach phase. The findings contribute to proactive risk identification and mitigation, in line with SMS principles, enhancing operational safety for all airspac e users.
Additionally, IATA reinforced the importance of embedding a strong reporting culture at the organizational level
as a key component of effective SMS. T hese efforts enable proactive Safety Risk Management (SRM) by
supporting hazard identification, risk assessment, and the timely implementation of mitigation measures by both organizations and authorities.
▪ Several airlines in the region have joined the IATA Safety Leadership program, reaffirming their commitment to fostering a just reporting culture that enables the proactive identification of operational safety threats. In addition, they shared best practices that serve as benchmarks to further strengthen the program.
▪ Airlines in the region actively participated in the IATA Safety Culture survey, which seeks to identify
opportunities to enhance the program in line with the industry's needs, thereby supporting operational
safety.
As part of its regional safety enhancement strategy, IATA has highlighted the importance of centralizing communication through the IATA Connect platform. The platform serves as a hub for operational and safety information and provides discussion forums tha t support the reporting and management of safety risks
through Safety Management System (SMS) and Safety Management Reporting (SMR) processes, thereby strengthening regional safety programs.
68 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
▪ Safety Issue Hub: In the region, IATA reported the identification of 113 safety issues across various
forums and international events, with approximately 34 were added in 2025. The efforts have resulted in the development of over 200 guidance documents, pr oviding valuable reference material for operators.
▪ IATA updated the CAAs of Brazil, Argentina, Panama, and El Salvador on the benefits of Risk -Based
Audits under the IOSA program. These audits enable a more targeted approach to identifying and mitigating risks, strengthening the States’ Safety Oversight Sy stems (SSP) and enhancing the efficiency
of human resource management for the CAAs.
In response to the military activities occurring in the Caribbean region and Venezuelan airspace, IATA
implemented measures to enable real -time monitoring of the operational situation, maintain close
communication with CAAs and ANS providers, and promptly disseminate aeronautical publications to members
through IATA Connect .
▪ The IATA Americas Safety team was integrated into ICAO’s Contingency Coordination Team (CCT) communication structure to address specific operational situations.
▪ The IATA Americas Safety Team actively contributed to the development of operational alerts issued by
PA- RAST, ensuring a strong focus on operational safety.
▪ Finally, in coordination with the ATM team, the Americas Safety Team proposed operational measures to maintain Caribbean’s connectivity, while ensuring operational safety, considering the reported GNSS signal losses in the region.
15.3 Europe Region (EUR) and Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)
Europe remains the region with the highest concentration of IATA (145) and IOSA (179)
member airlines. In close partnership with European airlines, regulators, and safety
stakeholders, IATA supported the evolution of safety across the region throughout 2025.
Guided by the three pillars of the IATA Safety Strategy —leadership, risk management, and
safety promotion —the year’s work focused on strengthening safety culture, addressing emerging operational
risks, and reinforcing a cooperative ecosystem with EASA, ICAO, Eurocontrol, and other stakeholders.
Together, these efforts contributed to maintaining Europe’s position as one of the safest and most resilient aviation regions worldwide.
A central area of progress was the continued expansion of the IATA Safety Leadership Charter. Throughout the
year, twenty -eight European airlines joined the growing community of signatories, representing more than a
third of IOSA operators in the region. T heir commitment reflects a shared ambition to embed safety into
business strategy, encourage transparent reporting, and deepen trust across all operational levels. The momentum behind this initiative continues to build a common language and understanding o f effective safety
leadership in Europe.
Collaboration between IATA and EASA remained a defining feature of 2025. With navigation
integrity emerging as a critical risk area, both organizations worked closely to address the rapid increase in
GNSS (GPS) interference across Europe and surrounding re gions. Experts from IATA, EASA, and the broader
aviation community came together to develop a coordinated plan structured around improved reporting and monitoring, strengthened prevention and mitigation measures, enhanced airspace and infrastructure
resilience, and more effective interagency cooperation. This joint effort also advanced discussions with ICAO
to ensure these measures can be adopted and harmonized globally, reflecting the collective recognition that
navigation resilience is now a shared strate gic priority.
Beyond GNSS interference concerns, IATA supported the industry in tackling Europe’s key operational safety
risks. Work continued on runway incursion and excursion prevention, tail- strike reduction, turbulence -
encounter mitigation, and wildlife -hazard manag ement. These efforts were complemented by a series of
69 IATA Annual Safety Report - 2025 Unrestricted
workshops, technical exchanges, and thematic initiatives that supported the evolution of safety management
practices.
Throughout the year, IATA collaborated with partners on subjects such as the responsible use of artificial
intelligence in safety management, advancements in modern training methodologies, including computer -
based and evidence- based training, RPAS integrat ion, safety intelligence, and improvements to accident
investigation processes. Work also progressed with the ICAO Language Proficiency Task Force to better
understand and address language -related safety issues, supported by analyses and survey material pr epared
for regional discussion.
IATA’s engagement extended across the wider EUR/NAT region, including contributions to ICAO’s European
Aviation System Planning Group (EASPG) and ongoing support to the European Regional Aviation Safety Plan.
As a Co- Chair of the EASPG Regional Expert Safety Group, IATA helped guide updates to the plan and
contributed to the review of its implementation survey, ensuring operator perspectives and data were reflected in regional priorities.
Activities also continued in Central Asia, where IATA supported local safety initiatives and regional coordination of efforts, reinforcing the importance of consistent safety outcomes beyond the borders of the
European Union. Expanding the use of IATA safety programs and tools, including IOSA, ISAGO, Global Aviation
Data Management (GADM), Safety Issue Hub and promotion of positive safety culture and global sharing of
best practices through active participation in industry events and IATA Connect platform are important steps in
enhancing safety in the area.
Throughout 2025, collaboration with ICAO and EASA continued to strengthen the region’s safety
framework. ICAO set the global standards, EASA ensured their implementation and oversight within Europe,
and IATA supported airlines in aligning with those expect ations through operational standards, data programs,
and implementation guidance. This relationship —built on shared responsibilities and continuous dialogue—
ensures that European aviation remains robust, future -focused, and prepared for emerging challenges.
Looking ahead, IATA will continue working closely with regulatory partners, national authorities, and member airlines across the region. The focus for the coming year includes further strengthening GNSS resilience,
advancing data -driven safety intelligence, and deepening organizational safety leadership. Together, these
efforts will help ensure that Europe not only maintains its strong safety performance but continues to set a
global benchmark for aviation safety excellence.
15.4 Africa & The Middle East (Middle East and North Africa
[MENA] and Africa [AFI])
The Africa and Middle East (AME) Region continues to face disruption s to aviation caused
by geopolitical tensions and security -related events. These challenges have necessitated
the development of contingency routes through restricted airspaces to ensure safe and continuous operations taking, as seen with the contingency routes in Sudan / South
Sudan.
The annual IATA Safety Report is one of the sources of information used to produce the annual MID and AFI
Safety Reports, which guide regional initiatives toward addressing high -risk areas. Both Regional Aviation
Safety Groups (RASGs) continue to develop Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) pertinent to the high- risk
areas and actively monitor their implementation progress.
Reducing fatality risk and improving safety in the AME region remain a top priority in addressing the regions’ challenges. In AFI, these challenges include airfield management; failure to remove disabled aircraft; inadequate publication of aeronautical inf ormation; ineffective w ildlife hazard management; insufficient Rescue
and Firefighting Services (RFFS) , and poor infrastructure conditions.
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Air/Ground Communications deficiencies, encompassing both fixed and mobile aviation communication
systems, remain a major concern in AFI. The current area of applicability for the IATA In- Flight Broadcast
Procedure (IFBP), which includes 12 States, is bei ng expanded to include Ethiopia following several reports of
poor VHF communication. In addition, u nlawful interference on Mogadishu Area Control Centre (ACC)
frequency poses a concern to airlines, requiring concerted efforts by all stakeholders to resolve.
The IATA regional team continues to work closely with the two Regional Monitoring Agencies (RMA’s) for Africa and the Middle East Regions, providing aggregate Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisories
(TCAS RAs) data above FL 290 to support operational risk assessment.
The MID RMA transition regional plan for Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS -B) based aircraft
height monitoring, initiated in 2024, has achieved major progress. Bahrain and Oman CAAs have provided data
supporting height monitoring for approx imately 5000 aircraft. However, implementation challenges remain,
particularly regarding national regulators' approvals for ADS -B data submission. Data collection from the MID
states is expected by Q3 2026.
Large Height Deviations (LHD) events persist in AFI & MENA regions. Inconsistent LHD reporting from several
states, particularly those with high traffic volumes, undermines confidence in Safety Monitoring Report (SMR)
results. Conversely, a significant inc rease in LHD reports has been observed at the Eastern Boundaries of
Muscat FIR in the Arabian Sea.
GNSS interference has been identified as a safety concern and remains the main challenge hindering the
implementation and use of Performance -based Navigation (PBN) in the Region. Although only a few reports
have been recorded within the AFI Region , IATA continues to monitor the situation closely.
IATA AME is working closely with all relevant stakeholders to ensure effective reporting of GNSS interferences
and to develop mitigation measures that reduce its impact. GPS signal loss events increased dramatically in the
first half of 2025 compared to 2024.
In addition, IATA AME continues to promote the adoption of IOSA and ISAGO among airlines and Ground Service Providers (GSPs) in AFI & MENA regions. States across the region are regularly encouraged to enter into formal agreements recognizing and utilizing IATA’s audit programs to complement their safety oversight
activities. In 2025, AME successfully signed the revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with three
States (Egypt, Oman and Nigeria) , acknowledging these programs as an acceptable means to complement their
oversight obligations.
The team also remains an active and significant contributor to the ICAO Regional Aviation Safety Groups in
Africa (RASG– AFI) and the Middle East (RASG –MID), ensuring strong representation to drive the interests of
IATA’s members operating within the region.
Key advocacy engagements were conducted to address poor Annex 13 compliance in the AFI and MENA regions. A Working Paper highlighting the urgency for States to meet ICAO Annex 13 requirements was submitted at ICAO AFI Safety Management & Oversight Subgroup (SMO/SG), recommending that States
expedite the implementation of RASG -AFI/9 Conclusion 9/09. To support this, a dedicated Project Team was
established.
One of the main challenges faced by States in the AME region is the implementation of State Safety Program (SSP). To date, only a few countries have achieved Level 4 in SSP implementation.
As part of the focus initiative, a Collaborative Aviation Safety Improvement Program (CASIP) was established to
improve aviation safety and reduce the accident and serious incident rate across Africa. Together with the
CASIP partners will prioritize the most pressing safety concerns and secure resources to address them. The
IATA Safety Issue Revi ew Meeting (SIRM) Africa, held in Kigali in December 2024, and related workstreams
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identified several critical operational safety deficiencies. These deficiencies are being addressed through
initiatives like the IATA Focus Africa program and the CASIP. For the 2026 work program , the partners agreed
to:
▪ Reduce SIRM meeting frequency to one event per year instead of two meetings to allow sufficient time to address recommendations emanating from the SIRM meeting;
▪ Organize a safety data workshop;
▪ Conduct a workshop on Runway Excursion / Runway Incursion;
▪ Address ground operations risk management and apply strategies to reduce ground incidents in AFI;
▪ Use platforms such as Focus Africa, AFI week and CAA forums to report progress and promote activities.
15.5 North Asia Region (NASIA)
The IATA NASIA regional safety team continues to implement the IATA Safety Strategy and
its core pillars, which are Safety Leadership, Safety Risk, and Safety Connect in the region.
The following are the main achievements highlighted in 2025:
29 airlines, representing 5 9% of the member airlines in the NASIA Region , have signed the Safety Leadership
Charter, demonstrating their executives’ commitment to the continuous advancement of safety culture within
their organizations.
The IATA WSOC 2025, which was hosted by Xiamen airlines, was held in China Mailand for the first time. The
event brought together more than 850 participants from around the world. A total of 35 speakers from NASIA Member Airlines and stakeholders contributed their insights to the conference. Notably, several major local
industry partners such as Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), China Aviation Supplies (CAS), Nav China, China Southern Airlines, etc. sponsored and supported the conf erence. The event concluded
inspiring closing speech, including Chief Scientist and Designer of C919.
To improve the sharing of the global operational information , such as airspace interruption, severe weather and
volcanic ash, etc. with the NASIA member airlines, IATA Beijing Office established a local working mechanism
composed of major member airlines in the region. Its first meeting was held in March 2025, where participants
discussed global operational challenges and emphasized the importance of dynamic information sharing and
the support from IATA.
In August 2025, the IATA Beijing O ffice hosted an in- person meeting to address regional high- risk categories
and safety issues. The session brought together more than 60 participants from 31 member airlines, along with
Boeing, COMAC and Civil Aviation University of China (CAUC) . During the meeting. Participants reviewed the
issues listed in the IATA Safety Issue Hub and provided feedback to IATA headquarters. CAUC presented
participants with its analysis of the final accident report from the past decade (2015 -2024) , focusing on Tail -
strike and Runway Excursion events, which were well received.
To address the Pilot – Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO) Communication issues, IATA cooperated with Air
Traffic Management Bureau (ATMB) of CAAC to organize the 2025 ATMB & IATA Workshop, held on Nov 25 -27
in Xi’an, China. The event brought together a tot al of 103 participants from 9 CAA/ANSPs, 20 airlines
and 7 international organizations and institutes for in- person discussions. The workshop focused on air/ground
communication proficiency, ATCO training programs, and key operational challenges in the reg ion, including
callsign confusion, Global Navigation Satellite System Radio Frequency Interference (GNSS RFI), ATFM,
airspace disruption and NOTAMs, and the use of operational performance data. Furthermore, several working papers were submitted and discussed at ICAO meetings in APAC region, reinforcing the importance of
collaboration on these critical issues.
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The first IATA Ground Operations Day – NASIA, which was held in October in Beijing, attracted more
than 120 delegates from CAAC, IATA Member Airlines, airports, ground handling service providers, DCS
service providers and research institutes. The event introduced key safety -related topics, including ground
operations safety data analysis, as well as IATA IDX and IGOM mapping.
In addition, the IATA Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) program achieved significant progress in the
North Asia Region. 7 member airlines agreed to join, with 4 completed contract signings, bringing the total number of NASIA airlines to 25.
The IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) program has continued to make steady progress in the region. To date, the number of ISAGO member airlines reached 42, representing nearly 60% of the region’s
IATA member airlines. Additionally, a total of 22 ground handling service providers (GHSPs) has completed
ISAGO headquarters registration, and 26 ISAGO station certifications have been achieved within the region. Moreover, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on ground operation safety have been signed with two
additional airport authorities, bringing the total to 7. This milestone highlights a strong commitment to
partnering with all industry stakeholders and the continuous enhancement of ground operations safety
standards.
Another safety -related project – Dangerous Goods Trust Community (DGTC) went live on November 27, 2025,
providing a valuable reference for local stakeholders, like freight forwarders, airlines and ground handling
agents, to establish their own credibility system for the safe tr ansport of dangerous goods. In 2025, a total of
55 freight forwarders, 17 airlines, and 3 ground handling agents joined the DGTC. As part of the project, IATA
battery -related guidance materials were translated, and a gap analysis was conducted with CAAC lithium
battery -related regulations. The translated materials will be published in the DGTC, and the gap analysis report
will be submitted to the Dangerous Goods Centre of CAAC.
In 2025, IATA Beijing Office continued to make significant efforts to reduce the language barrier for member
airlines and other stakeholders, enabling better compliance with IATA’s safety related standards. These efforts
covered key areas, such as operational safety, ground handling safety and cabin safety.
▪ The IOSA Standards Manual (ISM) Ed.17 was translated into Chinese language and officially launched in
Q1 2025, supporting airlines in better understanding and compliance with the international standards.
Additionally, the IOSA cross -reference list against CAAC regulations was completed by the regional
team and recognized by CAAC and industry stakeholders.
▪ The IGOM (Ed.14) Translation & Gap Analysis Project is nearing completion, aimed at advocating CAAC’s recognition of IATA ground operations standards. The gap analysis report was reviewed and endorsed
by the industry experts and CAAC officials in the Project Completion Meeting.
▪ To further support the NASIA member airlines in promoting Cabin Safety and Operations, the IATA Beijing Office, in collaboration with CAUC, translated the IATA Cabin Operations Best Practices Guide
(Edition10) from English to Chinese.
In addition, NASIA actively participated in surveys organized by IATA HQ. A series of Tail Strike survey were
promoted among member airlines in the region, and feedback was collected and consolidated with
contributions from other regions.
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